

The Seinfeld Aptitude Test: An Analysis Under Substantial Similarity and the Fair Use Defense

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INTRODUCTION

Although Jerry, Elaine, George, and Kramer¹ no longer appear on prime time airwaves, we can watch repeats of the popular *Seinfeld* series in syndication.² However, we cannot test our knowledge of the events in the television series through a particular trivia book. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared that a book

¹ See *Seinfeld* (NBC television broadcast, 1989-1998). The four principal characters in the *Seinfeld* television series are Jerry Seinfeld, Elaine Benes, George Costanza, and Cosmo Kramer. See *id.*

² See *id.* The series ran on television for nine years until May 1998. See *id.* However, television stations continue to run repeats on a daily basis. See *Seinfeld* (FOX television broadcast, 1999) (broadcasting *Seinfeld* episodes six days per week).

called *The Seinfeld Aptitude Test* ("The SAT") infringed upon the copyright owner's rights in the series.³

In August 1998, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that *The SAT* copied enough material from *Seinfeld* to quantitatively and qualitatively amount to copyright infringement in *Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.*⁴ The court held that *The SAT* did not constitute a fair use of the *Seinfeld* television series⁵ because it infringed on protected expression.⁶

Beth Golub, the writer of *The SAT*, acknowledged that she took content from the series in order to write the book.⁷ However, mere copying does not rise to the level of infringement.⁸ Copyright law requires a showing of improper or unlawful appropriation in addition to a showing that the work was actually copied.⁹

This Note examines whether the court correctly determined that *The SAT* constitutes unlawful or improper copying, and if so, whether the court should have applied the fair use defense. Part I provides a synopsis of copyright law, and the tests used for analyzing whether copyright infringement occurred. Part II presents the facts of *Castle Rock Entertainment* and the court's rationale. Part III argues that the *Castle Rock Entertainment* decision is incorrect for two reasons. First, the court used a quantitative/qualitative analysis to find substantial similarity and dismissed other, more appropriate

³ See *Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group*, 150 F.3d 132, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that copying was unlawful or improper under quantitative/qualitative approach to determine substantial similarity).

⁴ See *id.*

⁵ See *id.* at 141-46 (applying four fair use factors). The court applied the four factors, namely the purpose/character of use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of work used, and the effect of use on the plaintiff's market. See *id.* The court concluded that the fair use defense did not apply to *The SAT*. See *id.* at 146.

⁶ See *id.* at 138-39 (analyzing substantial similarity under quantitative/qualitative approach to conclude that *The SAT* copied from *Seinfeld*'s protected expression).

⁷ See *id.* at 137 (explaining that Golub admitted directly copying from *Seinfeld* to create *The SAT* along with explanation of how she copied).

⁸ See *id.* (providing overview of elements required for copyright infringement action); *Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that plaintiff must establish, among other things, that she owned copyright and that defendant copied original elements of her work).

⁹ See *Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc.*, 166 F.3d 65, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1999) (listing elements required for copyright infringement); *Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc.*, 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that after showing that defendant actually copied plaintiff's work, plaintiff must show that copying amounts to improper or unlawful appropriation).

tests too readily.¹⁰ Second, even if the court found copyright infringement, the fair use doctrine provided a viable defense to the copyright infringement claim at issue.¹¹

I. COPYRIGHT LAW

Copyright is a property right in an original work of authorship that gives the holder the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, and display the work.¹² Copyright is a statutory doctrine, expressly authorized by Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution.¹³ This Clause grants authors and inventors exclusive rights in their writings and discoveries for the purpose of advancing science and useful arts.¹⁴ Pursuant to this constitutional right, the first Congress enacted the original Copyright Act in 1790.¹⁵ Copyright law continued to evolve as Congress enacted several statutory amendments over time.¹⁶ Congress enacted the current version of the Copyright Act in 1976.¹⁷

¹⁰ Compare *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 138-41 (dismissing ordinary observer test, total concept and feel test, nonliteral similarity test, and fragmented literal similarity test), with *Williams v. Crichton*, 84 F.3d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying total concept and feel test to analyze substantial similarity), and *Arnstein v. Porter*, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (utilizing ordinary observer test to determine substantial similarity).

¹¹ Compare *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 140-44 (denying fair use defense), with *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 577-93 (1994) (granting fair use defense to rap group's parody of plaintiff's song), and *New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group*, 904 F.2d 152, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that quotations from copyrighted works were fair use).

¹² See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994); *Agee v. Paramount Communications, Inc.*, 59 F.3d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1995); *Respect Inc. v. Fremgen*, 897 F. Supp. 361, 364 (N.D. Ill. 1995); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 336 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "copyright").

¹³ See U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (stating expressly, "To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").

¹⁴ See *id.*; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (defining rights given to authors).

¹⁵ See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1831); H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 2-3 (1976); A. A. GOLDMAN, GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1957) (providing history of copyright law).

¹⁶ See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976); Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (repealed 1909); Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. at 124.; Jessica Litman, *Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History*, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860-61 (1987) (discussing legislative history of copyright law). Congress enacted the first copyright law in 1790. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. at 124. Congress enacted constitutional revisions in 1831 and 1909. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. at 1075; Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. at 436. In 1976, Congress enacted the current version of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. To decide copyright infringement cases, nineteenth-century courts broke copyright infringement down into three elements: independent creation, misappropriation, and fair use. See *Daly v. Palmer*, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552); *Greene v. Bishop*, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1333-34 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763); *Emerson v. Davies*, 8 F. Cas. 615, 618-19 (C.C.D. Mass.

The Copyright Act fulfills its constitutional purpose of promoting the progress of arts and sciences by allowing authors to copyright their work.¹⁸ Copyright law fosters creativity by assuring authors that the law protects their expression from improper or unlawful use by others.¹⁹ However, in addition to benefiting authors by giving them exclusive control over their works, copyright law must serve the broader needs of society.²⁰ Society's advancement in the arts and sciences requires the use of novel ideas generated by individuals.²¹ Therefore, a balance must exist between granting authors monopolistic rights over their creations and al-

1845) (No. 4,436); *Folsom v. Marsh*, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Amy B. Cohen, *Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaningless of Substantial Similarity*, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719, 724-25 (1987) (discussing how nineteenth-century courts decided copyright infringement cases). Courts reviewed the similarity between the original and the alleged copy to analyze the three elements of independent creation, misappropriation, and fair use. See *Daly*, 6 F. Cas. at 1138; *Greene*, 10 F. Cas. at 1333-34; *Emerson*, 8 F. Cas. at 618-19; *Folsom*, 9 F. Cas. at 344-45.

¹⁷ See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (embodying current version of Copyright Act); Litman, *supra* note 16, at 857-58 (stating that 1976 Act is essentially same as 1909 Act, although it does make provision for technological changes that have occurred since 1909). The 1976 Act has been criticized as being too complicated and unclear. See *id.* at 860. In fact, legislative history indicates that instead of being drafted by members of Congress, the 1976 Act is a result of negotiations between authors, publishers, and others with economic interests in copyrights. See *id.* This mix of drafters coupled with their own self interests may have caused the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the Act. See *id.*

¹⁸ See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (defining rights given to authors); *Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (stating that copyright assures authors rights to their original expression); *Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (noting that "rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors"). See generally MAGRETH BARRETT, *INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS* 351 (1995) (discussing copyright as monopoly).

¹⁹ See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing statutory framework of authors rights regarding their creations); Jessica Litman, *Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image*, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 600 (1997) (noting definitional distinction between copyright law and Copyright Act). For purposes of this Note, "Copyright Act" refers to the Copyright Act of 1976, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, and "copyright law" refers to statutory and case law. Both the terms "Copyright Act" and "copyright law" are used in this Note because case law has played and continues to play an important role in developing copyright law, for example, by formulating tests used to evaluate substantial similarity. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (providing statutory framework of copyright law, but not mentioning term "substantial similarity"), with *Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 22 F.3d 1527, 1530 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that courts "retain authority to monitor limits the outer limits of substantial similarity"), and *Warner Bros. v. ABC*, 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that although jury may make factual determinations, courts monitor substantial similarity).

²⁰ See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing authors with five exclusive statutory rights). Authors have the right to reproduce their copyrighted works, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, perform their work publicly and display their work publicly. See *id.*

²¹ See BARRETT, *supra* note 18, at 352 (discussing rights of authors compared to public's interest in having access to copyrighted works).

lowing the public to use the creations to some degree.²² To reach this balance, copyright law precludes others from using the author's particular form of expression, but permits others to use ideas or information provided in the author's work.²³

A case illustrating this dichotomy between idea and expression is *Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service*.²⁴ In *Feist*, a publishing company compiled an area-wide telephone directory by copying information from Rural's single-county directory.²⁵ The United States Supreme Court held that this copying was not unlawful or improper and did not constitute copyright infringement.²⁶ The Court reasoned that the work must owe its originality to the author to qualify for copyright protection.²⁷ Because Rural had not created the factual information listed in the telephone directory, it could not claim originality to that information.²⁸ The Court distinguished between ideas and facts, on the one hand, and expression, on the other hand, noting that copyright law protects only expression.²⁹ The Court explained that copyright protection does not extend to names, telephone numbers and towns because they are

²² See *id.* (stating that while primary purpose of copyright law is creation and dissemination of intellectual works for public welfare, secondary purpose is to reward authors for their contribution to society); WILLIAM F. PATRY, *LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW* 104 (6th ed. 1986) (explaining that authors' exclusive rights over their works contrast public's interest in having works available); see also *Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv.*, 99 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that the interest in encouraging creation of new works must be balanced against the public's interest in using those works).

²³ See *Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv.*, 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (stating that copyright law protects only author's original expression); *Baker v. Selden*, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that blank account books showing method of bookkeeping were not copyrightable because method was idea, not expression); BARRETT, *supra* note 18, at 422 (stating that fundamental principal of copyright law is that copyright does not protect ideas but does protect expression of ideas).

²⁴ See *Feist*, 499 U.S. at 340.

²⁵ See *id.* at 342-43.

²⁶ See *id.* at 360-64 (holding that copying was not lawful or improper because defendant did not copy anything that was "original" to plaintiff).

²⁷ See *id.* Throughout the Court's analysis, it emphasized that the work must have originated with the author to warrant copyright protection. See *id.* at 345-48. Because Rural did not create the listings within the telephone directory, the listings were not protected. See *id.* at 361. The Court stated that even if the plaintiff was the first to publish the names, towns, and telephone numbers in its directories, the information did not owe its originality to plaintiff, and was, thus, uncopyrightable. See *id.*

²⁸ See *id.* at 362-64 (classifying names, telephone numbers, and towns as "ideas and information" that copyright law does not protect).

