Trademark Cosmopolitanism

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The world of global trademarks can be characterized in terms of three major shifts: first, a shift from national to global branding strategies; second, a shift from national and regional systems to harmonized international regimes governing trademark law; and third, a concurrent shift from local to transnational social movements that challenge branding and other corporate practices. This Article details how each of these areas are deeply intertwined with one another, and also how the emergence of a transnational trademark regime carries important implications for freedom of expression worldwide.

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INTRODUCTION

In May of 2008, Nadia Plesner, a Danish art student, decided to do something about the lingering crisis in Darfur. She designed a T-shirt to raise money for the cause, depicting a starving Sudanese child holding a Chihuahua in one hand and a Louis Vuitton bag in the other — in a classic appropriation of a famous photograph depicting Paris Hilton in a bikini. “I started this campaign because of the distorted way the media prioritizes between big and small world news,” she explained. “How can Paris Hilton make more front covers than the genocide in Darfur?” Shortly thereafter, she was served with a harshly written letter from the Intellectual Property Director for Louis Vuitton (“LVMH”) that read, in part:

Although we applaud your efforts to raise awareness and funds to help Darfur, a most worthy cause, we cannot help noticing that the design . . . includes the reproduction of a bag infringing on Louis Vuitton's Intellectual Property Rights, in particular the Louis Vuitton Monogram Multicolore Trademark to which it is confusingly similar. We are surprised of such a promotion of a counterfeit bag.

LVMH did not mince its words. The letter goes on to request that Plesner discontinue distributing the shirt immediately.2

Plesner eventually replied, explaining to LVMH’s lawyer that she did not use an exact replica of the bag, but rather meant for her depiction to simply evoke designer bags in general.3 Nevertheless, LVMH decided to file suit against her, threatening thousands of dollars in damages.4 Shortly thereafter, the news quickly began to travel

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1 Ernesto, Louis Vuitton Sues Darfur Fundraiser for Copyright Infringement, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 25, 2008), http://torrentfreak.com/louis-vuitton-sues-darfur-fundraiser-for-copyright-infringement-080425 (quoting Nadia Plesner); see also Jeremiah Owyang, Louis Vuitton Gets Brand-Jacked, Collateral Damage in Anti-Genocide Campaign, WEB-STRATEGIST BLOG (May 4, 2008), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2008/05/04/louis-vuitton-gets-brand-jacked-victimized-in-anti-genocide-campaign-tough-spot-to-be-in (quoting Nadia Plesner) (“I felt horrified by the fact that even with the genocide and other ongoing atrocities in Darfur, Paris Hilton was the one getting all the attention.”).


3 See Ernesto, supra note 1 (“Sometimes recognizable objects are needed to express deeper meanings, and in their new form they become more than the objects themselves, they become art,” Plesner explained, noting that she planned to “stand by my freedom of expression — artistic and/or otherwise,” and continue distribution).

4 LVMH demanded $7,500 for each day she continued to sell the product,
worldwide. Speaking to *New York Magazine*, Plesner argued that “[i]f I was making bags and copying the design, I would understand the problem,” but since she was caricaturing it instead in a picture, she considered it part and parcel of her artistic freedom. 5 Roughly six months later, and after a major maelstrom in the media, the case finally settled for an undisclosed amount, and Plesner no longer distributes the shirt as a result.

The resolution of the case might have ended the standoff between LVMH and Plesner, but only for the moment. Interestingly, a year or so after the settlement, Plesner decided to reuse the very same image in a large piece of visual art called *Darfurnica*, a piece modeled after Picasso’s *Guernica* (a famous 1937 piece protesting the bombing of the town with the same name). Plesner juxtaposed the image with a variety of global brands, political symbols, and other elements from high fashion. Plesner explained that she decided to name the painting after Picasso’ famous work after she discovered that *Guernica* was shrouded in blue cloth during a United Nations press conference on the war in Iraq in 2003. For her, *Guernica* represented the power of visual art to make connections between current political events and issues of social justice.6

Plesner’s own work draws obvious parallels between the power of political symbols, fashion symbols, and corporate symbols, noting how each one occupies a tremendous amount of prominence in our visual culture. Indeed, there is a triadic convergence of function between all three categories of symbols, because each type can personify both the brand creator as well as the audience that consumes them. Each of these audiences — whether consumers of luxury goods, political actors, or artist/activists like Nadia Plesner — oppositional or otherwise, all integrate and respond to particular brands as part of their process of self-expression.


6 See Nadia Plesner, *Darfurnica Day 18* (July 27, 2009),  http://www.nadiaplesner.com/the-making-of-darfurnica (“It is amazing that an art work can be considered so powerful, that it has to be covered up while governments present their plans. It only proves that artists around the world must continue to work with the harsh issues to influence the people with power and to start important debates.”).
Further, as this story demonstrates, the relationships between luxury brands, artistic expression, and global politics are constantly shifting and in flux. The transnational nature of social movements and global branding strategies have evoked significant questions about the proper role of intellectual property law, sovereignty, and speech within each sphere. Whereas earlier discussions of international social justice issues (like the crisis in Darfur) might have been restricted to human rights law or other forms of public international law, today’s movements now unfold within the structures of the increasing globalization of intellectual property law, as well. In other words, private law — or specifically, trademark law — is now emerging to play a role in international social justice disputes alongside these longstanding public law approaches.

We have long been aware of the magnetic pull of global brands across the world. But what is also remarkable is how powerful that pull has become, even to those who oppose their prominence. As Plesner’s case demonstrates, global luxury brands have become not just the lingua franca of transnational consumption, but also of the antibranding activists who resist it. Particularly when luxury brands acquire a level of global prominence in public culture, as LVMH has done, it is inevitable that its iconic imagery becomes even more susceptible to recoding and commentary. The more LVMH has invested in its brand, making it more and more ubiquitous in consumer culture, it becomes more and more vulnerable as a result, leading many individuals to use their brands and logos as a means of expressing their own identity or as a vehicle for commenting on consumerism, luxury, or branding in general. As a result, LVMH’s logo is not just a logo; precisely because of its ubiquity, it now stands for something else — luxury, elite excess, celebrity culture, and the like. As Plesner’s case demonstrates, activists may seek to recode a brand for purposes that have little to do with LVMH’s brand specifically. Yet in each of these cases, property principles and freedom of speech collide, with luxury brands as the backdrop, producing an impasse with variable and unpredictable results.

with examples of unauthorized use, has a choice to make: it can either
tolerate alternative commentary, or it can choose to threaten litigation
over the unauthorized use of its trademarks. Either choice carries
consequences, both positive and negative, but each decision that
LVMH faces underscores how much our world has changed in the last
several decades regarding the rise and prominence of global branding.
Today, there are a multitude of what I call transnational brands:
brands that began with national origins, but which have become global
icons in the process.\(^8\)

The rise of transnational brands brings with it an attendant series of
legal shifts in trademark law. Long considered the stepchild of
intellectual property law, today, trademark law has morphed into a
powerful global legal phenomenon, revealing a foundational shift from
national and regional systems to harmonized international regimes
governing trademark law. A unitary system of trademark registration
is emerging. However, even if a system of harmonized registration
becomes the new normal, territorial systems of trademark enforcement
— not to mention constitutional protections for freedom of expression
— vary widely. Here, age-old questions regarding sovereignty, human
rights, and artistic freedom have also begun to play a role in modern
trademark disputes, both domestically and internationally. Yet as the
Plesner case clearly demonstrates, as brands become global,
transnational entities, they also engender modes of resistance from a
number of different social movements. These movements, it seems, are
just as transnational as the global branding strategies that are often
their targets, demonstrating how questions of freedom of expression
emerge alongside the circulation of transnational brands.

This Article details how each of these areas are deeply intertwined
with one another, and how they demonstrate the emergence of a broad
phenomenon that I call trademark cosmopolitanism, which carries
important implications for freedom of expression worldwide. In this
Article, I refer to the phenomenon of trademark cosmopolitanism to
broadly sketch out four trajectories of transnational activities, and
their relationships to the various entities that play key roles in the
global branding enterprise — namely, the consumer, the corporation,

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most-valuable-luxury-brand.html (stating Louis Vuitton remained the world’s most
valuable luxury brand for the seventh consecutive year).

\(^8\) For example, brands such as Nike, Apple, Ralph Lauren, and Honda started off
nationally before becoming global icons. See generally Mark K. Smith & Michele Erina
Doyle, Globalization: Theory and Experience, INFED, http://infed.org/mobi/globalization-
theory-and-experience/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013) (arguing that the growth and
globalization of multinational corporations is intertwined with branding power).
the politician, and the activist. The first set of activities involves what I call consumptive cosmopolitanism, and that refers to the purchasing and shopping practices of the global consumer and the ways in which these practices reflect a kind of globalized consciousness. The second set of activities, which are closely related to the first set, involves the emergence of a corporately-oriented cosmopolitanism that stems from the global corporate social responsibility movement. The third kind of activity, which reflects a more macroeconomic set of considerations, involves the emergence of an institutionalized form of cosmopolitanism, which refers to the variety of government and nongovernment entities that have emerged to facilitate the creation, enforcement, and protection of transnational brands. The final set of transnational activities, however, typify a more politicized form of trademark cosmopolitanism that focuses on challenging, rather than consuming, the power of branding and multinational corporations.

All of these trajectories, I would argue, demonstrate broad and varied facets of a phenomenon I call trademark cosmopolitanism — underscoring the globalization of trademark law. This Article has three sections. In Part I, I describe the first three trajectories of trademark cosmopolitanism, and discuss the emergence of brands as global, transnational figures of both speech, property, and increasingly, corporate ethics. In Part II, I turn to the last trajectory and discuss how the rise of trademark cosmopolitanism also relates to the global antibranding movement, typified by the Plesner example. The interplay between the global brand, the global antibrand, and the language of ethics, cosmopolitanism, and corporate social responsibility, with all of the legal differences associated with sovereignty and speech, I would suggest, is one of the paramount issues for trademark scholars in the future.

I. THE RISE OF TRADEMARK COSMOPOLITANISM

In 1992, Jeremy Waldron published an article, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, which described the emergence of individuals who prefer that their cultural identities not be tied specifically to a set of rigidly defined borders. In Two years later, Martha Nussbaum published a groundbreaking essay, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, where she argued in favor of a kind of moral

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universalism and the need for a cosmopolitan education that recognized that central features of human personhood transcended national boundaries. At the same time, however, she also embraced a more robust notion of empathy. “By looking at ourselves in the lens of the other,” she wrote, “we come to see what in our practices is local and non-necessary, what more broadly or deeply shared.”

Those words were written almost twenty years ago, where Nussbaum described cosmopolitanism’s roots as linked to Diogenes, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher, who once proclaimed himself as “a citizen of the world,” in response to a question about his geographic origin. In a sense, as Nussbaum explained, Diogenes meant that he eschewed a sense of identity that was defined solely by his local origins and memberships, that instead, his identity was defined by more universal aspirations. Much of this early view was later developed by the Stoics, who viewed everyone as belonging to a world community of humankind that was joined by basic ethical values and principles, like justice, dignity, and respect. As Nussbaum observed, through these globalized lenses, “[w]e recognize moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real, and that otherwise would go unrecognized.” At the same time, however, Nussbaum did not totally

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11 Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10.

12 See Nussbaum, Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10, at 5.

13 Id. at 7-12.

14 See, e.g., Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, supra note 10 (“If we really do believe that all human beings are created equal and endowed with certain inalienable rights, we are morally required to think about what that conception requires us to do with and for the rest of the world.”).
escrow the pull of localized loyalties; she notes that even within this approach, there was still room for patriotism, for localized attachments and identities formed from a specific geographic origin.15

Similar observations have been made by Stuart Hall,16 anthropologist Craig Calhoun,17 and others, all of whom embrace the notion of an emergent global citizenry, a kind of transnational consciousness that spanned borders and cultures and celebrated openness and solidarity.18 Many have described cosmopolitanism as having essentially two strands — one about culture and the self, and another about justice — rejecting a kind of relativism that strict nationalism might embrace.19 Others describe it along the lines of a political or

15 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 Yale L.J. 1022, 1032 (2007) (asserting Nussbaum insisted on a “cosmopolitanism with room for local, ‘patriotic’ attachments”). Similarly, Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his book on cosmopolitanism, also applauds a view that focuses on ethical obligations to others, one that also embraces a highly robust view of autonomy, but also espouses a similar kind of partiality — what Appiah calls “rooted cosmopolitanism” — the idea that one can be partial to one’s ethical community. See kwame anthony appiah, cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers 213, 223-32 (2007); Appiah, supra note 10, at 618; see also Feldman, supra, at 1043 (discussing both Nussbaum and Appiah).

16 See Stuart Hall, Political Belonging in a World of Multiple Identities, in CONCEIVING COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE 25, 26 (Steven Vertovec & Robin Cohen eds., 2002) (defining cosmopolitanism as “the ability to stand outside of having one’s life written and scripted by any one community”); see also Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism 35, 40 (2005).

17 See Craig Calhoun, The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism, in CONCEIVING COSMOPOLITANISM: THEORY, CONTEXT, AND PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 86, 102-09 (linking cosmopolitanism to the spread of democracy); see also Tarrow, supra note 16, at 40.


19 See, e.g., Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 Ethics 48, 49 (1992) (distinguishing between legal and moral cosmopolitanism); Samuel Scheffler, Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, 11 Utilitas 255 (1999) (outlining two views of cosmopolitanism); see also David A. Hollinger, Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The New Cosmopolitans Find Their Own Way, 8 Constellations 236, 236-38 (2002) [hereinafter Not Universalists]. See generally Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Robert Post ed., 2006) (noting a transition from international to cosmopolitan formations of justice); Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (2004) (examining the incorporation of aliens, immigrants, and refugees in light of Kantian cosmopolitanism); Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (James Bohman & Matthias Lutz-Bachmann eds., 1997) (examining a tension between Kantian cosmopolitanism and nationalism that has remained constant throughout the last 200 years); Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989) (asserting that Rawl’s critics fail to distinguish between morality and justice); The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005) (containing works by political theorists in defense of positive cosmopolitanism as opposed to rigid support for national boundaries); kok-chor
institutional formulation — focusing on the emergence of globalized institutions.\textsuperscript{20}

Of course, much ink can be spilled about the importance of cosmopolitanism on political and legal theory. For the purposes of this Article, however, I want to briefly sketch out some of the ways in which dominant approaches to the study of both cosmopolitanism and transnationalism reveal new ways of situating our increasingly globalized systems of trademark regulation, and the ancillary ethical and moral questions that inevitably accompany this growth.

On a primary level, I would argue that Nussbaum and the current scholarship on cosmopolitanism have much to offer intellectual property scholars, many of whom are grounded in territorial frameworks that often fail to reckon with the erosion of sovereignty, the rise of global branding, and the ancillary rise of trademark harmonization in our current legal context. Currently, the field of trademark doctrine often remains closely tied to principles of territoriality and localized principles, despite the widespread embrace of transnational forces.\textsuperscript{21} As a result, the two forces often collide — a
trademark system grounded in territoriality and the emergence of harmonized systems of branding, marketing, and registration.

Admittedly, given how broad the field of cosmopolitanism has become, and its vast history, it can mean a variety of things—everything from an attitude or a value, to a kind of global governance, to a set of views on social structures and beyond. Yet trademarks, and global brands, are often a central vehicle by which these general approaches to cosmopolitanism specifically and symbolically unfold, and often the terrain under which conflicts over globalization and localization take place. As a result, trademark cosmopolitanism, one might argue, is thus inextricably linked to global flows of content, and as content and brands circulate transnationally, so do the legal principles of intellectual property that underpin them. The same is also true for the social and political movements that have also emerged surrounding the rise of global brands. Even the forces that oppose globalization and the rise of multinational corporations, I would argue, reflect a kind of cosmopolitan ethic that is worth further analysis and study. This phenomenon also includes a wide array of


23 Several legal scholars have also studied similar themes with respect to the globalization of intellectual property. See, e.g., Louise Bernier, Justice in Genetics: Intellectual Property and Human Rights from a Cosmopolitan Liberal Perspective (Edward Elgar ed., 2010) (discussing cosmopolitization in relation to distribution of intellectual property as health resources); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1341-42 (1996) (discussing the difficulties of conflicting legal regimes and globalization in relation to intellectual property law); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a
third parties who are, directly or indirectly, broadly implicated in the process of global branding, either because they support the process, like consumers, or because they oppose it, like anti-globalization activists. All of these elements encompass descriptive and normative aspects to their approaches, and they also underwrite some of the most important challenges for trademark law in the future.

A. From National Brand to Global Icon: Consumptive Cosmopolitanism

In 1983, in a groundbreaking article for the *Harvard Business Review*, Professor Theodore Levitt claimed that a global market for standardized, uniform products and services had emerged.24 To maximize the opportunities that this market presented, Levitt recommended selling standardized products in a wide variety of


geographic contexts and markets. Commenting on Levitt’s article, years later, brand scholars Douglas Holt and others explained that even though Levitt did not explicitly discuss branding, his ideas were interpreted to suggest the need for greater standardization and uniformity — not just among products, but among brand identities — giving rise to the growth of the global branding phenomenon.25

Thirty years after Levitt’s article was published, we see dramatic shifts in the standardization of both goods and of trademarks globally. Corporations, just like individuals, have adopted a global outlook and approach in many aspects of their day-to-day practices regarding brand management. Today, international branding comprises much more than just a selection of brand names — remember the famous Chevy Nova story, where “No Va” translated into “no go” in Spanish — but it is also about auditory, visual, emotional brand design.26 The process of global branding, for example, has been described to encompass everything from companies that use an identical marketing strategy across countries to others which utilize a similar brand with some variations in different markets.27 Other definitions of global


26 See Bernd Schmitt, From the Special Issue Editor, 10 J. INT’L MARKETING, SPECIAL ISSUE ON GLOBAL BRANDING, Summer 2002, at 2, 2-3 (containing excellent empirical papers on global trademarks and brands).

branding focus instead on the building of brand equity internationally, and still others focus on the harmonization of an international brand and marketing architecture.28

In turn, just as brands now reflect a kind of global consciousness and design, globalization has also produced a generation of cosmopolitanist consumers.29 This emerging culture is not tied to a singular global brand, or a culture of homogeneity, but a global culture instead — enabling consumers to “see themselves in relation to other cultures as well as their own.”30 This is not to suggest that consumers share the same tastes, but rather, that they participate in a shared conversation that often centers around the presence and participation of global brands. “Like entertainment stars, sports celebrities and politicians,” Douglas Holt writes, “global brands have become a lingua franca for consumers all over the world.”31 Anecdotal evidence further demonstrates these conclusions — “Global brands make us feel like citizens of the world, and...they somehow give us an identity,” one Argentinian consumer observed.32

Reading some of the vast literature on global branding, one is struck by the immediate similarity of its descriptive and normative insights to the differing cultural effects on brand performance); Sandeep Saxena, Challenges and Strategies of Global Branding in Indian Market, IOSR J. BUS. & MGMT., Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 38 (discussing the six challenges (6E's) and the strategies of global marketing); Kasia Moreno, What's Easier: To Make a Billion Dollars, Build a Global Company or Create a Global Brand?, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2013, 2:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2013/04/09/whats-easier-to-make-a-billion-dollars-build-a-global-company-or-create-a-global-brand/ (discussing how innovation in a given country affects marketing strategy); Schumpeter, Emerging-Market Companies are Trying to Build Global Brands, ECONOMIST (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21559894/ (discussing the hardships associated with global branding).

28 See Pike, supra note 27, at 626-27 (citing sources).


30 Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 70.

31 Id.

32 Id. at 71. Another consumer from New Zealand echoed similarly, “Global brands make you feel part of something bigger and give you a sense of belonging.” Id.
the literature on cosmopolitanism. Some authors, for example, tend to focus on the notion of cosmopolitanism as a fundamental set of identities that involve a sense of “belonging . . . to the world as a whole,” a kind of global citizenry that reflects transnational perspectives. Other authors tend to describe cosmopolitanism in terms of a set of identities, values, and attitudes that variously embrace notions of diverse world perspectives, and a strong degree of openness to others. This type of cultural competence embraces global diversity in terms of food, music, self-presentation, and ethical world views.

As the prior sentence suggests, part of the culture of cosmopolitanism is deeply tied to consumer practices of consumption, and it is also linked to visual brand culture as well. Our sense of the world around us — our very language and ways of thinking and framing our environments — are deeply inscribed and circumscribed by the brands and advertising that inhabit our everyday world. Brands, like cosmopolitanist approaches, have symbolic, emotional, and cultural aspects. And as brands become more and more global in their design and interpretative reach, it makes sense that our cosmopolitan world view becomes reflected through patterns of consumption and changes in consumer identity. Twenty years ago, global branding

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33 See Nancy E. Cook, Canadian Development Workers, Transnational Encounters and Cultures of Cosmopolitanism, 27 INT’L SOC. 3, 5-6 (2012) (suggesting three aspects — one normative, one political, and one cultural); Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 209 (“[Cosmopolitanism is] an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences.” (quoting Ulf Hannerz, Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY: A THEORY CULTURE AND SOCIETY SPECIAL ISSUE 242-43 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990))). Other, cultural approaches to cosmopolitanism, for example, center on increasing tolerance for diversity and cultural competence, see Cook, supra, at 5. For example, one author defines the cosmopolitan as possessing a “willingness to engage with the other.” Id. at 6; see also Michele Lamont & Sada Aksartova, Ordinary Cosmopolitanisms: Strategies for Bridging Racial Boundaries Among Working-Class Men, 19 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, Aug. 2002, at 1, 2; Loren B. Landau & Iriann Freemantle, Tactical Cosmopolitanism and Idioms of Belonging: Insertion and Self-Exclusion in Johannesburg, 36 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 375, 380 (2010).

34 See Woodward et al., supra note 22, at 208.

scholars argued that the less consumerized a market is, the more the emphasis is on the utilitarian aspects of a brand, and its link to the marketplace. Today, all of that has shifted in favor of advertising that trends towards being more symbolic, and more emotional in order to connect to the consumer. Trademarks, today, are less about identifications of origin; instead, their earlier function has been surpassed by their growing role as “messengers” that convey a broad range of information to the public about the product, the company, the people behind the company, and the attributes of each.36 As a result, the trademark represents both a global visual receptacle and a vehicle for all of the emotive and personality characteristics that advertisers hope to associate with a particular brand.37 Obviously as markets become globalized, brands — and individuals — do as well.38

More recently, although the rush towards global branding has waned at different points, it has also given rise to a greater push towards localized customization to suit consumer tastes, a “glocal” strategy, as some have called it.39 For example, Kraft general foods markets Philadelphia cream cheese globally, but it differs its approach — so in the United States we are encouraged to eat it on bagels, but in Spain, they sell a salmon-flavored version; Germany gets a pear-flavored version; Italy, a tuna version. McDonalds does something similar — you can get wine with your burger in France, or beer in Germany, or an Indian potato burger in India.40 All of this, of course, depends on the interplay between satisfying and constructing consumer preferences, depending upon the context.41


38 See Julio Cerviño & Jose Maria Cubillo, A Resource Based Perspective on Global Branding: An Analysis of Trademark Registration Data, 21 INT’L J. MGMT. 451, 460 (2004).