²⁹ See *id.* at 349-50 (stating that copyright protects author's expression but encourages public to use ideas and information provided in author's work).

purely factual in nature.³⁰ The Court held that while copyright law protects the arrangement of directories that evince originality, Rural's directory showed no originality, since it was arranged alphabetically.³¹ Thus, for copyright infringement to occur, the alleged infringer must have copied the author's expression.³²

A. Copyright Infringement

The Copyright Act grants copyright owners exclusive rights over reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display of their work.³³ A copyright owner can bring an infringement action under the Copyright Act if the alleged infringer encroaches upon any fundamental rights provided in the Act.³⁴ However, the Copyright Act fails to adequately define what constitutes copyright infringement. Accordingly, courts have developed several tests to determine if infringement occurred.³⁵

In general, courts find copyright infringement when the owner of a valid copyright demonstrates unauthorized copying of protected expression.³⁶ Courts impose the burden of proof on the party alleging infringement.³⁷ The plaintiff must prove that he or

³⁰ See *id.* at 362 (stating that listing names, telephone numbers, and towns in alphabetical order lacks creativity).

³¹ See *id.* at 362-63 (stating that although unique arrangements requiring originality are protected under copyright law, plaintiff's arrangement was unoriginal).

³² See *id.* at 360-64 (holding that expression requires degree of originality).

³³ See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1994).

³⁴ See *id.*

³⁵ See *Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.*, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (developing *Krofft* test which consists of extrinsic test and intrinsic test to determine substantial similarity); *Roth Greetings Cards v. United Card Co.*, 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (developing total concept and feel test to determine substantial similarity); Amy B. Cohen, *Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments*, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 196 (1990) (stating that courts enunciate their own standards as to what constitutes infringement due to lack of definition by Congress).

³⁶ See *Feist*, 499 U.S. at 361; *Repp v. Webber*, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997); see also *Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc.*, 964 F.2d 131, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing elements of copyright infringement).

³⁷ See *Johnson v. Jones*, 149 F.3d 494, 506-07 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that plaintiff bore burden of establishing defendant's gross revenue from infringing plaintiff's drawings); *The Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Assocs., Inc.*, 119 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 1997) (requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant copied plaintiff's text book); *Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc.*, 768 F.2d 481, 483 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating that plaintiff bore burden of proving that defendant copied plaintiff's works of Mystic English); *PATRY*, *supra* note 22, at 191 (stating that copyright owner bears initial burden of proving prima facie case of infringement).

she owns the subject matter of the copyright.³⁸ If the plaintiff meets this burden, the courts apply a two-part test to analyze the alleged infringement.³⁹ First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant actually copied the work.⁴⁰ Second, the plaintiff must establish that the copying was unlawful or improper.⁴¹

1. Work Must Actually Be Copied

The plaintiff can show that the defendant copied the work by either direct or indirect evidence.⁴² Direct evidence of copying occurs when an individual admits copying.⁴³ Indirect evidence occurs when the defendant has access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work.⁴⁴ Because direct evidence of actual copying is rare, plaintiffs commonly use indirect evidence of copying to prove actual copying.⁴⁵

For example, in *Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications International*,⁴⁶ in the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiff used indirect evidence to establish infringement.⁴⁷ The copyright owner of the television series *Twin Peaks* brought an infringement claim against the writer and publisher of a book about the series.⁴⁸ The book covered areas such as the show's popularity, the characters and actors who played the roles, the plots of eight episodes, and trivia

³⁸ See *Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc.*, 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 1999) (confirming that plaintiff must prove ownership to succeed in infringement action).

³⁹ See *Laureyssens*, 964 F.2d at 140 (stating that plaintiff must satisfy two-part test to establish that infringement occurred).

⁴⁰ See *Repp*, 132 F.3d at 889 (stating that substantial similarity need only be shown after plaintiff establishes actual copying); *Laureyssens*, 964 F.2d at 139-40 (summarizing two-part test).

⁴¹ See *Laureyssens*, 964 F.2d at 140; *Arnstein v. Porter*, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (discussing improper appropriation as issue for trier of fact to decide).

⁴² See *Folio Impressions v. Byer California*, 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991). The court stated that because direct evidence of copying is rarely found, a court can infer that copying occurred. See *id.* For the courts to make this inference, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant accessed the plaintiff's copyrighted work and that both works are substantially similar. See *id.*; *Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer*, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing evidence of copying in both direct and indirect terms).

⁴³ See *Fasa Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc.*, 912 F. Supp. 1124, 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (giving example of direct evidence of copying). An example of direct evidence of copying is a witness observing the defendant copying. See *id.* at 1168.

⁴⁴ See *Laureyssens*, 964 F.2d at 140 (describing ways actual copying can be established by indirect evidence); *Arica*, 970 F.2d at 1072 (discussing evidence of copying in indirect terms).

⁴⁵ See *Laureyssens*, 964 F.2d at 140 (circumstantial evidence in form of access along with substantial similarity is more commonly used as indirect evidence of copying).

⁴⁶ See *Twin Peaks Prods. Inc. v. Publications Int'l*, 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).

⁴⁷ See *id.* at 1372 (using access to plaintiff's work to prove actual copying).

⁴⁸ See *id.* at 1371.

questions.⁴⁹ In deciding whether the defendant actually copied the work, the court considered the defendant's access to the broadcasted programs.⁵⁰ Thus, the court used indirect evidence of copying to determine that infringement occurred. Direct evidence, such as an individual witnessing the defendant physically copying, was unavailable.⁵¹ Therefore, either direct or indirect evidence suffices to prove the required element of copying. In addition to showing that the copying occurred by direct or indirect methods, the plaintiff must establish that the copying was unlawful or improper.

2. Copying Must Be Unlawful or Improper Under the Substantial Similarity Standard

To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant actually copied the original work and that the copying was unlawful and improper.⁵² Even if evidence of copying exists, a court may still deem the copying lawful and find for the defendant if the material copied is not protected by copyright.⁵³ For example, in *Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*⁵⁴ the court found lawful copying, ruling for the defendant even though the defendant admitted copying.⁵⁵ In *Hoehling*, the defendant wrote and published a book about the destruction of the Hindenberg airship entitled *The Hindenburg*.⁵⁶ The defendant acknowledged

⁴⁹ See *id.* at 1370-71.

⁵⁰ See *id.* at 1372 (noting that defendant's access plus similarity to plaintiff's copyrighted work is sufficient for infringement).

⁵¹ See *id.* at 1372-73 (discussing defendant's access to plaintiff's work combined with substantial similarity to override defendant's claim of no direct evidence of access).

⁵² See *Repp v. Webber*, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) (establishing elements of copyright infringement). In *Twin Peaks*, the court found unlawful copying when an author copied episodes of the *Twin Peaks* television series in narrative detail. See 996 F.2d at 1375. The defendant's 128-page book included a 46-page narrative description of the show's plots. See *id.* at 1372-73. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found literal similarity, nonliteral similarity and infringement of the plaintiff's right to make derivative works. See *id.* at 1372.

⁵³ See *Baker v. Selden*, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that blank account books showing method of bookkeeping were not copyrightable because they constituted idea, not expression); see also *BARRETT*, *supra* note 18, at 414 (noting that copying news stories, factual narratives, and biographies is lawful); COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT OF 1976 12 (Commerce Clearing House, Inc. ed., 1976) (stating that ideas, procedures, systems, and processes cannot be protected because they are ideas, not expression).

⁵⁴ See *Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).

⁵⁵ See *id.* at 975, 979-80.

⁵⁶ See *id.* at 975 (explaining that defendant wrote his book 10 years after publication of plaintiff's book).

consulting the plaintiff's book on the same topic for details.⁵⁷ Although the defendant admitted using information contained within the plaintiff's book to write his own book, the Second Circuit deemed the copying lawful.⁵⁸ The court explained that the factual information that the defendant copied was in the public domain.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the court stressed the practical importance of saving time by referring to another's work for historical facts, rather than duplicating the research.⁶⁰ As the *Hoehling* ruling indicates, copying must be unlawful or improper to prevail on a copyright infringement claim.⁶¹

The most common way to establish that the copying is unlawful or improper is to show that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work.⁶² Because substantial similarity is such an elusive term, courts have developed different approaches to analyze the concept.⁶³ Courts generally choose an

⁵⁷ See *id.* at 976 (discussing that in addition to consulting plaintiff's book, especially for its sabotage theory, defendant researched national archives and other sources).

⁵⁸ See *id.* at 978-80 (explaining that defendant copied historical facts which belong to public, not to author).

⁵⁹ See *id.* at 979.

⁶⁰ See *id.* (discussing policy reasons for placing factual works within public domain). The court emphasized that if factual works were not within the public's usage, this would deter authors from writing about historical events. See *id.* at 978.

⁶¹ See *id.* at 979-80 (emphasizing that not all copying constitutes infringement, especially copying historical works).

⁶² See *Repp v. Webber*, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing ways to establish unlawful or improper copying in absence of direct copying); *Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc.*, 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992) (establishing that once plaintiff proves actual copying, next step is to show substantial similarity between two works).

⁶³ See, e.g., *Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.*, 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (developing *Krofft* test which consists of extrinsic test and intrinsic test to determine substantial similarity); *Roth Greetings Cards v. United Card Co.*, 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (developing total concept and feel test to determine substantial similarity); Jeannette Rene Busek, *Copyright Infringement: A Proposal for a New Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible Expressive Variation*, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1777, 1787-91 (1998) (discussing pattern test, abstractions test, and total concept and feel test); Jeffrey D. Coulter, *Computers, Copyright and Substantial Similarity: The Test Reconsidered*, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. J. 47, 54-56 (1995) (discussing *Krofft* test as applied to computer programs); Laura G. Lape, *The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to Earth*, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181, 190-92 (1994) (discussing common tests courts use for substantial similarity and discrediting them); Cohen, *supra* note 16, at 747-57 (discussing *Salked* approach and *Krofft* approach to find substantial similarity). The issue of what amounts to substantial similarity has been called one of the most difficult questions in copyright law. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(a) (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. In fact, some commentators advocate a change in this standard. See, e.g., Cohen, *supra* note 16, at 758 (advocating and describing new approach that distinguishes idea and expression, and utilizes objective test to determine substantial similarity). Critics focus on the lack of clarity for the amount of simi-

approach that suits the specific facts of each case.⁶⁴ Furthermore, courts frequently apply more than one approach to support their determination of substantial similarity.⁶⁵ This Note focuses on five common approaches: (1) the qualitative/quantitative analysis; (2) the ordinary observer test; (3) the total concept and feel test; (4) the fragmented literal similarity test; and (5) the nonliteral similarity test.

First, the qualitative/quantitative analysis considers the amount and nature of the work copied.⁶⁶ To satisfy the qualitative component, the alleged infringer must have copied the plaintiff's expression.⁶⁷ On the other hand, the quantitative component deals with how much the alleged infringer exactly copied from the original copyrighted work.⁶⁸ To establish substantial similarity, the amount of work copied must be above a *de minimis* threshold.⁶⁹ Therefore, copyright law does not condemn trivial copying.⁷⁰ Because of its generalistic nature, courts do not usually apply the quantitative/qualitative analysis as the sole basis for determining substantial similarity. If courts decide to use the quantitative/qualitative ap-

ilarity required to be "substantial," the failure to separate "copying" from misappropriation and an inadequate dealing with the idea/expression dichotomy. See, e.g., *id.* (describing problems associated with term "substantial similarity" as used in copyright infringement cases).