39 Holt et al., Global Brands, supra note 24, at 69.

40 See Elsmore, supra note 36, at 224-25.

41 For example, with respect to goods like laundry detergent — some markets prefer “green” detergents and are willing to pay a premium, others care less about these issues, but face a wide diversity in machines, water temperature, and preferences, requiring greater creativity in marketing. See id.
Today, Coca-Cola soft drinks and Marlboro cigarettes are the top two global brands. Soft drinks, tobacco, pet foods, and snack foods are other areas with the greatest global brand presence. Not only are global branding strategies economical from an efficiency perspective, because they enable one company to use one advertising agency for its global reach, but they also help centralize the messaging and personality that surrounds a global brand. Further, not only do they enable the creation of a global brand identity, but they are also thought to offer a number of benefits to the consumer, namely credibility, authority, value, and power, and the feeling of belonging to a global community. Some empirical evidence has shown, for example, that people tend to endorse the idea that globalization will enhance their opportunities to consume products from around the world, and relatedly, that sampling from and learning about different cultures is a widely appealing endeavor.

However, cosmopolitanism is not an enterprise free from critique and concern. Some scholars have critiqued cosmopolitanism for its close relationship to notions of empire, capitalism, and western idioms of thought, expressing concern that it facilitates “an improving conversion of the local other into the western universal.” One must be careful not to presume that both cosmopolitanism and globalization are always connected — as one author points out, it is both historically and empirically unwarranted to view globalization as a precondition for cosmopolitanism. One can be globalized, but still lacking the definitive consciousness that cosmopolitanism brings, desiring insularity, nationalism, and parochialism.

Further, there remain substantial and quite valid concerns about the impact of globalization on cultural and consumer diversity. Global

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43 Aaker & Joachimsthaler, *supra* note 27, at 137.
44 See Hsieh, *supra* note 37, at 60-61.
45 Woodward et al., *supra* note 22, at 217 (showing 85–93% of respondents to a survey endorse these views).
46 Cook, *supra* note 33, at 5 (citation omitted).
47 See Woodward et al., *supra* note 22, at 210.
48 See, e.g., Ritzer, *supra* note 29 (discussing the affect of globalized corporate structure on the international community); Saskia Sassen, *The Global City* (1991) (exploring the relationship between the globalization of the financial industry and the growth of global cities); Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labor and Capital* (1988) (discussing cultural changes in manufacturing nations, especially South-East Asia and the Caribbean Basin, as well as changes in market locations such as California, New York, and New Jersey).
consumer culture has been described as “a cultural identity not associated with a single country, but rather a larger group generally recognized as international and transcending individual national cultures.” 49 There are, of course, distributional effects of these social formations — one scholar writes that the “rise of global consumption ideals, potentially makes the elite among Third World consumers into cosmopolitans who are more concerned with how they compare to the world’s privileged consumers than they are to compare themselves locally.” 50 Other anecdotal and theoretical treatments of this issue have emphasized the increasing homogeneity of the global consumer, to the point that localized cultures and tastes may play a secondary role to the dominance of global brand identity. Even empirical studies have suggested this to be the case. 51 Other studies argue, as a variation, that “increasing globalization has reduced the homogeneity of consumer behaviors within countries, while increasing communalities among consumers across countries.” 52 Central to this process, nevertheless, is the desire to own the “consumption symbols” or goods from countries whose lifestyles are admired. 53 Here, brands become a central part of the sign of membership in a global cosmopolitan community, of membership in a “transnational commerce culture.” 54

49 See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 80.
51 One study concludes that while localized behaviors still matter, “a global consumer is beginning to emerge to some degree,” noting that mass communication has the ability to “break down national identity.” Bruce Keillor, Michael D’Amico & Veronica Horton, Global Consumer Tendencies, 18 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 1, 15-16 (2001).
53 Cleveland & Laroche, supra note 52, at 253.
54 See Alden et al., supra note 27, at 77 (quoting Ulf Hannerz, Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture, in GLOBAL CULTURE: NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY: A THEORY CULTURE AND SOCIETY SPECIAL ISSUE 242-43 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990)).
B. The Rise of Corporate Cosmopolitanism

So far, I have outlined how a cosmopolitan world view has become reflected in the process of global branding and transnational consumption, both by corporations and also by individuals. But for Nussbaum and others, cosmopolitanism is also deeply tied to a notion of ethics, a concept of duty to other individuals. Here, too, trademark law becomes intimately tied to the process of creating greater attention to corporate social responsibility, particularly in the creation of global brands.

As companies become more globalized, and multinational in character, and the design and creation of brands have followed suit, consumers have also followed this trend, focusing their attention on the global business practices of the companies that they patronize. While there is a vast literature on corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) and its various forms, I want to sketch out, briefly here, some of the complementarities between modern CSR approaches and the phenomenon of trademark cosmopolitanism that I have described so far. 55

Although the term “corporate social responsibility” was coined by economist Howard Bowen a decade after Nuremberg, 56 its modern formation tends to emphasize the need for corporations to consider the social and ecological impact of their practices on humanity as a whole, and without ceasing to remain a profit generating entity. 57 While the field of CSR traditionally refers to the protection of human rights, labor rights, the environment, and non-corrupt business practices, among other considerations, 58 it also connects deeply to notions of trademark cosmopolitanism for a variety of reasons.

First, as the previous section suggested, the brand’s visuality often becomes the central repository for all the ancillary conflicts that surround a corporation — social, political, economic, etc. As a result, in order to protect their brands from public reproach, most companies


57 See id. at 560.

58 Id.
now engage in proactive strategies that infuse the brand’s personality with information about a company’s desirable business practices and its commitment to social responsibility. Information about corporate practices in each of these areas — human rights, labor, the environment, etc. — deeply affects the way in which the brand is viewed. Think, for example, of how companies like British Petroleum have had to rebrand themselves after evidence of their ethical or environmental practices came to light.

Second, it also connects to consumers’ own cosmopolitanism, reflected in their global buying practices. As consumers view themselves as global citizens, they increasingly offer concern for the manufacturing practices of the companies that they patronize. For example, consider the maelstrom of media attention that focused on Apple after evidence of its iPhone manufacturing practices came to light. Third, and relatedly, the brand becomes the visual cue for the information that the consumer possesses about a company’s labor practices. That is why the relationship between a company’s brand managers and activist antibranding movements can be so contentious for trademark lawyers.

59 See Douglas B. Holt et al., How Model Behavior Brings Market Power: Consumers Associate Global Brands with Good Quality But Also Hold Global Companies to Higher Ethical Standards, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2004), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0e4c539c-f4a0-11d8-9911-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2FSAllfHhN.


61 See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, Will Child Labour Claims Stop You Buying Apple?, GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2010/mar/01/apple-ipod (discussing allegations that children manufactured Apple products); Farhad Manjoo, Apple in China: The iPhone Maker Should Ditch Its Troubling Labor Practices and Reinvent Gadget Manufacturing, HUFF. POST (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/apple-china-foxconn_n_1246693.html (discussing the working conditions of Chinese employees producing Apple products); Bill Ray, 40,000 Apple Fansbois Demand Ethical iPhone 5, REGISTER (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/01/ethical_iphone/ (discussing a petition requesting better working conditions for employees who make Apple products); Katherine Yau, Apple Product Sales at an All-Time High, Labor Practices at Dangerous Low, GOLDEN GATE EXPRESS (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.goldengateexpress.org/2012/03/07/apple-products/ (discussing the need to refrain from buying Apple products as long as there are poor working conditions in the factories).

company’s connection to environmental degradation, unfair labor practices, or other issues of social justice, activists can further inform the public and — literally — alter the semiotic significance of a particular brand to the public. That is why branding often plays such a powerful role in disputes about CSR.63

There are other, proactive branding strategies that further underscore a commitment to CSR.64 One of the key ways in which corporations address their CSR is through the marketplace — including “rights-sensitive” branding strategies, codes of conduct, voluntary submissions to auditing practices, and shareholder pressure.65 “Rights-sensitive” branding involves the practice of offering a particular selection of goods to consumers who are willing to pay a premium for ethically sourced materials — like Starbucks’ “fair trade” coffees, Chiquita’s “ethical banana” marketed in Europe, and the Kimberly Process of reducing conflict diamonds in the marketplace.66 Other market-based solutions also have branding implications as well — Royal Dutch Shell, Nike, and others have adopted private codes of conduct that are often used to buttress their reputations on the global branding platform.67

63 It also helps explain why the most prominent global brands often have the best reputations for CSR. See, for example, Jacquelyn Smith, The Companies With the Best CSR Reputations, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2012/12/10/the-companies-with-the-best-csr-reputations/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2013), for a discussion that Forbes’s ranking of the companies with the best corporate social responsibility are also companies with the most prominent global brands. See Being a Responsible Company, STARBUCKS COFFEE CO., http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (stating “as we have grown to now more than 18,000 stores in over 60 countries, so too has our commitment to corporate citizenship” and noting Starbucks’s commitment to ethical sourcing); Corporate Responsibility Report: FY 10-11, N I KE, INC., http://www.nikeresponsibility.com/report/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013); Microsoft 2012 Citizenship Report, MICROSOFT 62, http://www.microsoft.com/about/corporatecitizenship/en-us/reporting/(last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (noting its commitment to global citizenship); Sustainable Business Performance Summary: Striving for Better Performance, NIKE, INC., http://nikeinc.com/pages/responsibility (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (“As environmental, social and economic challenges in our world proliferate, they demand our best performance. We’re using the power of our brand, the energy and passion of our people and the scale of our business to create meaningful change.”).


65 Bellish, supra note 56, at 567.

66 Id.

67 Some have argued that the “rights-sensitive” branding approach only affects a small segment of consumers, those that are not price sensitive, but highly value sensitive. Indeed, most of the companies that engage in fair trade and ethically sourced practices tend to be premium brands, which suggests that consumers that purchase these goods tend to be willing — and able — to pay a premium. Admittedly,
Of course, that is not the only practical strategy of CSR visibility — other companies, like Shell Nigeria, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum, and Union Carbide also engage in rebranding and CSR-type behavior after a major disaster, attempting to retain consumers by taking measures to restore their reputation. Other companies engage in voluntary codes of conduct — Nike, Gap, Levi Strauss, and other companies employ inspectors who grade suppliers on labor standards and attempt to ensure fairer practices. These practices are both represented and reinforced by massive advertising campaigns that are also infused with branding these companies' social responsibility and further informing the public of their activities. Here, the global brand is actively linked to the culture and ethics of cosmopolitanism, albeit indirectly, further underlining how trademarks provide the visual, symbolic vehicle to communicate such information.

C. The Role of Institutionalized Cosmopolitanism

Of course, trademark cosmopolitanism would be deeply ineffective if it were not for the way in which both legal and political systems have adjusted to facilitate the production of global brands to suit consumer preferences. Here, too, we can find key synergies with traditional cosmopolitanist approaches, particularly those which focus on the growth of institutional frameworks. For example, one of the most prominent articulations of modern institutional cosmopolitanism stems from Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the idea of membership to the community of humanity as a whole. Kant developed this idea in the context of a world federation that focused on cosmopolitanism as a form of right, along with the growth of world trade and a global public sphere. In more contemporary times, Jack Goldsmith, in his
writing on cosmopolitanism, similarly writes of a recent turn to a more institutionalized sense of cosmopolitanism — the idea that duties attach to domestic institutions (e.g., national governments) and, derivatively, to international institutions.72

These ideals also resonate in the complex world of international intellectual property. In just the past few decades, we have seen a massive rise in systems of intellectual property harmonization, along with the simultaneous rise of global branding and trademarking practices. While the two may or may not be causally related, they suggest that the institutional growth of transnational entities to regulate trademarks raises related questions regarding the aftereffects of globalization on both legal and political systems. The Paris Convention and TRIPS both obligate parties to create and provide minimum standards of protection for trademarks, but this process has been messy, costly, and deeply fraught with conflict for some nations, particularly across the developing world.73

Yet as applied to trademarks, the institutional afterlife of cosmopolitanism reveals a complex reordering of the notion of national borders, one that is largely scripted by the transnational


circulation of global brands. Some brands, of course, begin as local markets and then expand internationally, and others are actually designed to be global at their outset. The emergence of transnational systems — TRIPS, the Madrid system, and Europe’s Community Trademark system, among others — shift the process of branding from a national or local enterprise to one where companies must imagine, at the moment of brand creation, how their brands will fare on the worldwide stage. “At Novartis,” for example, one spokesperson explains, “we only have global branding concepts. Our products are introduced at the global scale.”

Thus, just as global branding is now an integral part of any multinational marketing enterprise, global trademark registration is an essential part of the portfolio for any growing business. In Eastern Europe, for example, companies had registered marks for over a decade prior to the fall of communism in markets that had not even opened yet. Empirical evidence has shown how trademarks have dramatically risen in power, as companies have chosen to engage in far more trademarking and branding activity than in prior years, suggesting that trademarks comprise a much greater proportion of countries’ GDP.

The increase in trademarking activity — coupled with the rise of global branding — has also spurred some significant international changes. More and more companies are choosing to register trademarks in other countries; WIPO has reported a significant increase in nonresident applications for trademarks, mostly from applicants who reside in higher income countries. Consider some statistics: According to WIPO, the number of trademarks has increased from 500,000 in 1985 to over two million in 2007. From 2009 to 2010, for example, the world saw a 21.4% increase in the

76 The expanding economic role for trademarks in national economies is dramatic. In Australia, for example, the number of marks per billion of dollars of GDP has doubled, from 50 in the early 1990s to 100 in 2002. Joanne Loundes & Mark Rogers, The Rise of Trade Marking in Australia in the 1990s 3 (Melb. Inst. of Applied Econ. and Soc. Res. Inst. of Austl., Working Paper No. 8/03, 2003); see also Smith, supra note 75, at 2.
global registration of trademarks. 2011, in turn, saw the highest number of international trademark applications ever filed under WIPO’s Madrid system, with filings from Russia, the EU, and the United States in the lead for the most applications. Applications had gone up almost 7% over the previous year, to a total of nearly 42,000 filed that year.

Today, the Madrid Protocol remains the most powerful tool for brand owners to register their marks in other countries. The Madrid system is based on two treaties, the Madrid Agreement which is called the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (“Madrid Agreement”), adopted in 1891, and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement, adopted in 1989 and in force since

80 See id.
1996. The Madrid system enables applicants to file a single registration, facilitating the global spread and growth of brands. Under the Madrid system, a firm that already has a trademark in one of the participating countries can apply to register that mark in other participating countries. The top users of the Madrid system utilize a global branding strategy, enabling them to market a single brand in multiple markets, reflecting both market power and dominance. One business owner said that Madrid is essential for a global branding strategy: “Through Madrid we can get quicker into markets. This means we gain time and the whole management of IP is different. There are not 50 different systems, but everything is much simpler.”

The advantages of the Madrid system are manifold — it reduces the costs associated with trademark registration and streamlines the process. The Madrid system has been heralded for its low costs — Microsoft has claimed that costs have gone down 40% in its international filings. Empiricists have also found a positive correlation between the growth of global trade and the rise of filings and renewals under the Madrid system. In 1985, there were only 50,000 nonresident trademark registrations, comprising 28% of the global trade marks registered; as compared with 760,000 such registrations in 2007, making up now 36% of those marks in 2007.

However much the Madrid system does to advance trademark cosmopolitanism, it is not perfect. The system is mostly a procedural one, it does not actually substantively examine the specific trademarks. Instead, the substantive application takes place in the originating country, otherwise known as the Country of Origin.

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82 Ghafele, supra note 74, at 161.
83 Smith, supra note 75, at 7 (citing Ghafele, supra note 74, at 166).
84 Ghafele, supra note 74, at 166.
86 Ghafele, supra note 74, at 161-62.
have a mark protected in one country but not in another. Similarly, these registrations are also deeply dependent on the home country — so that whatever happens to the national trademark, an amendment, cancellation, denial, withdrawal, happens to the international one as well, although it is possible to convert some applications into national ones. There is also not a lot of room for movement in terms of localizing or nationalizing global brands filed under the Madrid system — any slight change in the trademark’s status usually requires a refile.

However mixed some of the reviews may be of the Madrid system, it is patently clear that Madrid reflects, in some ways, an institutionalized cosmopolitanist outlook that bridges the link between corporations and government systems in the process of global branding. Even as it actively facilitates global branding, it is also intrinsically designed to overlook national differences in trademark registration, the protection of speech, and so on. Further, Madrid is only one example of the trend towards trademark harmonization. The Community Trademark in Europe (“CTM”) is another example of a harmonized regime, facilitating a single process of registration for all states in Europe. This single registration is valid for all of the member countries of the European Union, and there are a variety of other, international, means towards trademark harmonization. Here, the European Trademark Office offers the European Trademark, which gives uniform protection for all identical brand names after a single registration is filed with the office of harmonization. The CTM is widely considered to be a model for future calls towards greater trademark harmonization, suggesting that it may serve as an inspiration for a future, unitary global system of trademark protection.

Yet optimistic predictions of the rise of global trademarking can often belie a more complicated reality regarding the distributive effects of harmonization. At the same time that this global trend has
unfolded, for example, it is important to mention that there are some islands of resistance to the global branding trend. One study on the Madrid Protocol has discovered, for example, that India and South Africa have demonstrated some forms of discrimination in the registration process against foreign firms. This finding resonates with the research done by another scholar, who has found evidence of trademark protectionism in China, Hong Kong, India, and South Africa, noting that “discrimination is more likely to occur when products offered by foreign firms are of similar quality to the ones produced by domestic firms.”

Further, perhaps one of the greatest issues faced by the rise of trademark cosmopolitanism is how to reconcile the protection of intellectual property with the protection of other fundamental rights, like the freedom of expression. Some countries, like the United States, expressly protect freedom of expression as a fundamental right, and some courts offer specific protections for things like parody; and still other commonwealth countries, like the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia, do not have a constitutional right to freedom of speech, but recognize its existence in statutes or common law. In addition, there has been very little discussion of the importance of protecting freedom of expression at the treaty negotiation level, suggesting that many of these issues are considered to be best left to the local and regional judicial systems to sort through. For example, according to Lisa Ramsey, the legislative history suggests that there was almost no discussion of the conflict between trademark rights and freedom of expression during the TRIPS negotiations. Neither the Paris Convention, nor TRIPS, nor the Madrid Protocols have any formal declaration of a commitment to freedom of expression, suggesting that it never rose to a level of importance as a fundamental


94 Smith, supra note 75, at 8 (citing Eugenia Baroncelli et al., Trademark Protection or Protectionism, 15 REV. INT’L ECON. 126, 128 (2007)).

95 Eugenia Baroncelli et al., Trademark Protection or Protectionism, 15 REV. INT’L ECON. 126, 140 (2007). This is unsurprising, given some history: In the 1970s and 1980s, India required that foreign brands be linked to local allied companies so that local companies could benefit from the brand equity that foreign trademarks enjoyed. Kate Gillespie et al., Protecting Global Brands: Toward a Global Norm, 10 J. INT’L MARKETING 99, 101 (2002).


97 Id. at 415.
part of the international architecture of trademark law. International protections of copyright, in contrast, do have protections for freedom of expression built into them.\(^98\) As the following Part suggests, this absence has deep significance for the activist movements that target multinational corporations and their practices, and for the flourishing of freedom of speech, generally.

II. THE TRANSNATIONAL ANTIBRAND

As the previous Part suggested, the emergence of trademark cosmopolitanism can often implicate questions about freedom of expression as a fundamental right, demonstrating another side to the phenomenon of global branding — global antibranding. In just the last few decades, a new activist movement has sprung up internationally and domestically, engaging in artistic and political activity to challenge the expansion of the brand into public discourse.\(^99\) Sometimes antibrands might target a certain brand for opposition; at other times (like Nadia Plesner's evocation of an LVMH bag to bring attention to Darfur), they might utilize a brand for the purposes of political, satirical, or humorous commentary on another subject. And yet, the ways in which these artists have done so have raised complicated questions of identity, language, and control — setting up a clash between the international standards for freedom of speech and intellectual property.\(^100\)

Transnational activism of this sort is also deeply connected to the rise of trademark cosmopolitanism, even if there is not always a perfect identicality between the two. The rise of the global antibranding movement is intimately tied to the rise of global branding: one cannot have one without the other, and the proportional growth of the antibrand is tied to the growth of the brand. Much of the activities of antibrand activists, therefore, is deeply

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\(^100\) Katyal, Antibranding, supra note 99, at 797-98.
tied to targeting CSR practices — drawing attention to current events, or using brands to comment on issues involving racial inequities, distributive injustice, labor issues, and the like. In other words, the same elements that contribute to the global consumption of brands can often contribute to global anti-consumption of them as well. As Rosemary Coombe has written: “Protests against sweatshop labour practices, and the movement of big box stores and fast food franchises into communities, suggest that the trademark now provides a site and a symbol around which to resist forms of commodification that people find contrary to their understandings of community and social justice.”

A. The Rise of Cosmopolitan Political Solidarity

Benedict Anderson’s famous book Imagined Communities powerfully postulated that a nation is conceived, not as a reality, but as a collective work of imagination that has emerged from the circulation of capital and the rise of print communication. From this starting point, a number of scholars relied on Anderson for a deeper study of nationalism and the territorial impulse. Writing on Anderson, Partha Chatterjee writes that the newspaper, the novel, and other forms of print media “afford the opportunity for individuals to

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imagine themselves as members of larger than face-to-face solidarities, of choosing to act on behalf of those solidarities, of transcending by an act of political imagination the limits imposed by traditional practices.”

Today, some have argued, and I would agree, that Anderson’s observations can profitably extend to today’s global circulation of media, and relatedly, to the emergence of cosmopolitan forms of solidarity. After all, if print media helped individual citizens imagine the nation, then why can the rapid circulation of new media not help individuals imagine a similar kind of imagination of a collective, cosmopolitanist global identity? And why can the same not be true of the transnational consumption of global branding as well? Does the transnational circulation of brands signify a new global order, an imagined community of consumers — and an imagined community of global activists? As Arjun Appadurai observes, these transnational solidarities are crafted from, not nationalism, but from a commonality of tastes, of pleasures, and of politics, what Appadurai calls “communit[ies] of sentiment.”

Even as a purely non-legal matter, I would also argue that Anderson’s construction of the imagined community perfectly tracks similar observations regarding the cosmopolitanist trajectories of both

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Some of them may wish to redefine the nation . . . others again are in the nation but not a part of it. They may be the real cosmopolitans, or they may indeed owe a stronger allegiance to some other kind of imagined international community . . . . There may be divided commitments, ambiguities, and conflicting resonances as well.

global consumption and anti-global activism. In the case of global consumption, as I suggested in Part I, we see a cosmopolitanist trajectory that embraces the increasing unification of global brands that operate to help individuals imagine themselves as part of a broader, global community of other consumers. But in the case of the anti-globalization activist, the lingua franca of the antibrand operates similarly, just in reverse. As scholars have argued, many transnational activists presume a kind of cosmopolitan solidarity across borders that transforms “national citizens into global citizens by creating obligations towards people suffering outside the nation.”

There is also a fascinating parallel between the cosmopolitanist consumption that I detailed in Part I, and the antibranding activists I detail in this Part and elsewhere. Like consumers of global brands, many cosmopolitan activists accept multiplicities of roots and plural loyalties, and although they move outside of their spatial origins, they continue to be linked to a concept of place and the resources and opportunities that place offers them. As a result, the imagined community, here, is not a community of consumers, but of activists who are often deeply critical of the practices of multinational corporations and global branding. These activists are defined as transnational because they mobilize domestic and international resources in order to advance claims on behalf of external actors or in favor of goals they may hold in common with other transnational allies. These individuals typify the trend of “activism beyond borders,” and they comprise groups of immigrant and labor activists, ecologists, and other political actors who may exist loosely outside of state formation.