⁶⁴ See, e.g., *Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1985) (applying fragmented literal similarity test because plaintiff alleged literal copying); *Williams v. Crichton*, 84 F.3d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying total concept and feel test because plaintiff's allegedly infringed work was children's book with simple plot line).

⁶⁵ See *Knitwaves v. Lollytogs*, 71 F.3d 996, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1995) (using both ordinary observer test and total concept and feel test to analyze similarity between sweaters); *Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc.*, 18 F.3d 502, 509-11 (using both ordinary observer test and total concept and feel test to analyze similarity between soft sculptured animal heads and tails on duffel bags); *Tree Publ'g Co. v. Warner Bros. Records*, 785 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) (using both quantitative/qualitative analysis and fragmented literal similarity test to analyze similarity between songs).

⁶⁶ See *Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television*, 126 F.3d 70, 74-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing quantitative/qualitative approach).

⁶⁷ See *Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv.*, 499 U.S. 340, 360-64 (1991) (holding that originality requires degree of expression); NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, *supra* note 63, at § 13.03(a)(1) (discussing qualitative component).

⁶⁸ See NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, *supra* note 63, at § 13.03(a)(2) (discussing quantitative component).

⁶⁹ See *Ringgold*, 126 F.3d at 75. The *de minimis* standard comes from the legal maxim "*de minimis non curat lex*" meaning "the law does not concern itself with trifles." See *id.* at 74. Therefore, the quantitative component permits a minimal degree of copying. See *id.*

⁷⁰ See *id.*

proach, they usually use it in conjunction with another test to determine substantial similarity.⁷¹

The Second Circuit found infringement based on the quantitative/qualitative analysis in *Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc.*⁷² In *Ringgold*, the creator of the *Church Picnic Quilt Story* painting brought a copyright infringement action against a television producer for using a poster of the painting as a set decoration for a program.⁷³ Qualitatively, the court found that because the plaintiff had created the painting, the poster used in the set consisted of protected expression.⁷⁴ Quantitatively, the court found that nine shots of the poster, totaling twenty-six seconds of television time, exceeded the de minimis threshold.⁷⁵ Thus, the quantitative/qualitative analysis focuses on the amount and nature of the defendant's use of the plaintiff's copyrighted work.⁷⁶

Courts also employ the ordinary observer test to determine whether two works are substantially similar.⁷⁷ The essential inquiry

⁷¹ See, e.g., *Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc.*, 166 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1999) (using quantitative/qualitative analysis and ordinary observer test to analyze similarity between news articles); *Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co.*, 827 F.2d 569, 570 n.1, 572 (9th Cir. 1987) (using quantitative/qualitative analysis and total concept and feel test to determine substantial similarity between encyclopedias and trivia game); *Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. ABC*, 900 F. Supp. 1287, 1299-1300 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (using quantitative/qualitative analysis and total concept and feel test to determine substantial similarity between television advertisement character and James Bond character).

⁷² See *Ringgold*, 126 F.3d at 74-77 (analyzing substantial similarity under quantitative/qualitative approach).

⁷³ See *id.* at 72-73 (describing poster of painting and how it was positioned in defendant's television program).

⁷⁴ See *id.* at 77 (stating that painting was recognizable in television program with detail viewable to average observer).

⁷⁵ See *id.* at 76 (describing observability of poster during television program, including camera angles and airtime).

⁷⁶ See *id.* at 74-76 (explaining how courts use this approach). Courts apply a de minimis approach to determine if more than a trivial amount was copied. See *id.* at 76-77; *Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp.*, 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998). Courts then inquire into the quality of the copying, in other words, what exactly has been copied and how it has been copied. See *Ringgold*, 126 F.3d at 75-77 (describing qualitative element of copying to determine substantial similarity, and evaluating whether expressive elements of plaintiff's work were copied).

⁷⁷ See *Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.* 376 U.S. 234, 235 (1964) (using ordinary observer test to determine substantial similarity between patented reflectors); *Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc.*, 905 F.2d 731, 734-36 (4th Cir. 1990) (describing ordinary observer test). The *Dawson* court pointed out that the ordinary observer test should be narrowed to consider the audience for whom the work was created. See 905 F.2d at 734. If the intended audience was the general public, then courts should use the ordinary observer test in its broadest form, with the jury making the determination. See *id.* However, if the defendant targets the work at a narrower audience, then the court should ascertain whether a member of that audience would find the two works to be substantially similar. See *id.* To determine

is whether a lay observer would believe that the defendant's allegedly infringing work originated from the plaintiff's copyrighted work.⁷⁸ The ordinary observer test protects the copyright owner's market position by guarding against consumer confusion between the original work and the alleged copy.⁷⁹ Therefore, application of this test is most appropriate where the danger of guarding against consumer confusion exists as to source.⁸⁰

The Second Circuit applied the ordinary observer test in *Arnstein v. Porter*.⁸¹ In *Arnstein*, the plaintiff composer alleged that the defendant unlawfully copied several of his musical compositions.⁸² The court examined whether lay listeners would find that the defendant wrongfully appropriated the plaintiff's work.⁸³ The court remanded the case to the district court along with instructions that the court play the plaintiff's and defendant's musical compositions to the jury as lay listeners.⁸⁴ The court employed the ordinary observer test because a danger existed that consumers would believe that the two works originated from the same composer. On remand, the jury did not find substantial similarity between the plaintiff's and defendant's compositions.⁸⁵ Thus, under the ordinary observer test in *Arnstein*, ordinary listeners decided the issue of infringement.⁸⁶

whether a member of that audience would find the two books substantially similar, testimony from people within the intended audience should be given at trial. *See id.*

⁷⁸ *See* *Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.*, 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (discussing whether ordinary observers would believe that defendant's dresses originated from plaintiff). The *Peter Pan* court stated, "the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same." *Id.* Many other courts applying the ordinary observer test quote this statement from *Peter Pan* to determine an ordinary observer's reactions. *See, e.g.,* *Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs*, 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995); *Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer*, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1992); *Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc.*, 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992).

⁷⁹ *See* Douglas Y'Barbo, *The Heart of The Matter: The Property Conferred by Copyright*, 49 MERCER L. REV. 643, 647 (1998) (describing ordinary observer test). The goal of the ordinary observer test is to provide consumers with an accurate account of originality. *See id.* With this knowledge, the public can make more informed decisions about particular works. *See id.*

⁸⁰ *See id.* (describing goal of ordinary observer test is to eliminate consumer confusion).

⁸¹ *See* *Arnstein v. Porter*, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (phrasing ordinary observer test in terms of "lay listeners").

⁸² *See id.* at 467 (documenting plaintiff's allegations).

⁸³ *See id.* at 473.

⁸⁴ *See id.* (instructing district court how to apply ordinary observer test).

⁸⁵ *See* *Arnstein v. Porter*, 158 F.2d 795, 795 (2d Cir. 1946) (dismissing complaint, thereby finding no substantial similarity).

⁸⁶ *See id.* The jurors who were deemed lay listeners dismissed the complaint. *See id.*

Another case exemplifying the ordinary observer test is *Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.*⁸⁷ In *Peter Pan*, both the plaintiff and defendant manufactured textiles with similar prints.⁸⁸ Although slight differences existed between the prints, the court found that the ordinary observer would overlook these differences and consider their aesthetic appeal identical.⁸⁹ Thus, the court found copyright infringement.⁹⁰

In 1970, the Ninth Circuit formulated a third test, the total concept and feel test, which other circuits have embraced.⁹¹ Courts apply this test when a plaintiff alleges that the defendant copied the overall combination of elements provided in the plaintiff's work, thereby copying the work in its totality.⁹² For example, the Second Circuit used the total concept and feel test to conclude that no infringement occurred in *Williams v. Crichton*.⁹³ In *Williams*, the plaintiff, author and copyright owner of children's stories called *Dinosaur World*,⁹⁴ claimed that the defendants' novel and movie *Jurassic Park* infringed upon the plaintiff's work.⁹⁵ After comparing the themes, plots, pace, characters, and settings of the two works, the court found that they differed substantially.⁹⁶ The court observed that the theme of *Jurassic Park* was a horror story, whereas the *Dinosaur World* books were adventure stories.⁹⁷ The

⁸⁷ See *Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.*, 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).

⁸⁸ See *id.* at 488 (describing how plaintiff and defendant produced similar Byzantium prints).

⁸⁹ See *id.* at 489 (describing how ordinary observer would not be able to detect subtle differences in either plaintiff's or defendant's prints upon general examination of their respective dresses).

⁹⁰ See *id.* at 490.

⁹¹ See *Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.*, 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (formulating total concept and feel test to analyze substantial similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's greetings cards). Other circuits now also use this test. See, e.g., *Towler v. Sayles*, 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying total concept and feel test to analyze substantial similarity between screen plays); *Williams v. Crichton*, 84 F.3d 581, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1996) (using total concept and feel test to analyze substantial similarity between children's books and movie); *Cartier v. Jackson*, 59 F.3d 1046, 1049 (10th Cir. 1995) (using total concept and feel test to analyze similarities between songs).

⁹² See *Towler*, 76 F.3d at 580 (stating plaintiff's allegation that defendant copied overall elements in plaintiff's screen plays); *Williams*, 84 F.3d at 582 (stating plaintiff's allegation that defendant copied overall elements in plaintiff's books).

⁹³ See *Williams*, 84 F.3d at 589-90.

⁹⁴ See *id.* at 582 (plaintiff created four fictional works for children entitled *Dinosaur World*, *Lost in Dinosaur World*, *Explorers in Dinosaur World*, and *Saber Tooth*).

⁹⁵ See *id.*

⁹⁶ See *id.* at 588-89 (applying total concept and feel test to determine that plaintiff's and defendant's works did not invoke same type of feelings).

⁹⁷ See *id.* (discussing plaintiff's and defendant's works in terms of theme).

court also found that the sets amounted to ideas and thus were not protected.⁹⁸ Finally, the court distinguished the plots and pace between the two works because the *Dinosaur World* stories transpired within a day, and the *Jurassic Park* story occurred over a longer time period.⁹⁹

Courts also apply a fourth approach, the nonliteral similarity test, when the alleged infringer takes an abstract of the copyright owner's work instead of copying specific elements.¹⁰⁰ The nonliteral similarity test differs from the total concept and feel test in that the total concept and feel test is more generalized, with courts analyzing the totality of two works to find similarities. The total concept and feel test permits rather than compels courts to evaluate factors such as organization, themes, settings, plots and characters to determine whether the two works invoke the same type of feelings.¹⁰¹

The nonliteral similarity test is useful when the plaintiff specifically alleges that the defendant copied aspects of his or her work such as themes, plots, settings, and characters.¹⁰² Although the *Williams* court analyzed the similarities between theme, plots, settings and characters, the overall inquiry compared the totality of concept and feel between *Jurassic Park* and the *Dinosaur World* books.