107 See TARROW, supra note 16, at 41-42 (arguing that the cosmopolitanist trajectory is far more ethically and politically oriented than other accounts suggest).

108 Kyriakidou, supra note 105, at 482 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kate Nash, Global Citizenship as Show Business: The Cultural Politics of Make Poverty History, 30 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOCY 167, 168 (2008)).

109 See, e.g., Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, supra note 99 (connecting artistic disobedience, activism and antibranding); Katyal, Antibranding, supra note 99 (describing the complex interrelationship between branding and antibranding).

110 See TARROW, supra note 16, at 42; see also Mitchell Cohen, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 39 DISSERT, Fall 1992, at 478, 483.

111 TARROW, supra note 16, at 43.

112 Id. at 9-10 (quoting MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, at xii (1998)). Due to their language proficiency and connectedness to international issues, people, and places, these activists are able to leverage their more nuanced understanding of society’s connectedness on an international level. Id. at 43; see also KECK & SIKKINK, supra, at 2 (discussing the increasing significance and relevancy of activist networks).
Indeed, as Douglas Holt has explained, at times, global branding has lost its luster precisely because multinational corporations have become vulnerable to charges from anti-globalization activists. “Who can forget,” Holt writes, “the images of angry demonstrators smashing the windows of a McDonald’s outlet in Davos, Switzerland, or stomping Coke cans in Seattle?” Labor, pollution, and cultural imperialism concerns operate at the forefront of activist agendas, which tend to coalesce around the global branding enterprise. As the journalist Naomi Klein recounts in her book, No Logo, the antibranding movement operates at the cross-section between art, labor, and anti-globalization. By targeting companies that have invested millions in building strong global brands, antibranders seek to expose potential hypocrisy between corporate philosophy and corporate activity to the average consumer. Indeed, evidence has suggested that in countries with weak or underenforced environmental regulations, companies tend to adopt private regulatory programs only when their overseas clients and shareholders demand it. As a result, antibrANDING activism often exploits the same tools used in advertising — powerful visuals, brand recognition, catchy slogans, and emotionally scripted language — to get their message out to the public.

It is therefore no surprise that much of the world’s most prominent trademark cases regarding antibranding have come from one of the largest and most international environmental action groups: Greenpeace. In 2010, in response to the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf, Greenpeace, an environmental awareness group, announced a contest to “Redesign BP’s logo,” explaining:

Anti-sweatshop movements were galvanized in 1992 when the National Labor Committee performed an expose of corporate and U.S. government subsidies of maquilas. Afterward, major labels like the GAP, Nike, Disney, and Guess were forced to respond to consumer concerns about their labor practices with partners in developing nations, even though they had claimed only years earlier to be “innocent global shoppers.”

Id. (quoting Martin Morris, Contradictions of Post-Modern Consumerism and Resistance, 64 STUD. POL. ECON. 25, 26 (2001)).
A few years ago, BP rebranded themselves as “beyond petroleum.” And yet BP is pursuing... deepwater drilling, despite the massive environmental damage that’s being caused by their business.

That’s why we want you to rebrand them.

The campaign concludes: “BP’s slick green logo doesn’t suit a company that engages in dangerous offshore drilling. We’re inviting you to design them a new logo that’s more suitable for their dirty business.”118 Greenpeace’s work was particularly effective at changing the semiotic import of British Petroleum’s massive advertising campaign to highlight its focus on clean energy. After a few of these graphic interventions, it was hard to see British Petroleum’s advertising campaign in the light it had originally intended.119

In addition to a growing concern about CSR, a second factor has added to the growth in antibranding: the increasing force of “consumer sovereignty,” which has led many consumers to respond and publicize their complaints against particular corporations.120 These dynamics have reframed the relationship between advertising and consumers into a much more dialogic relationship, as opposed to a one-way relationship of corporate incultuation. “Ethical shareholders, culture jammers, street reclaimers, McUnion organizers, human rights hacktivists, school-logo fighters and Internet corporate watchdogs are at the early stages of demanding a citizen-centered alternative to the international rule of the brands,” Naomi Klein writes in No Logo.121 In many cases, antibranding activists have decidedly turned to the advertising executives’ own arsenal of tools to address consumer concerns, using appropriative strategies to address the increasing dominance of branding strategies in both private and public space.


121 Rimmer, supra note 101, at 79 (quoting NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES 445-46 (2009)).
Many of these practices intrinsically raise trademark concerns, however. Consider, again, the story of Nadia Plesner and her relationship to the crisis in Darfur. Plesner’s ability to use LVMH bags as a floating signifier of political import is also, in part, a function of the same variety of elements that facilitate brand transnationalism. Yet Plesner felt, like many cosmopolitanists, a moral duty to draw attention to the crisis — a keen desire born from a foundational belief in the shared responsibility of humankind. Every aspect of her political expression — from the conceptualization of the project, to its execution, to her attempts to secure legal protection for her expression — was tied to other localities. Further, Plesner’s intent in drawing a transhistorical connection between Picasso’s antiwar position and her own critique of celebrity branding, luxury, and contemporary political culture was also meant to place use of the LVMH logo at the center of her expression. Whereas Picasso’s earlier iconoclastic work of art targeted governments, Plesner’s work drew attention to the need for targeting global luxury brands and the consumptive practices that exalted them. Moreover, as the legal dispute over Nadia Plesner’s work demonstrated, much of the conflict played out in reference to the global visibility of LVMH’s brand — which operated as a symbol and vessel for both commentary on the global presence of luxury brands, cosmopolitanist consumption, and the need for international social justice and awareness.

There was no doubt that Plesner’s use of the image was deliberately provocative, in that she had already been sued by Louis Vuitton. But it is also fascinating that Louis Vuitton chose to pursue a case against her when its previous threats against her led to such criticism in the press. The court’s reaction to the Darfunica case, though, was

122 See generally Tarrow, supra note 16, at 35-56 (discussing the role of the availability of rapid forms of personal and digital communication, the widespread use of English, the ease of international travel, and the diffuse spread of knowledge from the Web).

123 She kept a widely read blog on the creation of her painting, Darfunica, making daily updates to the painting that were explicitly linked to the ever-changing political conditions in the Sudan. See Lucie Guibault, The Netherlands: Darfunica, Miffy and the Right to Parody!, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFOR. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 236, 244 (2011) (quoting from the translated decision Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 4 mei 2011, KG 2011, 294 m.nt. (Plesner Joensen/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.), translation available at http://www.nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living-darfurica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf).

124 There was, however, a key reason for LVMH’s choice to sue. Contrary to the settlement in 2008, this time, Plesner — probably in a show of provocation to LVMH — planned to market sales of t-shirts and other goods that depicted the same image that LVMH had already objected to. When they discovered Plesner’s commercial plans, LVMH was, understandably, quite incensed. After the piece was finished,
fascinating. Both parties, in fashioning their arguments, relied on different sections of the European Convention on Human Rights; Plesner relied on the right of freedom of expression, and Louis Vuitton relied on the fundamental right to property (and relatedly, intellectual property). At first, the lower court ruled in favor of LVMH in its bid for a preliminary injunction, ruling in favor of its intellectual property rights. It concluded that a subsequent use of the picture in an announcement for the artist's upcoming exhibition was an “eye-catcher,” and thus unjustified because it functioned as an advertisement for the artist's own work. But a few months later, the same court reversed its position after fully adjudicating the issue, deciding to rule in favor of Plesner based on her freedom of expression claim instead. In an insightful citation, the court explained that property rights needed to take a secondary role to the protection of freedom of speech, noting: “Opposite Louis Vuitton's fundamental right to peaceful enjoyment of its exclusive rights to the use of the design, there is, according to established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the fundamental right of Plesner that is high in a democratic society's propriety list to express her opinion through her art.”

Central, of course, to the court's determination was its conclusion that Plesner's activities, contrary to LVMH's arguments, did not take place in the commercial realm. “[A]rtists enjoy a considerable protection with regard to their artistic freedom, in which, in principle, art may ‘offend, shock or disturb.’ . . . Plesner's intention with 'Simple Living' is not (or was not) to free ride with Louis Vuitton's reputation in a commercial sense,” the court concluded. Instead, it found that Plesner's juxtaposition of LVMH logos and glamorous images with the

LVMH again decided to seek action to stop the work from being shown, this time from a court in The Hague. Just as it had previously done, the company argued that Plesner had illegally appropriated its marks.

125 Guibault, supra note 123, at 236. Note that LVMH argued that its fundamental right to property was violated, under the European Convention on Human Rights, and extended this fundamental right to intellectual property, which the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) did in the Anheuser/Busch decision. Plesner's freedom of expression claim, in contrast, comes from Article 10 of the ECHR, which protects the right to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas. See id. at 245. For further discussion on Article 10, see Coenraad Visser, The Location of the Parody Defence in Copyright Law: Some Comparative Perspectives, 38 CILSA 321, 339-41 (2005).

126 See Guibault, supra note 123, at 244 (quoting from a translation of the decision).

127 See id. at 237.

128 See id. at 246.

129 Id.
crisis in Darfur was consistent with her critique of luxury and affluence in a time of famine. Indeed, the court explained her motivation as follows:

[S]he wished to draw attention to the poignant difference between luxury and affluence on the one hand, and poverty and famine in Darfur on the other hand. She has expressed the aspect of luxury by using the Design of [LVMH] in her work of art. She has succeeded in her purpose. Partly because of her work of art, the genocide in Darfur came to the attention of the general public in 2008.\footnote{Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage 4 mei 2011, KG 2011, 294 m.nt. (Plesner Joensen/Louis Vuitton Malletier SA) (Neth.), translation available at http://www.nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living--darfurica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf.}

It compared Plesner’s symbolic brand appropriation to that of a newspaper, ascribing it an informational function by concluding that “a newspaper should not have a lesser far-reaching protection of the freedom of speech” because it pursues profits with the articles it publishes.\footnote{Guibault, supra note 123, at 247.} Significantly, in a curt line or two, the court ordered LVMH to pay Plesner’s legal fees, and also quashes the previous order with retroactive effect, meaning that any penalties that Plesner faced would no longer be due.\footnote{See id. at 248.}

**B. Three Antibrand Examples**

Decades ago, Beaumarchais wrote, “Provided that, in my writings, I speak neither of the authorities, nor of religion, nor of politics, nor of morals, nor of the people in power, nor of the bodies in credit, nor of the opera, nor of other performances, nor of anyone who believes in anything, I shall be free to print whatsoever I choose, subject to inspection by two or three censors.”\footnote{See Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 371, 371 (2006) [hereinafter “Constitutionalising”] (quoting Beaumarchais).} This famous quote, one trademark scholar argued, is especially pertinent in this day and age, noting that “it would probably now be necessary to add trade marks to
the list of subjects that must be treated with delicacy and, in place of the censor, the large companies that hold these trade marks."134

In some ways, the antibranding activism that has evolved in the last decade or so reflects so much of the globalization that it often opposes. The problem that our antibranding movements demonstrate, however, is that while brands — and even antibrands — are now global and cosmopolitan in character, the doctrinal architecture that protects them and enables them to flourish is not. As a result, the existing case law reflects an emerging confusion regarding how trademarks are viewed, both internationally and domestically, and whether antibrands are constitutionally protected. How do we balance protection of trademark property with protection for freedom of speech? Many cases take approaches that are similar to the Plesner case: where a court might begin by awarding relief to the trademark owner, but then take the opposite holding on appeal, usually after global media attention ensues, and the appeals court has a chance to consider other approaches.

Cases like Plesner’s, I would argue, illustrate yet another aspect of trademark cosmopolitanism, because they underscore the increasing globalization of brands as well as the jurisprudential frameworks that govern them. Here, I examine three separate cases — one involving parodic T-shirts from South Africa (the famous Laugh it Off case),135 another case involving Greenpeace’s appropriation of a logo in France, and a third case involving an appropriated TATA company logo in India. My principal argument in this section is that just as we are seeing the emergence of a global branding movement, we are also seeing a global antibranding movement. However, national disparities regarding whether parody is a constitutionally protected freedom carry dramatic implications for the movement’s future, raising critical questions about the future of reconciling trademark cosmopolitanism with the freedom of political and artistic expression.

1. Laughing It Off in South Africa

The Laugh it Off case, which concerned the conflict over parody and property, is probably one of the most prominent antibranding cases outside of the United States. The plaintiff, South African Breweries, or SAB, is one of the leading beers in the country of South Africa, and a

134 Id.
135 See Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. S. African Breweries Int’l (Fin.) BV t/a Sabmark Int’l & Another 2005 (8) BCLR 743 (CC) at 39 para. 65 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter Laugh It Off].
pervasive advertiser of its brand. The defendant, on the other hand, Laugh it Off, is a corporation that engages in the appropriation of brands for the purposes of humor and social commentary. According to its website, the company has two objectives: one, to create a close association with well-known brands, and two, to make fun of them.

This particular case is illustrative of how localized antibrand expression can often give rise to questions of international, constitutional importance. In that case, the defendant replaced SAB’s trademark, which said “Black Label,” with “Black Labour,” and the slogan, “America’s Lusty, Lively Beer — Brewed in South Africa,” was replaced with “Africa’s Lusty, Lively Exploitation Since 1652 — No Regard Given Worldwide.” After SAB sent several cease and desist letters in 2002 that went unanswered, it decided to commence litigation. At issue in the case was whether the mark had taken unfair advantage of, or was detrimental to the reputation of the Black Label mark. In its defense, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had not established a likelihood of detriment, and that even if such a likelihood had been established, the antibrand was protected by the South African Constitution’s protection for freedom of expression.

After having lost several times before the lower courts, Justin Nurse, the company founder of Laugh it Off, decided to appeal his case to the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the highest court, and won, in a surprising, landmark defense of freedom of expression over trademarks as property. For scholars, Laugh it Off represents an

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136 Id. at 7.
137 Id. at 7-8. According to the company’s founder, Justin Nurse, a journalism graduate student, his work constitutes “ideological jujitsu,” whereupon brands are appropriated, but slightly modified, to send an alternative message. “The purpose,” the defendant explained, “is to lampoon the brands, to make a statement about the company’s policies or practices; to probe issues bearing on the broader society; to assert free expression and in doing so to challenge the inordinate use of trademark laws to silence expressions that are unflattering about brands.” Id. at 9-10.
138 This was not the first time Nurse ran into trouble with trademark owners. Laugh it Off previously faced legal action initiated by Lego for a T-shirt design that used lego blocks with the word “Legover” underneath. Owners of the brand “Weet-brix” had objected to another shirt that featured the logo, “Weed-brix,” Red Bull to a shirt that said “Dead Bull,” the soap brand Dettol to a shirt that said “Death Toll,” and the denim brand “Diesel for Successful Living” similarly expressed displeasure over a shirt that said “Denial for Successful Loafing.” Coca-Cola claimed trademark infringement over a shirt that said, “Corruption.” There were other brands that did not object, however, like Kentucky Fried Chicken, which was called “Unlucky Fried Chicken,” or Virgin, which became “Viagra.” See Rimmer, supra note 101, at 73-74.
140 Id. at 120.
example of how anti-global activist movements have raised international, critical questions for scholars of both intellectual property and constitutional law. Yet the opinion, in and of itself, demonstrates a judicially-oriented cosmopolitanist masterpiece, demonstrating a significant array of global constitutional borrowing by the international range of the cases cited by the Court in reaching its decision.

Consider, at the outset, the question of the standard for trademark infringement, which drew heavily from foreign jurisdictions. The Court notes, for example, that its trademark provisions bear near-complete identicality to similar protections from the European Directive and the United Kingdom. There was, however, one significant difference — whereas those statutes required proof of actual detriment or unfair advantage, South Africa required only a “likelihood” of unfair advantage or detriment. Significantly, despite this more relaxed standard, the Constitutional Court still decided to protect the antibrand, reversing the lower courts’ earlier opinions. Part of the reason for this outcome, of course, stemmed from the delicate balancing of constitutional freedoms with intellectual property. In South Africa, freedom of expression is constitutionally protected by

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141 Australian scholar Matthew Rimmer writes, for example, of the need to contextualize the dispute over the Black Label mark “in the context of wider debates over trade mark law, culture jamming, and the No Logo anti-global capitalism movement.” Rimmer, supra note 101, at 86.

142 I have described this phenomenon elsewhere, as others have. See Sonia K. Katyal, The Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1415, 1422 (2010) (collecting citations); see also Jacob Foster, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Lessons from South Africa, 45 U.S.F. L. Rev. 79, 92 (2010).

143 Section 10(3) the United Kingdom (UK) Trade Marks Act 1994, which was fashioned along the provisions of the first European Directive, provides that “A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign which - (a) is identical or similar to the trade mark, and (b) is used in relation to goods and services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign, being without cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the trade mark.” Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 10 (Eng.).

144 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 13 para. 21. According to the constitutional court, Article 5(2) of the European Directive and Section 10(3) of the 1994 United Kingdom Act are virtually identical, but require proof of actual detriment or unfair advantage: the South African section requires a likelihood of unfair advantage or detriment, stating “the use of the trademark would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trademark, notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception.” Charles Webster, Laugh It Off Gets Last Laugh in Dilution Case, INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N (July 1, 2005), http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/LaughItOffGetsLastLaughinDilutionCase.aspx.
Section 16 of the Constitution, which protects the right, along with the “freedom of artistic creativity” and “freedom to receive or impart information or ideas,” along with other forms of protection.145

In the case of *Laugh it Off*, the Constitutional Court took the view that the right to hold intellectual property was not universally accepted as a fundamental right, but still informally treated it as such for the purposes of the opinion.146 The lower court, in contrast, had refused to consider a defense of freedom of expression for two principal reasons: first, because of the commercial purpose of the shirts; and second, because it found that the message went beyond parody and bordered, instead, on hate speech because of its invocation of race and inequality.147 On appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”), *Laugh it Off* fared no better.148 Although the SCA noted that unlike fixed property, intellectual property enjoyed no special status under the Constitution, it chose to protect the property rights of SAB over the interests in freedom of expression.149 For the SCA, like the lower court, the expression on the shirt was found to create an association that was “particularly unwholesome, unsavoury, or degrading” because it constituted an “unfair” and “unjustified racial slur” on SAB.150 Under this view, *Laugh it Off* could have easily expressed an identical message about “black labour” and “white guilt” without appropriating the specific brand at issue. There was no parody here, SCA concluded, because *Laugh it Off* was not commenting on SAB, but merely employing SAB in service of its humor. In other

145 See *Laugh it Off*, (8) BCLR at 2 para. 2.
146 One scholar reported that the *Laugh it Off* judgment’s most promising aspect involved “its unequivocal recognition that the right to hold intellectual property is in effect a right, of equal status to the specified fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights such as freedom of speech and privacy.” Owen H. Dean, *The Irresistible Force of Freedom of Speech Meets the Immovable Object: Trade Mark Law in South Africa*, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 614, 617, 619 (2006).
147 See *Laugh it Off*, (8) BCLR at 10 para. 15.
148 The plaintiff had merely asserted a likelihood of harm, by pointing out that the racial slur would build a racially insensitive association with the company, erode the exclusiveness of its mark, and discourage people from purchasing the beer. Yet because these harms were all largely speculative, and were not accompanied by added evidence or facts showing the probability of these events taking place, the Constitutional Court rejected them. “It is plain from the record that no evidence, direct or inferential, was adduced to establish likelihood of detriment either in the sense of unfavourable associations that have been created . . . or in the context of a likelihood of loss of sales by virtue of the reduced commercial magnetism of the mark.” See id. at 35-36 para. 58.
149 See Dean, supra note 146, at 616.
150 See *Laugh it Off*, (8) BCLR at 13 para. 21.
words, if the antibrand had not become an actual “brand,” in the sense of the shirts becoming a commodity in the court’s eyes, it might have remained protected had it remained entirely noncommercial.151

In contrast, the Constitutional Court’s main holding concluded that SAB had failed to show proof of infringement, because there had been no showing of material harm.152 Citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc., the court wrote that “in order to succeed, the owner of the mark bears the onus to demonstrate likelihood of substantial harm or detriment which, seen within the context of the case, amounts to unfairness.”153 The mere fact that the expressive act causes some discomfort or “appear[s] to be morally reprobate or unsavoury to others,” however, is irrelevant if the expression is otherwise protected, the Court wrote.154

To the value of freedom of expression, the Court emphasized its primary value by referencing its own decisions on the matter, in addition to other jurisdictions — Canada and the United States in particular. It also referenced the protection for freedom of expression in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights as well as the European Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.155 Yet while other antibrand decisions directly relied on the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the South African Laugh it Off case interpreted the work “in light of” fundamental rights, which suggested at least some gentle reluctance to constitutionalizing

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151 Consider the lower court’s formulation, drawing a line between protecting a fundamental right of freedom of expression, and using a mark in the course of trade:

[Appellant] may not use [the mark] in relation to goods or services. The appellant may use in relation to goods or services by placing the caricature on T-shirts, flags or whatever provided it is not so used in the course of trade. The appellant may declaim the message about black labour and white guilt from rooftops, pulpits and political platforms; and it may place the same words (without appropriating the registered marks’ repute) on T-shirts, and sell them.

See Dario Tanziani, South Africa: Trade Marks, Infringement, Tarnishing of Marks, Defense of Freedom of Speech, 27 EUR. INT’L PROP. REV. N-4, N-8 (2005). Agreeing with this provision, another scholar echoed that trademark law “hardly affects the appellant’s freedom of expression. Freedom of expression does not entitle a party to damage private property such as painting graffiti on private or even public property. Why should it therefore be different simply because the property is a trade mark?” Id.

152 Illsley, supra note 139, at 120.

153 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 31 para. 50.

154 Rimmer, supra note 101, at 97 (quoting Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 34 para. 55).

155 See Laugh It Off, (8) BCLR at 27 para. 45.
the right to antibrand.\textsuperscript{156} However, in a telling section, the Court cited Laugh it Off’s position, extensively:

Brands, the applicant asserts, are often put to work by powerful corporations to crowd out equally legitimate expression. They tend to stifle the open and free flow of ideas. Brand building, the applicant asserts, sets out to occupy cultural space, social space, and even one’s own “headspace.” Since, in time, marketing brands graduate to cultural icons, they should not be beyond the reach of public disclaim or indeed applause. The purposes of copyright and trade mark laws in an open and democratic society is not to shut out critical expression or to throttle artistic and other expressive acts in a manner that gives way to inordinate brand sway.\textsuperscript{157}

Turning to the anti-dilution/infringement provisions within South African trademark law, the Court recognized a tension, noting that it “limits the right to free expression,” but decided to reach a conclusion that interpreted trademark principles in a way that ensured its compatibility with freedom of expression.\textsuperscript{158} “Courts must be astute not to convert the anti-dilution safeguard of renowned trade marks usually controlled by powerful financial interests into a monopoly adverse to other claims of expressive conduct of at least equal cogency and worth in our broader society,” the Court observed.\textsuperscript{159}

Finally, although the Court drew on the United States Supreme Court’s landmark decision on parody, \textit{Campbell v. Acuff},\textsuperscript{160} it drew back from the suggestion that parody was constitutionally protected, but then still wound up protecting it anyway. It was unnecessary, in the Court’s eyes, to consider the fairness of the parody because the plaintiff had failed to establish the likelihood of economic prejudice.\textsuperscript{161}

It must always be kept in mind that, unlike in the US, in our jurisprudence there are no enclaves of protected expression such as parody or satire and therefore the mere characterization of an expression as such would not be decisive of what is fair use under our anti-dilution protection of section 34(1)(c) because ordinarily all categories of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Geiger, “\textit{Constitutionalising},” supra note 133, at 396.
\item See \textit{Laugh It Off}, (8) BCLR at 49 para. 81.
\item \textit{Id.} at 29-30 para. 48.
\item Id.
\item Id. at 39 para. 64.
\item See \textit{id.} at 39-40 para. 66; see also Rimmer, supra note 101, at 99.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
expression, save those excluded by the Constitution itself, enjoy constitutional shield and may be restricted only in a way constitutionally authorised, the Court concluded. In this manner, the Court carved out a broader area of protection for expression like parody, but did so by explaining that all speech is deserving of protection, not just parody specifically.