⁹⁸ See *id.* (concluding that settings constitute "scenes a faire," which law does not protect). Scenes a faire are settings which are standard in a given situation. See *Atari v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs.*, 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (providing definition of "scenes a faire"). To illustrate, works about the life of policemen on duty would likely include drunkards, cars, and prostitutes. See *Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc.*, 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). Therefore, similarities based on these issues are unprotectable as scenes a faire. See *id.*

⁹⁹ See *Williams*, 84 F.3d at 589-90 (distinguishing time frame that plaintiff's and defendant's works covered).

¹⁰⁰ See NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, *supra* note 63, at § 13.03 (explaining nonliteral similarity test); Adaline Hilgard, *Can Choreography and Copyright Waltz Together in the Wake of Horgan v. McMillan, Inc.*?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 757, 789 (1994) (stating that issue in nonliteral similarity case is whether defendant has appropriated ideas or expression).

¹⁰¹ See *Shaw v. Lindheim*, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (illustrating nonliteral similarity). In *Shaw*, the writer of a pilot script entitled "The Equalizer," brought a copyright infringement action against the writers of a television series also entitled "The Equalizer." See *id.* at 1355 (describing events leading up to filing of suit). The plaintiff alleged nonliteral similarity for appropriating nonliteral elements of expression from the pilot script such as theme, mood, pace, characters, and plot. See *id.* at 1357-58. Both works shared the same character, the plots of the two works shared many common events, and both shows occurred in large cities. See *id.* at 1362-63. For these reasons, the court found infringement based on nonliteral similarity. See *id.* at 1363; see also BARRETT, *supra* note 18, at 483 (summarizing *Shaw v. Lindheim* in terms of nonliteral similarity).

¹⁰² See NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, *supra* note 63, at § 13.03 (explaining that themes, plots, settings, and characters are nonliteral elements).

The plaintiff in *Williams* did not specifically allege that *Jurassic Park* copied the *Dinosaur World* books' theme, characters, plots, or settings. Instead, the plaintiff generally alleged that *Jurassic Park* copied the *Dinosaur World* books.¹⁰³ In contrast, courts apply the nonliteral similarity test when the plaintiff alleges, for example, that the defendant copied the plaintiff's main character.¹⁰⁴ The court then analyzes the similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's main character.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, the nonliteral similarity test focuses on similarities of specific elements between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work.

Finally, courts apply the fragmented literal similarity test when the alleged infringer copies the copyright owner's work precisely.¹⁰⁶ For example, if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant engaged in verbatim copying or copied quotes, the courts would apply the fragmented literal similarity test to determine substantial similarity.¹⁰⁷ When applying this test, courts must determine whether the defendant appropriated enough of the plaintiff's work to constitute copyright infringement.¹⁰⁸ Courts decide this issue on a case by case basis.¹⁰⁹

For instance, in *Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises*, the United States Supreme Court held that literally copying 0.25%

¹⁰³ See *Williams*, 84 F.3d at 582 (stating plaintiff's allegation that defendant copied overall elements in plaintiff's books).

¹⁰⁴ See *Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp.*, 20 F.3d 454, 456, 456 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994) (alleging nonliteral similarity between plaintiff's character, Hakim, and defendant's character, Prince Akeem, in movie *Coming to America*); *Shaw*, 919 F.2d at 1357-58 (alleging nonliteral similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's main character, the Equalizer).

¹⁰⁵ See *Beal*, 20 F.3d at 456 n.1, 462 (analyzing similarity between plaintiff's character Hakim, and defendant's character, Prince Hakim); *Shaw*, 919 F.2d at 1357-58 (analyzing nonliteral similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's main character, the Equalizer).

¹⁰⁶ See NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, *supra* note 63, at § 13.03(a)(2).

¹⁰⁷ See *Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1985) (using fragmented literal similarity test because plaintiff alleged verbatim copying); *Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g Group*, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (using fragmented literal similarity test because plaintiff alleged that defendant copied quotes from *Star Trek* television series).

¹⁰⁸ See *supra* text accompanying notes 67-76 (discussing quantitative element of infringement under quantitative/qualitative approach).

¹⁰⁹ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 564 (stating that copying approximately 0.25% of plaintiff's work (between 300 and 400 words from 200,000 word manuscript) sufficed to constitute infringement because material copied constituted "heart" of plaintiff's work); *New Era Publications, Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc.*, 904 F.2d 152, 158 (1990) (stating that copying 6% is not enough to constitute infringement); *Salinger v. Random House, Inc.*, 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that copying 10% is enough to constitute infringement).

of President Ford's memoirs amounted to infringement.¹¹⁰ The Court reasoned that the copied description of why President Ford pardoned President Nixon constituted the "heart" of the memoirs.¹¹¹ Courts consider the amount of work copied and whether that portion is important in the overall context of the copyrighted work.¹¹² Thus, courts have considerable discretion in applying this test.¹¹³

Courts usually choose which test to use based on the circumstances of the case.¹¹⁴ However, even if a court finds that the plaintiff has satisfied one of these tests, the defendant can assert the fair use defense to avoid liability.

B. *The Fair Use Defense*

The Copyright Act provides a fair use defense to a copyright infringement claim.¹¹⁵ This defense allows copyright law to achieve a balance between encouraging creativity and providing the public with the knowledge, use and enjoyment of the author's work.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 568, 579 (explaining that defendant copied between 300 and 400 words from 200,000 word manuscript).

¹¹¹ See *id.* at 564, 568 (explaining court's rationale for why literally copying 0.25% of copyrighted work was sufficient to constitute copyright infringement).

¹¹² See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 564-65 (stating that material copied by defendant comprised heart of plaintiff's work); *New Era*, 904 F.2d at 158-59 (stating that defendant did not copy key portions of plaintiff's work).

¹¹³ See *Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc.*, 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1421 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that amount and substantiality of copying does not turn on mechanical measurement of percentage of copied material).

¹¹⁴ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 544-45 (applying fragmented literal similarity test because plaintiff alleged verbatim copying); *Williams v. Crichton*, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996) (using total concept and feel test because plaintiff alleged that defendant copied totality of plaintiff's elements); *Arnstein v. Porter*, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (using ordinary observer test because danger existed of confusing source of plaintiff's and defendant's works); MICHAEL EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ch. 5 (1)(c) (2d ed. 1984-1992) (stating that no bright line rules exist to determine copying, which therefore must be determined on ad hoc basis); Lape, *supra* note 63, at 191-92 (explaining that courts usually choose one or more of standard tests to help them determine whether infringement had occurred).

¹¹⁵ See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).

¹¹⁶ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 551 (stating that fair use requires balancing of equities between availability to potential user and copyright owner's right); Pierre N. Leval, *Toward a Fair Use Standard*, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109-10 (1990) (stating that fair use must stimulate productive thought in public domain without excessively diminishing incentives for creativity).

The fair use defense recognizes that dissemination of knowledge benefits society.¹¹⁷

The Copyright Act sets forth four factors a court must consider in deciding whether the fair use defense applies.¹¹⁸ The first factor considers the purpose and character of the use.¹¹⁹ The second factor deals with the nature of the copyrighted work.¹²⁰ The third factor concerns the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.¹²¹ Finally, the fourth factor considers the effect of the use upon the potential market for the copyrighted work.¹²² The Copyright Act does not specify how courts should weigh these factors.¹²³ Generally, courts apply the four factors on a case by case basis.¹²⁴

For the first factor, courts evaluate the purpose and character of use to ascertain whether the use of the plaintiff's work furthers or frustrates the goals of copyright law.¹²⁵ If a court finds that the de-

¹¹⁷ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 546 (noting that potential users of copyrighted work benefit from availability of author's work); Willajeanne F. McLean, *All's Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use Defense After Rogers v. Koons*, 59 BROOK L. REV. 373, 375-76 (1993) (equating fair use defense to equitable remedy that gives society a privilege to use the copyrighted work).

¹¹⁸ See 17 U.S.C. § 107.

¹¹⁹ See *id.* § 107(1).

¹²⁰ See *id.* § 107(2).

¹²¹ See *id.* § 107(3).

¹²² See *id.* § 107(4).

¹²³ See *id.* § 107. There is no language suggesting how to apply the factors, or how much weight should be accorded to each factor. See *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that Congress intended that courts continue common-law tradition of weighing fair use factors).

¹²⁴ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 577 (stating that application of bright line rules in fair use analysis is unhelpful). For example, in *New Era Publications, Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc.*, 904 F.2d 152, 155-60 (1990), the defendant wrote and published an unfavorable biography of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology. See *id.* at 153-54. New Era was the exclusive licensee of Hubbard's works. See *id.* at 154. The court held that although the defendant copied some of Hubbard's works, each of the four fair use factors weighed in the defendant's favor. See *id.* at 160. Regarding the first factor, the defendant's purpose in using the plaintiff's works was to show that the Church of Scientology was a dangerous cult. See *id.* at 156. The court held that this was a legitimate purpose for enriching the defendant's biography. See *id.* The second factor favored the defendant because Hubbard's writings were factual rather than fictional. See *id.* at 157-58. The third factor, amount and substantiality also weighed in the defendant's favor because the defendant used a small amount of the plaintiff's work, which did not constitute the "heart" of the works. See *id.* at 158-59. Finally, the court held that a critical unauthorized biography serves a different function than an authorized biography, thereby not affecting the plaintiff's market. See *id.* at 159-60. Therefore, defendant's use of the works fell within the fair use defense. See *id.* at 160.

¹²⁵ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (concluding that purpose of defendant's use of plaintiff's work was parody, which furthers goals of copyright law); *Sony Corp. of America v.*

fendant's use benefits society in some way, this factor favors a finding of fair use.¹²⁶ In the past, commercial uses weighed against fair use whereas nonprofit uses favored fair use.¹²⁷ Today, this distinction has lost most of its force because courts recognize that commercial gain results from most uses of copyrighted works.¹²⁸

The first factor also considers whether the second work transforms the original. Transformation occurs by taking another's work and adding value in some way to that work.¹²⁹ The more alterations made to the original piece, the higher the transformative value of the final work. Courts usually apply the fair use defense when the second work has high transformative value.¹³⁰

In evaluating the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, courts consider whether the original work was fictional or factual.¹³¹ Courts apply the fair use defense to factual works because copyright law does not protect facts, which belong in the public domain.¹³² On the other hand, courts are reluctant to

Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that defendant's purpose of selling copying equipment allowing public to copy television programs onto video cassette furthered goals of copyright law); *Sundeman v. The Seajay Soc'y*, 142 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that defendant's scholarly use of plaintiff's work furthered goals of copyright law); Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1111 (discussing first statutory factor).