In a heavily cited concurring opinion, Judge Sachs opened with the question, “Does the law have a sense of humour?,” noting that judicial views on parody are tremendously varied internationally. Although parody is not a separate defense in South Africa, Judge Sachs also wrote to underscore his finding that the commercial intent of Laugh it Off should not detract from its constitutional protection. Instead, for Judge Sachs, in a world where both artists and advertisers use cultural icons to comment on society, the line between commercial and noncommercial has disappeared. “In our consumerist society where branding occupies a prominent space in our public culture,” Sachs concludes, “one does not have to be a ‘cultural jammer’ to recognise that there is a legitimate place for criticism of a particular trademark, or of the influence of branding in general or of the overzealous use of trademark law to stifle public debate. In such circumstances the medium could well be the message, and the more the trademark itself is both directly the target and the instrument, the more justifiable will its parodic incorporation be.”

As a final matter, the Court also demanded that SAB pay for Nurse’s attorney’s fees, a significant win for Laugh it Off. In celebration of the decision, Laugh it Off auctioned off 1,000 t-shirts and donated the proceeds to an anti-alcohol abuse charity.

2. Protecting the Right to Critique: Greenpeace v. Esso

In France, the trajectory of such antibranding cases has revealed a trend that resembles that of South Africa, demonstrating again the
global, dyadic pull of both branding and antibranding phenomena, and the tendency to borrow from other jurisdictions to resolve conflicts between them.

Early cases, however, were not as friendly to the cause. Some French courts had held that antibrand uses of trademarks could be infringing, including the use of a trademark in an antismoking campaign (a pool of tar emerging from a Marlboro packet, for example) or even the use of a trademark in a newspaper headline. In another case, a lower French court also held that a website calling for a boycott of the Gervais Danone company was infringing.

Like South Africa, more modern cases have reversed the trend, to some extent, and reveal that most successful antibrand cases win on appeal, and usually after the court employs case law from other jurisdictions. For example, consider a case that involved an antismoking campaign that used a dying Camel from the famous cigarette maker producing smoke in the shape of a skull that also accompanied the slogan, “The fag is worse than crossing the desert . . . .” The French Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that found infringement and instead found that the humorous use of the mark served the goal to protect the public health of adolescents.

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166 Christophe Geiger, *Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression — The Proportionality of Criticism*, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. 317, 319 (2007) [hereinafter *Trade Marks*]. In one such case involving humor, the Paris High Court ruled that a parody of the LACOSTE label crocodile that showed two fornicating crocodiles accompanied by the expression, “Attention, j’accoste” (“Beware, I’m accosting”) was infringing. In that case, the Court cast the expression as commercial and also concluded that “the right to parody or caricature could not apply in a field which is purely commercial.” See Jean-François Bretonnière & Cordélia Flourens, *France: Trademark Rights v. Free Speech: Can Prejudicial Trademark Use Still Be Prevented?*, in 7 IP VALUE: BUILDING & ENFORCING INTELL. PROP. VALUE 136, 136-37 (2009), available at http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/Article.ashx?g=46a24ecb-1bcd-4c10-be35-4854fd8a9da (noting an initial trend towards holding defendants liable that has now shifted towards protection of freedom of expression). Both a satirical treatment of the trademark Pastis, and even a representation of a dying camel smoking a cigarette in an antismoking campaign were also the subject of a successful tarnishment claim at the lower court level. See Emmanuel Baud, *The Damage Done*, TRADEMARK WORLD, Apr. 2005, at 29, 30.

167 See Bretonnière & Flourens, *supra* note 166, at 137 (discussing the case’s disposition).


Yet, like the South African case, it is important to note that in France, parody is not a complete defense against trademark infringement. Instead, it is simply one of a multiplicity of factors that courts consider in deciding whether to protect the expression through constitutional reasoning. The absence of clear protections for parody, as we see in the Plesner and *Laugh it Off* cases, have the effect of putting greater emphasis on other factors, like whether or not the activity is commercially oriented. The same is true here, where the absence of commercial intent can be a deciding factor in the defendant’s favor.

In one particularly notable case, the company Esso decided to take legal action against Greenpeace’s French organization, whose Stop E$$O Campaign targeted the oil company for its environmental practices. Esso (otherwise known as ExxonMobil) had argued that Greenpeace’s use of the logo made it resemble the symbol of the Nazi SS, thereby confusing the public, and putting it within the realm of illegal hate speech associated with Nazi memorabilia. However, a French high court, while noting that parody was not a complete defense, nevertheless decided to protect Greenpeace’s use of the mark “E$$O” because Greenpeace did not aim to promote its products commercially but instead only to express its political point of view. It reached this conclusion, however, even though there was evidence that the antibrands had been placed on t-shirts, and Esso argued that even Greenpeace’s call for an Esso boycott had a commercial impact. The court rejected the import of this evidence,

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170 See Tanziani, supra note 151, at N–8.
171 Esso is ExxonMobil in France. See ExxonMobil Sues Over Logo ‘Abuse,’ BBC News World Edition (June 25, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2064599.stm. Some part, it seems, of Esso’s allegations appeared tied to an earlier speech case that held Yahoo liable, in part, for the auction of Nazi memorabilia in France, which violates French law that prohibits the wearing or exhibition of Nazi memorabilia. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). Not only did Esso demand an end to the campaign, but also claimed almost $80,000 in daily compensation to the company due to the alleged cost of the infringement. “We find it ironic that the richest corporation in the world can’t recognise the dollar sign, and confuses it with a Nazi symbol,” claimed Greenpeace to the public. In response, Esso claimed that it was only trying to prevent Greenpeace’s use of the logo, not alter Greenpeace’s message or stop them from expressing themselves. See ExxonMobil Sues Over Logo ‘Abuse,’ supra.
172 See Tanziani, supra note 151, at N–8 to N–9 (discussing this case).
accusing Esso of displaying “the worst kind of bad faith” in suggesting that such activities would have a business import.\footnote{Id. at 666.}

Instead, the court said that “the constitutional principle of the freedom of expression implies that the organization . . . can, on its internet site, criticize, in the form that it regards appropriate, the damage to the environment and the risk caused to public health by industrial activities . . . .”\footnote{Geiger, \textit{Trade Marks}, supra note 166, at 321.} While characterizing the work as a parody, but also characterizing it as an expression of noncommercial speech, the court crafted out a special area of exception, it seems, for expression motivated specifically by political purposes and limited to the Internet. “[T]he defendant should be able to denounce attacks on the environment and the risks to human health caused by certain industrial activities, in whatever form it deemed best suited to the aim pursued. While this freedom is not absolute, it may only be subject to restrictions which are necessary to respect the rights of others,” the court wrote.\footnote{Esso, [2006] E.T.M.R. 53, at 666.}

Although the case was a win for Greenpeace, it highlights a few areas of concern for trademark scholars. The first area of concern involves the reality that the French court implicitly suggests that parody cases, when they are not cast as parody, can still be vulnerable to a charge from a non-trademark claim, such as denigration, disparagement, or defamation. In such cases, plaintiffs often employ defamation or disparagement claims, in addition to the trademark causes of action, sometimes with varying success. Under French law, disparagement is described as “[a]ny act whatsoever which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred to compensate it,” usually referring to conduct that aims to discredit or belittle the plaintiff.\footnote{Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 137 (quoting \textit{CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.]} art. 1382 (Fr.)).} (Some French courts have described disparagement to involve “a polemical use alien to business life.”)\footnote{Geiger, \textit{Trade Marks}, supra note 166, at 322.}

In this case, Esso had charged that Greenpeace had sought to denigrate and discredit Esso’s products and services. At the same time that Esso made these allegations, however, it also admitted that Greenpeace had not actually targeted or criticized any of its products or services, but only restricted its critique to its logo specifically and to discuss Esso’s role in climate change and its environmental
practices. As a result, the court, in turn, rejected Esso’s allegations, noting, “[i]t is, at the very least, paradoxical to invoke acts of denigration — of which, incidentally, the exact nature is not stated . . . and to assert that the products and services of the appellant company were not subject to any criticism.” Given the content of Greenpeace’s website, the court concluded that denigration was completely unproven.

However, despite the outcome of the case in the Esso judgment, it remains noteworthy that claims like denigration, disparagement, and defamation can still be employed successfully against activist groups, particularly at the lower court level. Lawyers have suggested that the use of humor, like other types of parody, is defensible and protectable, so long as the defendants do not use the trademark for a commercial purpose, and so long as the trademark use is “proportionate,” meaning that the use is not outrageous in nature. This reasoning was used to protect a website that named itself “SOS victims of Credit Agricole” on the grounds that the use was not outrageous in nature. But defining what is outrageous is clearly a matter that is deeply loaded with subjectivity.

For example, in another case involving Greenpeace, this time targeting Areva, a Paris High Court held that the trademark had not been infringed but was disparaged, exceeding the protection of freedom of expression and holding Greenpeace liable. However, this opinion was reversed at the Court of Cassation, which held that the parody had to be read in conjunction with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court concluded that Greenpeace was acting in accordance with “the interest of the general public and

180 Id.
181 See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 138.
182 Id. The Supreme Court also reached a similar conclusion involving a use of a puppet in a television show, which represented the president of the Peugeot car brand who was disparaging products of the company. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed lower court rulings that found that the outrageous nature of the speech caused damage to the company. Id.
183 See Baud, supra note 166, at 31. In that case, the “A” of the company had been modified with a skull-like shadow, and the body of a dead fish with the statement, “Stop Plutonium — the Stopping is Obvious.” Here the court found that other means to communicate the same message could have been used — “the equation AREVA=DEATH proceeds from a purely disparaging reasoning for which their authors should be liable,” it concluded. There was a risk that consumers would believe that all of Areva’s products were harmful, the court explained, and enjoined the expression as a result. Geiger, Trade Marks, supra note 166, at 322 (quoting case).
public health, and using proportionate means in so doing, and had therefore not misused their right to freedom of expression.”

Nevertheless, while most of these cases do eventually come out in favor of the defendants, it is worth noting that disparagement can still be at issue if the defendant targets specific products or services. And it is also worth noting the added role that defamation may play in such cases. This cause of action has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to not include criticism of products or services, suggesting that it can apply as an alternative in cases where disparagement does not apply and a company (rather than its specific products or services) is targeted instead. The availability has led some to suggest that it may be a fruitful alternative for plaintiff corporations to pursue to curb antibranding expression.

3. Gaming the Antibrand: TATA and the Turtles

Antibranding is also alive in India, whereupon Greenpeace has also faced one of its own court cases involving the creation of an online game called Turtles v. TATA, in which the goal of the game, modeled after Pac Man, is to help yellow turtles eat as many little white dots as possible, without running into “Ratty” who appears to be modeled after Ratan Tata, chair of the powerful multinational Tata Corporation. The game is designed so that TATA is the antagonist, and the turtle has to, literally, strategically destroy the TATA logo. The purpose of the game was to draw attention to the potential environmental impact of a proposed TATA dam, known as the Dhamra Project, and the risk


185 See Bretonnière & Flourens, supra note 166, at 138.

186 The 1881 law of defamation charges that defamation occurs “where an allegation or an assessment of a precise fact is made targeting a specific person so as to harm his or her honour or reputation.” Id. at 139.