¹²⁶ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that parody benefits society and thereby finding fair use); *Sony*, 464 U.S. at 421 (holding that video recorders benefit society by allowing public to record programs and watch them at their own convenience); BARRETT, *supra* note 18, at 354 (suggesting that in case of conflict between author's rights and public rights, public must prevail).

¹²⁷ See Mary L. Shapiro, *An Analysis of the Fair Use Defense in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin*, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 11 (discussing evolution of significance of commercial gain in first fair use factor).

¹²⁸ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 584 (stating that nearly all uses are conducted for commercial profit); *San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee*, 483 U.S. 522, 541 n.19 (1987) (stating that monetary gain should not dictate analysis of first fair use factor).

¹²⁹ See, Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1111 (emphasizing importance of transformative value in determining first fair use factor).

¹³⁰ See, e.g., *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that rap group's version of plaintiff's song had high transformative value and, thus, warranted application of fair use defense); *Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc.*, 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding defendant's abstracts of plaintiff's financial, business, and industry news were not transformative and, thus, fair use defense not applied).

¹³¹ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586 (stating that fair use defense is more difficult to establish when fictional works are copied); *Stewart v. Abend*, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (stating that fair use defense is more applicable to factual works than fictional works); Shapiro, *supra* note 127, at 13 (explaining that courts will more likely find fair use with factual works because they involve less creativity than fictional works).

¹³² See *Hoehling v. Universal City Studios*, 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing protectability of historical factual works).

grant the fair use defense for copying fictional works because the work owes its originality to an author.¹³³

As its name suggests, the third factor of amount and substantiality acknowledges the volume of copied work.¹³⁴ Recently, the United States Supreme Court stated that courts should inquire into whether the extent of copying was more than necessary to further the purpose and character of the use.¹³⁵ In general, a high volume of copied work negates the fair use defense.¹³⁶ However, even a small portion of copied work nullifies the defense if the copied work comprises the heart of the work.¹³⁷

Finally, in evaluating the effect on the market factor, courts consider whether the defendant's work will compete in the same market as the plaintiff's work.¹³⁸ If the two will compete in the same market, courts strongly disfavor the defense.¹³⁹ The United States Supreme Court described this factor as the most influential factor in the fair use analysis.¹⁴⁰ However, the holding of a recent case suggests that the other statutory factors may be given equal weight.¹⁴¹ *Castle Rock Entertainment* involved a copyright infringe-

¹³³ See *Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (involving copying from factual works). The fact that the defendant copied plaintiff's copyrighted factual work was a significant factor in denying the application of the fair use defense. See *id.*

¹³⁴ See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994); *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 564-66 (stating that amount and substantiality factor considers amount of expression taken in relation to copyrighted work as whole); Shapiro, *supra* note 127, at 13 (explaining how courts analyze amount of work copied).

¹³⁵ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586-87 (discussing whether defendant's parody of plaintiff's song took more than required from plaintiff's lyrics).

¹³⁶ See *id.* at 579 (stating that if new work is highly transformative, other factors are less significant); Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1112 (finding correlation between volume of copied work and likelihood of finding infringement).

¹³⁷ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 565 (holding that small amount of work copied sufficed for copyright infringement). In *Harper*, the court held that although the defendant took only 300-400 words from the plaintiff's 200,000 word manuscript, the portion of work taken constituted the "heart" of the matter. See *id.* This was sufficient for copyright infringement. See *id.*

¹³⁸ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 578 (stating that defendant's rap version of plaintiff's song did not adversely affect plaintiff's market); *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 566-67 (finding that defendant's news article would compete directly in plaintiff's market); Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1123; Shapiro *supra* note 127, at 15-16 (discussing fourth statutory factor).

¹³⁹ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 566-67 (finding that defendant's news article would compete directly in plaintiff's market, thereby finding no fair use); Shapiro, *supra* note 127, at 15-16.

¹⁴⁰ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 566 (stating that last factor is most important element of fair use).

¹⁴¹ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 578 (stating that all statutory factors are to be explored and results weighed together in determining copyright infringement). Although these four factors are specifically enumerated by statute, Congress did not intend them to be a conclusive end to the determination of fair use. See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 560 (stating that four statu-

ment action of a highly successful television series and the fair use defense.

II. *THE SEINFELD APTITUDE TEST: INFRINGEMENT OR NOT? — THE COURT’S ANALYSIS IN CASTLE ROCK ENTERTAINMENT V. CAROL PUBLISHING GROUP*

Castle Rock Entertainment (“Castle Rock”) produces and owns the copyright in the *Seinfeld* television series.¹⁴² The series ran on television for nine years,¹⁴³ with an estimated thirty million viewers watching each episode.¹⁴⁴ The series, famous for being a show about “nothing,”¹⁴⁵ chronicled the daily adventures of Jerry Seinfeld and his three friends.

Beth Golub, the writer of *The SAT*, is a lawyer.¹⁴⁶ She created *The SAT* by taking notes while watching televised and videotaped episodes.¹⁴⁷ A 132-page book filled with 643 trivia questions and answers resulted from the notes.¹⁴⁸ Golub organized the questions on a multiple-choice basis, although she also presented matching and

tory fair use factors are not exclusive in determination on fair use defense). Thus, courts can and often do consider other factors in the analysis. See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that if second work is highly transformative, this reduces significance of other factors, such as commercialism); *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417, 449 n.32 (1984) (stating that commercial or nonprofit characteristics should be weighed along with other factors); *New Era Publications Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Group*, 904 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing additional factors); Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1125-30 (discussing existence of additional factors).

¹⁴² See *Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ’g Group*, 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that Castle Rock owns copyright of each episode of *Seinfeld* television series).

¹⁴³ See *Seinfeld* (NBC television broadcast, 1998). The last episode aired in May 1998. See *id.*

¹⁴⁴ See Aaron Barnhart, *Haven’t We Heard This Conversation Before?* (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <<http://www.echonyc.com/barnhart/seinfeld2.tex>> (on file with author) (stating that *Seinfeld* regularly attracts 30 million viewers). The show won the number one spot in the Nielson Media Ratings for three consecutive years from 1995-1998. See *id.* 76 million viewers watched the final episode, although NBC estimated that 105 million viewers watched at least some part of it. See David Bauder, *Seinfeld Ratings Points to 76 Million Viewers* (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <<http://www.detnews.com/1998.accent/9805/16/05160148.htm>> (on file with author).

¹⁴⁵ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 135-36 (describing how series revolved around Jerry Seinfeld and his three friends in New York City).

¹⁴⁶ See *Trivia Book Based on TV Show Infringes Copyright, Does Not Constitute Fair Use*, 6 Mealey’s Litig. Rep. Intell. Prop. No. 21, at 4 (Aug. 3, 1998) (explaining facts and outcome of case).

¹⁴⁷ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 136.

¹⁴⁸ See *id.* at 135.

short answer questions.¹⁴⁹ In the multiple-choice section, Golub embedded the correct answer in either three or four wrong answers that she created.¹⁵⁰ Golub further divided the questions into five levels of difficulty named after anecdotes from the show.¹⁵¹

Eighty-six *Seinfeld* episodes aired prior to the publication of the book.¹⁵² *The SAT* asked questions on eighty-four of those episodes.¹⁵³ Every question concerned an event from one of the episodes.¹⁵⁴ The name "Seinfeld" was present on the front and back cover of the book.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, Carol Publishing Group ("Carol Publishing") placed a disclaimer on the back cover stating that the producers of *Seinfeld* did not approve or license the book.¹⁵⁶ Golub described *The SAT* as a book which was "devoted to the trifling, picayune and petty annoyances encountered by the show's characters on a daily basis."¹⁵⁷

The SAT enjoyed a good reception amongst the television community.¹⁵⁸ The National Broadcasting Corporation, which broadcasted *Seinfeld*, requested free copies to distribute along with other promotions of the show.¹⁵⁹ Furthermore, the executive producer of *Seinfeld* described *The SAT* as a "fun little book."¹⁶⁰ No evidence existed to suggest that *The SAT* harmed *Seinfeld* in any way.¹⁶¹ On the contrary, after publication of *The SAT*, *Seinfeld*'s audience increased.¹⁶²

Castle Rock brought this action in federal district court against Golub, as writer of the book, and Carol Publishing Group, as publisher.¹⁶³ Both parties moved for summary judgment.¹⁶⁴ The district

¹⁴⁹ *See id.*

¹⁵⁰ *See id.* at 135-36.

¹⁵¹ *See id.* at 135 (stating that Golub grouped questions in increasing order of difficulty). The five groups of questions are called "Wuss Questions," "This, That, and Other Questions," "Tough Monkey Questions," "Atomic Wedgie Questions," and "Master of Your Domain Questions." *See id.*

¹⁵² *See id.* at 135-36.

¹⁵³ *See id.* at 135.

¹⁵⁴ *See id.* at 136.

¹⁵⁵ *See id.*

¹⁵⁶ *See id.*

¹⁵⁷ *Id.*

¹⁵⁸ *See id.* (explaining how NBC requested copies of *The SAT* and how *Seinfeld*'s executive producer described *The SAT* as one "fun little book").

¹⁵⁹ *See id.*

¹⁶⁰ *See id.*

¹⁶¹ *See id.* at 144.

¹⁶² *See id.*

¹⁶³ *See id.* at 135-36.

court granted summary judgment in favor of Castle Rock, holding that *The SAT* infringed upon their status as copyright owner.¹⁶⁵ More specifically, the court stated that the book was sufficiently similar to the television series to warrant infringement.¹⁶⁶ In addition, the court held that the fair use defense did not apply.¹⁶⁷ The court permanently enjoined Carol Publishing from publishing *The SAT*, ordered the company to pay \$403,000 damages to Castle Rock and to destroy any copies in their control.¹⁶⁸

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding.¹⁶⁹ In deciding the issue of copyright infringement, the court considered the two elements required, actual copying and improper or unlawful purpose.¹⁷⁰ Because Golub admitted directly copying from the show to create the book, Carol Publishing met the "actual copying" requirement.¹⁷¹ The court only had to determine whether the copying was unlawful or improper and if so, whether the fair use defense applied.¹⁷² The court first looked at the issue of substantial similarity to decide whether Golub unlawfully or improperly copied *Seinfeld*.

A. The SAT: Substantial Similarity

The court employed a quantitative/qualitative analysis to decide whether *The SAT* was substantially similar to *Seinfeld*, and, therefore, whether Golub engaged in unlawful or improper copying.¹⁷³ To decide the quantitative aspect, the court analyzed whether the amount actually copied from *Seinfeld* exceeded a de minimis level.¹⁷⁴ The court evaluated infringement on a cumulative basis, determining that the book excessively copied from eighty-four epi-

¹⁶⁴ See *id.* at 135 (noting that initially, both plaintiff and defendant moved for summary judgment).

¹⁶⁵ See *Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group*, 955 F. Supp. 260, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) [hereinafter *Castle Rock I*] (granting summary judgment to plaintiff).

¹⁶⁶ See *id.* at 264-65 (analyzing substantial similarity).

¹⁶⁷ See *id.* at 267-72 (holding fair use inapplicable under four statutory factors).

¹⁶⁸ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 135 (describing district court's holding); *Castle Rock I*, 955 F. Supp. at 274 (setting case management conference to determine measure of relief of damages).

¹⁶⁹ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 146.

¹⁷⁰ See *id.* at 137. To determine the unlawful or improper purpose issue, the court analyzed the case in terms of substantial similarity. See *id.* at 138-39.

¹⁷¹ See *id.* at 137 (noting that Golub freely admitted copying).

¹⁷² See *id.* at 137, 141.

¹⁷³ See *id.* at 138-39.

¹⁷⁴ See *id.* at 138 (discussing quantitative element).

sodes to create 643 questions.¹⁷⁵ Based on these numbers, the *Castle Rock Entertainment* court concluded that *The SAT* crossed the quantitative copying threshold by exceeding a de minimis level.¹⁷⁶

In evaluating the qualitative aspect, the court analyzed the content of the copied work, concluding that it constituted legally protected expression.¹⁷⁷ The court concluded that the book infringed upon *Seinfeld's* creative expression, reasoning that *The SAT* quizzes everyday occurrences in the lives of four fictitious characters.¹⁷⁸ Because the writers of *Seinfeld* conceived these characters, they were not facts.¹⁷⁹ Instead, the court protected the show's content because it represented the author's creative expression.¹⁸⁰ In doing so, the court distinguished *Feist*,¹⁸¹ where the Court found the defendant not liable for directly copying from plaintiff's single-county telephone directory.¹⁸² Thus, the court found substantial similarity between *Seinfeld* and *The SAT* and concluded that copyright infringement had occurred.¹⁸³

The court dismissed many other tests used to determine substantial similarity.¹⁸⁴ The court defined substantial similarity under the ordinary observer test as occurring when an ordinary observer con-

¹⁷⁵ See *id.* at 138. The court had the choice of evaluating the copying on a per-episode basis or to analyze the cumulative amount copied from *Seinfeld* as a whole. See *Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73, 1380-81 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding substantial similarity between book and television series as whole, but awarding damages based on each individual episode). In *Twin Peaks*, the defendant wrote and published a book about the *Twin Peaks* television series. See *id.* at 1370. The *Twin Peaks* court chose to evaluate infringement on a cumulative basis. See *id.* at 1372-73. The *Castle Rock* court chose to follow the *Twin Peaks* analysis to follow precedent. See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 138.

¹⁷⁶ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 138 (analyzing copying on aggregate basis).

¹⁷⁷ See *id.* at 138-39 (distinguishing ideas from expression).

¹⁷⁸ See *id.* (providing examples of fictitious instances in *Seinfeld* television series).

¹⁷⁹ See *id.*

¹⁸⁰ See *id.* (stating that characters and events on *Seinfeld* arise from author's imagination).

¹⁸¹ See *Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv.*, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In *Feist*, the Court did not find infringement because telephone numbers are facts and not creative expressions. See *id.* at 361. In effect, *Feist* required creative expression in order to grant copyright protection. See *id.* at 345 (requiring "creative spark" for copyright protection).

¹⁸² See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 138-39 (distinguishing facts in phone book, which do not owe their origin to act of authorship, to facts in *The SAT*, which constitute expression created by *Seinfeld* writers).

¹⁸³ See *id.* at 138-39 (analyzing substantial similarity under quantitative/qualitative approach to conclude infringement had occurred).

¹⁸⁴ See *id.* at 139-40 (dismissing ordinary observer test, total concept and feel test, nonliteral similarity test, and fragmented literal similarity test).

siders the aesthetic appeal between the two works as identical.¹⁸⁵ The court dismissed the ordinary observer test because *Seinfeld* and *The SAT* share no common aesthetic appeal.¹⁸⁶ The court also dismissed the total concept and feel test as unhelpful in analyzing works in different genres, namely television and books.¹⁸⁷ The court stated that *The SAT*'s lack of direct quotations or paraphrases from *Seinfeld* precluded use of the fragmented literal similarity test.¹⁸⁸ Finally, the court dismissed the nonliteral similarity test as unhelpful to the substantial similarity analysis.¹⁸⁹ Having lost the copyright infringement claim, Carol Publishing argued that *The SAT* constituted a fair use of *Seinfeld*.

B. The SAT: Fair Use Defense

The *Castle Rock Entertainment* court denied Carol Publishing the fair use defense.¹⁹⁰ The court analyzed whether the fair use defense protected Carol Publishing under the four factors enumerated in the Copyright Act.¹⁹¹ The court found that the first factor, purpose and character of the use, weighed against finding fair use for two reasons.¹⁹² First, the court noted that Golub used *Seinfeld* for commercial gain.¹⁹³ However, the court concluded that because most uses are conducted for commercial gain, this fact was indeterminate.¹⁹⁴

Second, the court considered whether *The SAT* bore any transformative value. The court reasoned that if *The SAT* transformed and added value to *Seinfeld*, then it enriched society and consti-

¹⁸⁵ See *id.* at 139 (defining substantial similarity under ordinary observer test, as requiring aesthetic appeal between two works) (citing *Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.*, 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).

¹⁸⁶ See *id.* at 139-40 (stating that *Peter Pan* definition of substantial similarity cannot be logically applied to *Castle Rock*, and dismissing test).

¹⁸⁷ See *id.* at 140.

¹⁸⁸ See *id.*

¹⁸⁹ See *id.* at 140-41.

¹⁹⁰ See *id.* at 141-46 (applying four statutory factors to case and denying application of fair use defense).

¹⁹¹ See *id.*

¹⁹² See *id.* at 141-43.

¹⁹³ See *id.* at 141-42.

¹⁹⁴ See *id.* (denying force to fact that *The SAT* resulted in commercial gain for defendant by recognizing that most defendants use the plaintiff's work for commercial gain).

tuted a fair use.¹⁹⁵ Carol Publishing claimed that *The SAT* was transformative because Golub took the *Seinfeld* television series and added value by transforming it into a trivia quiz book.¹⁹⁶ They argued that Golub transformed the series by putting it into a question-answer format and by creating the questions and the wrong answers.¹⁹⁷

Carol Publishing argued that even though the subject matter of the quiz was light and entertaining rather than scholarly, it was nonetheless eligible for fair use protection.¹⁹⁸ The *Castle Rock Entertainment* court agreed with the assertion that *The SAT* could constitute a transformative work.¹⁹⁹ However, the court ultimately determined that any transformative value held by *The SAT* was slight to nonexistent.²⁰⁰

The court also found that *The SAT* did not satisfy the second statutory factor regarding the nature of the copyrighted work.²⁰¹ Because the defendants acknowledged the fictitious nature of their work, this factor was not at issue. Therefore, the second factor weighed against a finding of fair use.²⁰²

The third fair use factor required the court to consider the amount and substantiality of *Seinfeld* that *The SAT* used.²⁰³ The court noted that *The SAT* must necessarily reconstruct some of the show's expression to test readers about *Seinfeld*.²⁰⁴ However, the court found that the amount of *Seinfeld* that Golub used to create

¹⁹⁵ See *id.* at 142 (using Leval's description of transformative value). Leval stated that society is enriched if a secondary work creates new information, new aesthetics, or new insights through transformation. See Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1111.

¹⁹⁶ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 142 (claiming two transformative qualities of *The SAT*, namely testing one's knowledge of *Seinfeld* and decoding mystery surrounding *Seinfeld*).

¹⁹⁷ See *id.* at 143.

¹⁹⁸ See *id.* at 142. Carol Publishing cited *Twin Peaks Prods v. Publications Int'l*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1374 (2d Cir. 1993), for the proposition that "[a] comment is as eligible for fair use protection when it concerns Masterpiece Theater . . . as when it concerns 'As the World Turns.'" *Id.* The *Castle Rock* court agreed with this assertion, reasoning that "the fact that the subject matter of the quiz is plebeian, banal, or ordinary stuff does not alter the fair use analysis". *Id.* at 142.

¹⁹⁹ See *id.* at 143 (conceding that creating trivia book does require some creativity but not giving much importance to this fact).

²⁰⁰ See *id.* at 142 (rejecting *The SAT*'s transformative value).

²⁰¹ See *id.* at 143-44 (dismissing second factor because *Seinfeld* is fictional creation, not factual work).

²⁰² See *id.*

²⁰³ See Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1122-23 (outlining third statutory factor); Shapiro, *supra* note 127, at 13-15 (providing examples of amount and substantiality copied).

²⁰⁴ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 144 (recognizing argument that *The SAT* needed to be able to copy some of *Seinfeld*'s expression to pose questions about *Seinfeld* effectively).

the 643 trivia questions was excessive.²⁰⁵ Therefore, the court also dismissed the third fair use factor.²⁰⁶

Carol Publishing presented their strongest claim in the fourth factor, namely the effect of *The SAT* on the potential market of the television series.²⁰⁷ Carol Publishing argued that there was no proof that *The SAT* damaged *Seinfeld*.²⁰⁸ In support of Carol Publishing's argument, the court noted that *Seinfeld* ratings increased after publication of *The SAT*.²⁰⁹ Carol Publishing further argued that because Castle Rock showed no intent to create trivia quiz books about *Seinfeld*, others should be allowed to enter the *Seinfeld* trivia quiz book market.²¹⁰

Despite Carol Publishing's arguments, the court rejected the fourth factor. The court noted that the fourth factor's proper analysis considers whether *The SAT* acted as a substitute for *Seinfeld*.²¹¹ In response, the court found that the book may substitute for a derivative market that Castle Rock may wish to enter later.²¹² As such, the court concluded that *The SAT* was not a fair use.²¹³ In summary, the court upheld Castle Rock's rights and awarded summary judgment in their favor.²¹⁴

III. ANALYSIS

Although the *Castle Rock Entertainment* court correctly determined that the only element at issue was whether unlawful or improper copying existed, the court reached an incorrect holding. The court improperly found substantial similarity between the two works by summarily dismissing many tests used to analyze the standard.²¹⁵ Furthermore, Carol Publishing had a viable fair use defense.

²⁰⁵ See *id.* (finding that excessive amount of copying suggests that purpose of *The SAT* was to entertain).

²⁰⁶ See *id.*

²⁰⁷ See *id.*

²⁰⁸ See *id.*

²⁰⁹ See *id.* (noting increase in *Seinfeld*'s ratings after *The SAT* was published, but not commenting on whether this was related or coincidental increase).

²¹⁰ See *id.* at 144-45.

²¹¹ See *id.* at 145 (relating substitution to transformative value).

²¹² See *id.* at 145.

²¹³ See *id.* at 146.

²¹⁴ See *id.* at 145-46 (discussing Castle Rock's rights to enter market for derivative works of *Seinfeld*).

²¹⁵ See *id.* at 139-41 (dismissing ordinary observer test, total concept and feel test, nonliteral similarity test, fragmented literal similarity test).

A. *Proof of Unlawful or Improper Copying*

Based on precedent and the facts of the case, the *Castle Rock Entertainment* court should have applied any of the four tests used to determine substantial similarity. The court's approach of only applying a quantitative/qualitative analysis to decide substantial similarity is unique.²¹⁶ In fact, the court does not even label the approach a "test."²¹⁷ This isolation of the quantitative/qualitative approach is not effective considering how many well-established tests are available for determining substantial similarity.²¹⁸ Yet, the court dismissed all such tests.²¹⁹ Based on precedent, the court should have applied other tests such as the ordinary observer test, the total concept and feel test, the nonliteral similarity test and the fragmented literal similarity test. If the court had applied any one of these four popular tests for finding substantial similarity, the court would likely have concluded that no infringement occurred.

The court declined to apply the ordinary observer test on the assumption that it required the court to determine, from the ordinary observer's perspective, the similarity of the aesthetic appeal of the two works.²²⁰ This formulation of the test originated in *Peter Pan Fabrics*, a case concerning dress designs in which aesthetic appeal was a significant factor.²²¹ However, it was not appropriate for the court to use this definition of substantial similarity in *Castle Rock Entertainment* because aesthetic appeal was not at issue. Because *Castle Rock* alleged that its television series was copied into a literal question and answer format, the question of aesthetics did not arise.

²¹⁶ The only other case that solely applies a quantitative/qualitative approach is *Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc.*, 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997). *Ringgold* is distinguishable, however, because it concerns visual works, *see id.* at 72, whereas *Castle Rock* concerns literary and television works, *see* 150 F.3d at 132.

²¹⁷ *See Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 138-39. The failure of the *Castle Rock* court to recognize the quantitative/qualitative approach as a "test" is significant considering there are many well established tests that assist in determining substantial similarity. *See supra* notes 77-109 and accompanying text (describing four common tests to determine substantial similarity).

²¹⁸ *See supra* notes 77-109 and accompanying text (describing ordinary observer test, total concept and feel test, nonliteral similarity test, and fragmented literal similarity test).

²¹⁹ *See Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 139-40.

²²⁰ *See id.* at 139.

²²¹ *See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc., v. Martin Weiner Corp.*, 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (involving infringement of plaintiff's copyrighted Byzantium print design for dresses).

The court erred in assuming that the ordinary observer test applies only where aesthetic appeal is at issue.²²² In *Arnstein*, for instance, the court used the ordinary observer test to determine substantial similarity between musical compositions.²²³ Courts can use this test in any situation where consumers may confuse the source of two works, whether the works are literary, musical or visual.²²⁴ Therefore, as in *Arnstein*, the *Castle Rock Entertainment* court could have used the ordinary observer test. Had the court applied the ordinary observer test, it may not have found infringement.

The ordinary observer test queries whether a lay observer believes that the allegedly infringing work originated from the copyrighted work.²²⁵ As the back cover of *The SAT* contained a statement disclaiming any association between *The SAT* and *Seinfeld*, the ordinary observer would understand that the two works did not derive from the same source. Furthermore, the statement "open this book to satisfy your *between* episode cravings" demonstrates that *The SAT* was not designed to replace the show in any way.²²⁶ Rather, the book was designed to entertain between episodes.

The court also readily dismissed the total concept and feel test because *The SAT* and *Seinfeld* exist in two different genres.²²⁷ However, the court's dismissal is inconsistent with its prior decision in *Williams*. *Williams* compared children's stories with the novel and movie *Jurassic Park* to conclude that no infringement occurred.²²⁸ Similarly, the *Castle Rock Entertainment* court compared a book with a television series. Thus, the court's argument that the total con-

²²² See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 139-40 (failing to proceed with ordinary observer test once court determined aesthetic appeal not at issue).

²²³ See *Arnstein v. Porter*, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (employing ordinary observer test so that lay listeners would determine issue of infringement).

²²⁴ See, e.g., *Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc.*, 166 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (employing ordinary observer test to analyze defendant's abstracts of publisher's news articles); *Beaudin v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc.*, 95 F.3d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1996) (using ordinary observer test to determine whether defendant's hats containing cow-like splotch patterns infringed upon plaintiff's hats); *Arnstein*, 154 F.2d at 473 (using ordinary observer test to determine infringement between musical works).

²²⁵ See *Arnstein*, 154 F.2d at 473 (defining substantial similarity under ordinary observer test in terms of lay listeners); Y'Barbo, *supra* note 79, at 647 (describing goal of ordinary observer test is to avoid confusion as to source between plaintiff's and defendant's works).

²²⁶ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d. at 136 (emphasis added).

²²⁷ See *id.* at 140 (concluding that *The SAT* and *Seinfeld* are incomparable because *Seinfeld* is television series whereas *The SAT* is literary).

²²⁸ See *Williams v. Crichton*, 84 F.3d 581, 582-87 (2d Cir. 1996).

cept and feel test is not applicable to works in different genres is unpersuasive given its own precedent.²²⁹

Carol Publishing argued that *Seinfeld* and *The SAT* were completely incomparable in terms of concept and feel, because *The SAT* has no plot.²³⁰ Each episode of *Seinfeld* centers around a particular theme with a plot. The episodes together tell a continuing story of four friends.²³¹ On the other hand, *The SAT* does not recount any stories.²³² *The SAT* focuses on single moments taken from eighty-four episodes at random.²³³ There is no plot or continuing story to be told unlike the book in *Twin Peaks*, which retold the *Twin Peaks* story in narrative detail.²³⁴ Therefore, had the court correctly applied the total concept and feel test, it may have found the two works to be different, precluding a finding of copyright infringement.

The court also dismissed the fragmented literal similarity test because *The SAT* copied few direct quotations or close paraphrases from *Seinfeld*.²³⁵ *The SAT* contains 643 questions, of which 41 contain quoted dialogue.²³⁶ *The SAT* only quoted between 3.6 % and 5.6 % from any single episode.²³⁷ However, if the United States Supreme Court in *Harper* applied the test to find infringement where the defendant copied a mere 0.25 % of the plaintiff's work,²³⁸ the fact that *The SAT* quoted up to 5.6 % of dialogue weighs in favor of applying the fragmented literal similarity test.

²²⁹ See *id.* at 589-90. In *Williams*, the court analyzed similarities such as feel, plot, pace and setting to conclude that there was no substantial similarity under the total concept and feel test, and therefore no copyright infringement. See *id.* at 588-89.

²³⁰ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 140.

²³¹ See *Seinfeld* (NBC television broadcast, 1989-1998).

²³² See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 135-36 (explaining content of *The SAT*).

²³³ See *id.*

²³⁴ See *Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that defendant's book was substantially similar to plaintiff's *Twin Peaks* episodes because it included "elaborate recounting of plot details").

²³⁵ See *id.* at 140 (raising and dismissing fragmented literal similarity test as irrelevant to this case).

²³⁶ See *id.* at 135-36.

²³⁷ See *id.* at 136 (providing plaintiff's and defendant's assertions of how much defendant copied from most-drawn episode, "The Cigar Store Indian").

²³⁸ See *Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.*, 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (stating that approximately 0.25% of copying — copying between 300 and 400 words from 200,000 word manuscript — was enough to constitute infringement because copied material constituted "heart" of plaintiff's work).

The fragmented literal similarity test mandates an inquiry into the quantity of work copied.²³⁹ Although in *Harper* copying 0.25 % was enough to constitute infringement, the portion of copied work comprised the “heart” of the copyrighted work.²⁴⁰ In contrast, *The SAT* did not copy from the most significant parts of the *Seinfeld* series, but instead copied randomly from numerous episodes.²⁴¹

In *Twin Peaks*, the Second Circuit found substantial similarity between a book and eight episodes of the *Twin Peaks* television series under the fragmented literal similarity test.²⁴² However, in *Twin Peaks*, the book described the content of the episodes in narrative detail, therefore abstractly copying a large amount of the series.²⁴³ Furthermore, two chapters of the book consisted of numerous literal quotations from the series.²⁴⁴ In contrast, *The SAT* does not attempt to describe the themes or storylines of the *Seinfeld* series,²⁴⁵ but rather poses questions that cannot be answered without seeing the series. Based on these differences, if the court had applied the fragmented literal similarity test to determine substantial similarity, it would likely have concluded that infringement had not occurred.

Some may argue that the application of the quantitative/qualitative analysis was sufficient to determine substantial similarity because courts can choose which test to apply. However, courts choose tests that are appropriate given the facts of the case and precedent.²⁴⁶ The quantitative/qualitative approach is so general that it is not suited to any particular fact pattern, which makes the court’s sole application of this test unique. Furthermore, courts may apply more than one test or synthesize tests in order to strengthen their substantial similarity analysis.²⁴⁷ *The Castle Rock*

²³⁹ See *supra* notes 106-13 and accompanying text (discussing fragmented literal similarity test).

²⁴⁰ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 564-65.

²⁴¹ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 135-36 (explaining creation and contents of *The SAT*).

²⁴² See *Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publications Int’l*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding substantial similarity through application of literal similarity and nonliteral similarity tests).

²⁴³ See *id.* (noting that third chapter of book about *Twin Peaks* television series was detailed description of first eight episodes).

²⁴⁴ See *id.* at 1372 (describing contents of allegedly infringing book).

²⁴⁵ See *supra* notes 149-55 and accompanying text (describing contents of *The SAT* in detail).

²⁴⁶ See *supra* note 64 (collecting cases illustrating that proper test for substantial similarity depends upon facts of particular case).

²⁴⁷ See *supra* note 65 (collecting cases illustrating that courts often apply more than one test for substantial similarity).

Entertainment court failed to apply any tests other than the quantitative/qualitative approach. Had the court applied other more appropriate tests, it may not have found infringement.

B. *The Fair Use Defense*

The court inappropriately denied Carol Publishing the fair use defense. In reaching this conclusion, the court misapplied the four statutory factors. Under the first factor, the court must assess the defendant's purpose in using the plaintiff's work, and the character of the use.²⁴⁸ In particular, the court must consider the transformative value of the defendant's work.²⁴⁹ The transformative value of *The SAT*, measured by the way it altered *Seinfeld*, weighs in favor of finding fair use. The book takes *Seinfeld* and completely transforms it into a trivia quiz of *Seinfeld*,²⁵⁰ without describing or telling the stories of the episodes.²⁵¹ Moreover, a great deal of imagination went into the selection and arrangement of questions, as well as the creation of wrong answers to the multiple choice questions.²⁵²

²⁴⁸ See *supra* notes 125-30 and accompanying text (describing first statutory fair use factor).

²⁴⁹ See Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1111-12 (explaining that transformative value is part of analysis under first factor).

²⁵⁰ See *Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group*, 150 F.3d 132, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing creation and organization of *The SAT*). Compare *id.* (rejecting transformative value of *The SAT*), with *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (accepting transformative value of defendant's parody of plaintiff's song).

²⁵¹ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 136 (describing how each question centered around single moments from show). Compare *id.* at 141-43 (explaining that *The SAT* does not retell any *Seinfeld* stories), with *Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that book about *Twin Peaks* television series included detailed description of episodes). For example, an excerpt from the book reads:

FBI Special Agent Dale Cooper
drives into town, primly dressed
in a dark suit and tie and dictating
the minutiae of his travels to his
secretary, Diane, into a microcassette
recorder. When he meets Sheriff
Truman — Harry S. Truman, that is — he
immediately questions Truman about
the local trees, beginning his
preoccupation with the local flora
and fauna.

Id. at 1373 n.2.

²⁵² See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 136 (describing how Golub created *The SAT*).

Despite acknowledging the need for a case by case analysis, the court used the transformative value of the book in *Twin Peaks* as a benchmark for transformative value.²⁵³ The court dismissed *The SAT*'s transformative value by concluding that it was less transformative than the book in *Twin Peaks*.²⁵⁴ By doing so, the court created a bright line rule for determining transformative value. This finding is incorrect because the narrative description of the television series in the *Twin Peaks* book distinguishes that case from *Castle Rock Entertainment*. *The SAT* did not include narrative descriptions of *Seinfeld* episodes, but merely posed trivia questions about *Seinfeld*.²⁵⁵ In *Twin Peaks*, however, the author of the book included detailed descriptions of the plots of eight episodes.²⁵⁶ Posing trivia questions differs from describing episodes because formulating questions requires imagination and creativity. Moreover, bright line rules by definition go against the very essence of case by case determinations.

Courts evaluate the allegedly transformed work against the original work to identify improvements and alterations.²⁵⁷ The court rejected the idea that *The SAT* bore transformative value by inappropriately concluding that *The SAT*'s purpose was to repack-age *Seinfeld*.²⁵⁸ The court's reasoning is incorrect because Golub did not intend *The SAT* as a replacement for *Seinfeld*.²⁵⁹ Golub transformed the original by turning a television series into an entertaining trivia book.²⁶⁰ Therefore, the first factor weighed in favor of finding fair use.

²⁵³ See *id.* at 143.

²⁵⁴ See *id.*

²⁵⁵ See *id.* at 135-36 (describing creation and organization of trivia questions).

²⁵⁶ See *Twin Peaks*, 996 F.2d at 1372-73 (observing that defendant's infringing book contained descriptions of *Twin Peaks* episodes).

²⁵⁷ See *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 579-82 (1994) (holding that defendant transformed plaintiff's work by altering it to fit rap song); *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (holding that defendant did not transform plaintiff's television programs); Leval, *supra* note 116, at 1112 (stating that courts must compare each allegedly infringing passage to original work). Furthermore, the subject matter of the quiz is not dispositive of transformative value. See *Twin Peaks*, 996 F.2d, at 1374 (suggesting that works commenting on frivolous or entertaining works as well as those addressing academic or serious works may garner fair use protection).

²⁵⁸ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 142.

²⁵⁹ See *id.* at 136 (observing that *The SAT*'s back cover characterized the book's purpose as between-episode entertainment).

²⁶⁰ See *id.* (describing creation and organization of *The SAT*).

The second factor of the fair-use analysis is the nature of the copyrighted work.²⁶¹ This factor favored Castle Rock because courts provide greater protection to fictional works than to factual works.²⁶² Both *Seinfeld* and *The SAT* are clearly fictional works because individual authors created them.²⁶³ Therefore, the court correctly decided that the second factor weighed against finding fair use.

However, the court's application of the third fair use factor was more problematic. The United States Supreme Court recently stated that courts should inquire into whether the extent of copying was more than necessary to further the purpose and character of the use.²⁶⁴ In other words, courts should consider whether the amount of copying was excessive. The *Castle Rock Entertainment* court conceded that *The SAT* must take enough from the show to be able to test readers' knowledge of *Seinfeld*.²⁶⁵ The court then concluded that by posing 643 trivia questions, *The SAT* excessively copied from the show.²⁶⁶

The court failed to give adequate consideration, however, to the size of the book.²⁶⁷ For example, a book containing ten questions will draw less from the original source than a book containing one hundred questions. Because *The SAT*'s purpose was to "expose Seinfeld's 'nothingness,'" it had to include "exhaustive examples deconstructing Seinfeld's humor."²⁶⁸ Posing 643 questions on eighty-four episodes does not constitute excessive copying of the *Seinfeld* series taken as a whole. Thus, the court's rationale limited the size of the book without warrant.

²⁶¹ See *supra* notes 131-33 and accompanying text (discussing second factor of fair use analysis).

²⁶² See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586 (stating that fair use defense is more difficult to establish when fictional works are copied); *Stewart v. Abend*, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (stating that fair use defense is more applicable to factual works than fictional works); *Twin Peaks*, 996 F.2d at 1376 (1993) (explaining preference for denying fair use defense for fictional works).

²⁶³ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 135 (explaining that Castle Rock is copyright owner of *Seinfeld* and Golub authored *The SAT*).

²⁶⁴ See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586-87 (discussing whether defendant's parody of plaintiff's song copied excessively from plaintiff's lyrics).

²⁶⁵ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 144 (stating that *The SAT* could not expose *Seinfeld*'s value without using examples from *Seinfeld*).

²⁶⁶ See *id.* at 138, 144.

²⁶⁷ See *Twin Peaks Prods. Inc. v. Publications Int'l*, 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1993) (analyzing substantial similarity on aggregate basis rather than on per-episode basis).

²⁶⁸ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 144.

The fourth factor, effect on the market, also favored finding fair use. Despite the court's conclusion that *The SAT* diminished *Seinfeld*'s value,²⁶⁹ no evidence existed to suggest that *The SAT* adversely affected *Seinfeld*'s market in any way.²⁷⁰ More importantly, as the court recognized, the book paid homage to *Seinfeld*.²⁷¹ The fourth statutory factor takes derivative works into account.²⁷² Castle Rock did not show any intention of entering the derivative trivia quiz book market.²⁷³ To preclude Carol Publishing from entering this market is unfair.

The *Castle Rock Entertainment* court chose to weigh all four factors equally even though the fourth factor is more significant.²⁷⁴ The United States Supreme Court in *Harper* expressly gave more importance to the fourth statutory factor.²⁷⁵ However, the United States Supreme Court recently stated in dicta that all factors are to be weighed together.²⁷⁶ The *Castle Rock Entertainment* court interpreted this to mean that all factors are to be weighed equally.²⁷⁷ However,

²⁶⁹ See *id.* at 144-45 (discussing fourth factor and concluding that *The SAT* impinges on plaintiff's right to produce derivative works).

²⁷⁰ See *id.* at 144 (explaining that *The SAT* did not detract any *Seinfeld* viewers away from television series).

²⁷¹ See *id.* at 145.

²⁷² See Shapiro, *supra* note 127, at 15-16 (stating that alleged infringer bears burden for showing no harm to plaintiff's market for derivative works).

²⁷³ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 145-46 (stating that although Castle Rock showed no interest of entering market, it still had right to produce derivative works).

²⁷⁴ See *id.* at 140-46. The court mentioned that the fourth statutory factor was considered the most important until the decision in *Harper*, where the Supreme Court stated "all factors are to be explored, and the results weighed together". See *id.* at 144. However, this statement does not say all factors must be weighed *equally*. See *id.* It only says that all factors must be considered together. See *id.* (noting precise language United States Supreme Court used). Therefore, *Harper* does not dictate that all factors be given equal weight.

²⁷⁵ See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 578. Even before *Harper*, courts considered the impact of the fourth statutory factor highly significant. See *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417, 451, 456 (1984).

²⁷⁶ See *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 559, 578 (1994) (stating that all statutory factors are to be explored and results weighed together in determining copyright infringement). Although these four factors are specifically enumerated by statute, Congress did not intend them to be a conclusive end to the determination of fair use. See *Harper*, 471 U.S. at 560 (stating that four statutory fair use factors are not exclusive in determination on fair use defense). Thus courts can and often do consider other factors in the analysis. See *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that if second work is highly transformative, this reduces significance of other factors, such as commercialism); *Sony*, 464 U.S. at 450 n.32 (stating that commercial or nonprofit characteristics should be weighed along with other factors); *New Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group*, 904 F.2d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing additional factors); Leval, *supra* note 116 at 1125-30 (posing rhetorical question whether additional factors exist).

²⁷⁷ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 140-46.

dicta is not sufficient to overrule longstanding precedent that the fourth factor is the most important factor in the fair use analysis. Thus, *Harper* has not been overruled and courts continue to follow *Harper*.²⁷⁸ Therefore, the *Castle Rock Entertainment* court should have given more importance to the last factor, which dictates finding fair use because *The SAT* did not adversely affect *Seinfeld*'s market.

Regardless, with two of the four factors weighing in the defendant's favor, and one that could go either way, the fair use defense should apply in this case. *The SAT*'s transformative value coupled with its lack of negative effect on the *Seinfeld* series strongly invokes the application of the fair use defense and precludes finding copyright infringement.²⁷⁹

CONCLUSION

Castle Rock Entertainment concerned copyright infringement of a highly successful television series. The Second Circuit determined that *The SAT*, a trivia quiz book, constituted copyright infringement under a qualitative/quantitative approach.²⁸⁰ However, based on precedent, the court should have applied other tests to determine substantial similarity. Had the court applied other tests, it would have found a lack of substantial similarity between *Seinfeld* and *The SAT* and would not have found infringement. In addition, the court should have found fair use because the court misapplied the statutory fair use defense factors.

By its holding, the court tipped the balance in favor of granting copyright holders a monopolistic right over their works. This can only hurt society by depriving the public of a "fun little book"²⁸¹ to the detriment of creativity, progress and senses of humor everywhere. Had the court appropriately applied the substantial similarity tests or alternatively, applied the fair use defense, *The SAT*

²⁷⁸ See *Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood*, 150 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) (following *Harper* analysis); *Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv.*, 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996) (calling fourth factor first among equals).

²⁷⁹ See *supra* notes 250-60 and accompanying text (arguing that *The SAT*'s transformative value should be considered). Equally important is the fact that *The SAT* did not harm *Seinfeld* in any way. See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 145.

²⁸⁰ See *Castle Rock*, 150 F.3d at 136-38 (applying quantitative/qualitative approach to find substantial similarity).

²⁸¹ See *id.* at 136-37 (describing how *Seinfeld*'s executive producer described *The SAT*).

would likely still be on bookshelves today, entertaining *Seinfeld* fans, and perhaps encouraging nonviewers to tune in.

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