187 Id.

188 “The aim of the colourful and noisy game is to help the yellow turtles to eat as many of the white dots [jellyfish and other sea creatures] . . . while dodging the TATA demons if you eat a power pill, you will be gifted with super-turtle powers to vanquish the demons of development that are threatening your coastal home.” Tata Sons Ltd. v. Greenpeace Int’l & ANR, (2010) 9089 I.A. 1, ¶¶ 7, 26 (Delhi H.C., 2011) (India) [hereinafter Tata Sons, (2010) 9089 I.A.], available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/562656/. Others to avoid are “matty,” “Natty,” or “Tinku.” Id.
of affecting a turtle habitat, the Olive Ridley Sea Turtle nesting beaches, among other environmental concerns. As I suggested in the previous section, trademark claims often appear alongside other, speech-related claims like defamation and disparagement. Here, Tata sued for defamation and trademark infringement, arguing, in a colorful filing before the court, that “portraying [Tata] as a demon in the game with pointed use of the ‘T’ device is malicious, as it is intended to convey to the world at large the so called heartlessness in setting up the Dhamra Project.” For support, Tata argued that “use of trademark is not confined merely to the defendant engaging itself in a trade or commercial activity, but other forms of speech or representation, which would tarnish the plaintiff’s mark,” citing the 1972 Gemini Rising case (the case involving a poster that said “Enjoy Cocaine”) and a Louis Vuitton case from 2007 involving Haute Diggity Dog, a pet toy manufacturer.

Greenpeace, as well, used its own form of comparative law — it argued that Tata’s actions demonstrated a form of a “strategic lawsuit against public participation” otherwise known as a SLAPP suit, that was intended to censor and intimidate those who are concerned with the environmental impact of the project. Greenpeace argued that its

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189 Id. ¶¶ 17-19.
190 “Had the intention of the defendant really been to express dissent, and if indeed they wanted to speak in hyperboles there was other legitimate means of doing so,” the filing stated. Id. ¶ 11.
191 For more on SLAPP suits, see, for example, Robert Abrams, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) Address, 7 PACE ENVT'L. L. REV. 33, 39 (1989) (noting that SLAPP lawsuits are harmful to activists regardless of whether the plaintiff wins or loses); Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105 (1988) (suggesting reform to prevent potential users of intimidation tactics from employing them); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPPS”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 955 (1992) (illustrating statistically the success of SLAPP plaintiffs); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & POLICY REV. 385 (1988) (using qualitative and quantitative data to measure the impact the SLAPP experience on subsequent political participation); Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of Libel Law for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417 (1991) (finding that enthusiasm for the SLAPP back strategy must be tempered by a recognition of its risks); Sharlene A. McEvoy, “The Big Chill”: Business Use of the Tort of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 503 (1990) (arguing that there must be a balance between the right to bring an action for defamation, and the right to exercise one’s first amendment rights); Jawn Ardin Sandifer & George Bundy Smith, The Tort Suit for Damages: The New Threat to Civil Rights Organizations, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 559 (1975) (finding that private causes of action are a threat to boycotts led by civil rights organizations); Victor J. Cosentino,
work was entirely noncommercial, and that Indian trademark law, specifically section 29(4) of the Indian Trademarks Act of 1999 demonstrates that the use of a trademark for the purposes of criticism, fair comment, or parody does not amount to infringement. 192 It alleged, similarly, that its use was not in the course of trade and therefore could not satisfy the requirements for dilution. 193

News reports initially suggested that the Delhi High Court advised Greenpeace to remove the TATA logo from its game (noting that one Judge was said to have stated to Greenpeace “[w]e are not directing you to stop using the game but you can consider not using the logo”). 194 However, in its written opinion, the Court advocated a strong defense of free speech, citing both the Esso case and the Laugh it Off case. 195 What is especially interesting about the case is that it focuses not just on trademark infringement, and also dilution, but on defamation, switching between these concerns throughout the opinion. It dismisses Greenpeace’s use of the term “demons” in conjunction with the TATA logo as “mere hyperbole,” noting that Greenpeace argued that the game “succinctly and creatively enables the registering of protest . . .” and thus must be viewed as part and parcel of criticism and commentary. 196

In the TATA case, the Court quotes extensively from a series of British opinions that suggested reluctance in granting preliminary injunctions due to the speech issues involved. 197 The Delhi High Court

Comment, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation: An Analysis of the Solutions, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 399, 427-29 (1991) (arguing that although plaintiffs in SLAPP cases have legitimate grievances, the disputes should be left to the political forum).


193 “The game in question is merely depicting the challenges that Olive Ridley turtles would have overcome in order to survive in spite of the Project,” it explained. Id.


196 Id. ¶ 21.

197 It cited an 1891 case involving a preliminary injunction, which the court denied to grant in a libel case because the court decided to test the allegations of defamation at trial. “Until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of
also questioned whether the role of the Internet called for a more relaxed standard, given the ease and speed of communication. It also continued to rely on American jurisprudence in finding the absence of actual malice, noting that there was no evidence, here, of a reckless disregard for the truth, and the Internet context did not change its outcome. Instead, here, the Court noted that the issue involved a project with a tremendous degree of environmental concern and a wide diversity of opinions.  

Finally, the Court also rejected the trademark infringement and dilution claims. Given the absence of a profit motive on behalf of Greenpeace, and the Court’s recognition of the right of defendants to “comment, ridicule and parody” the registered trademarks, the Court refused to grant an injunction. In its closing paragraphs, the Court drew heavily and admiringly from the Laugh it Off opinion, citing Judge Sachs’ observation that the Court’s focus on the detriment requirement tended to obscure a larger, and deeper focus on the value of parody, thus allowing a focus on property to overshadow a more substantial focus on the value and freedom of expression.

The Delhi High Court also noted that at times, a parody can actually enhance the distinctiveness of a famous mark by making it into an icon. Citing the Esso case, the Court concluded: “[T]he use of a trademark, as the object of a critical comment, or event attack, does not necessarily result in infringement . . . . If the user’s intention is to focus on some activity of the trademark owner, and is ‘denominative,’ drawing attention of the reader or viewer to the activity,” it may not be subject to injunctive relief.

In a particularly memorable set of observations, the Court wrote, that it “cannot anoint itself as a literary critic, to judge the efficacy of use of such medium, nor can it don the robes of a censor. It merely patrols the boundaries of free speech, and in exceptional cases, issues injunctions . . . .” It continued, “granting an injunction would freeze interim injunctions,” the case said. Id. ¶ 22.

See id. ¶ 35 (citing Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000) (comparing Greenpeace’s work to a statement made by a guest on the Oprah Winfrey show regarding the safety of American beef, where the court dismissed the defamation claim, holding that “exaggeration does not equal defamation”)).

Id. ¶ 40.

Id. ¶ 74.

The court drew on the example of the Hormel case’s use of the character Sp’am, which noted that the parody “tend[ed] to increase public identification of the famous mark with its source.” Id. ¶ 30.

Id. ¶ 42.

Id.
the entire public debate on the effect of the port project on the Olive Ridley turtles habitat. That, plainly would not be in public interest; it would most certainly be contrary to established principles.” The Court recalled the words of Walter Lippman: “The theory of the free press is not that the truth will be presented completely or perfectly in any one instance, but that the truth will emerge from free discussion.” 204

C. Three Key Themes: Fundamental Rights, Commodity and Commerciality

All of the major cases discussed thus far have all reached conclusions that are strongly protective of the antibrand, but with very different rationales. Plesner’s case, for example, relied almost exclusively on human rights reasoning, whereas the Laugh it Off case was resolved on trademark grounds (and a finding of an absence of actual damages). On the other hand, both the Esso and TATA cases were resolved on the grounds that the uses were noncommercial and therefore fell out of the realm of trademark law. Whatever the result, each case, I think suggests some areas that are ripe for further consideration, particularly given the global nature of each dispute.

Consider three main areas of tension, illustrated by the cases discussed above. The first major theme involves the fundamental question of which right matters more: the right to freedom of speech, and relatedly, the right to parody, or the right to intellectual property. Underlying this question, I would suggest, is an architectural question about how to situate the protection of intellectual property alongside the creation and protection of other fundamental rights. 205 Is intellectual property a fundamental right, akin to other fundamental rights, or should it be treated as secondary to these other rights? And if intellectual property is considered to be a fundamental right, then how does that right square with that of the right to freedom of speech?

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states in Article 17 section 2 that “Intellectual property shall be protected,” and further that it “stands as an end in itself.” 206 However, if the world is moving towards a more unitary regime for trademark registrations, it becomes necessary to confront the diversity of speech protections.

204 Id. ¶ 43.


within other nation states. Some countries, like the United States, expressly protect freedom of expression as a fundamental right, and other commonwealth countries, like the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia, do not have a constitutional right to freedom of speech, but recognize its existence in statutes or common law.207

Robert Burrell and Dev Gangjee have pointed out that the concept of freedom of expression in the United States, with its attendant suspicion of government, may make transplanting its legal principles quite difficult in jurisdictions which have different approaches to freedom of speech.208 Speech is much more protected in the United States than in other jurisdictions like Germany, France, and South Africa, which explains in part why the commercial or noncommercial nature of the speech became so significant. There is also some suggestion that commercial courts are ill-equipped to address constitutional matters, given the complexity of constitutional matters and the difficulty of transplanting legal concepts. There is also another excellent point raised by Gangjee and Burrell: a debate about constitutional rights, framed by a conflict between property and speech, just gets us nowhere because there is no "trumping" quality of either one.209

Then there is also the question of how to employ human rights principles in such disputes. Recall that the case involving Plesner, for example, and also others discussed, to a lesser extent, were resolved not on trademark grounds — but on human rights principles. In Germany, too, in one case, the defendant altered the Marlboro trademark to deliver a nonsmoking message; the court cited the basic human right of freedom of expression in protecting the work.210 This factor suggests yet another layer of complexity to trademark cosmopolitanism, because characterizing intellectual property as a fundamental right does not necessarily garner its primacy against other rights, like freedom of expression worldwide. Some have argued that human rights law operates as a “corrective” when intellectual property rights might be used “excessively” or “contrary to their functions” — and that these protections operate when other “safety valves” in intellectual property have failed, such as fair use, fair dealing, and other exceptions and limitations.211 But, at the same time,

207 Ramsey, supra note 96, at 412.
209 Id. at 559.
210 See Rahmatian, supra note 169, at 349 (discussing these cases).
there is growing evidence that the protection of intellectual property, itself, is now viewed as a human right — in one case before the European Court of Human Rights, involving the mark “Budweiser,” the Court decided to classify trademarks as a type of “property right” for the purpose of human rights analysis. As a result, it makes it difficult to see how relying on fundamental rights analysis assists in resolving tough cases.

Some scholars have argued, on this point, that thinking about intellectual property as a fundamental right ensures that it receives an important place in the relevant national constitution, ensuring that it ranks highly in any rights hierarchy. It also makes further justification of intellectual property unnecessary since it is viewed as a fundamental right. Finally, as Christopher Geiger has suggested, if intellectual property is considered to be a fundamental right, it becomes linked to “ethical values,” which are often considered to enjoy “widespread consent and acknowledgment under international law.”

Yet classifying intellectual property as a fundamental right gives us very little insight as to how to balance such a right against other fundamental rights, like freedom of speech. Particularly in countries where there is no fundamental right to freedom of speech, the very act of classifying intellectual property in this manner raises the risk of further alienating speech interests in favor of the primacy of intellectual property. Further, as Lawrence Helfer has explained, if intellectual property owners choose to invoke human rights law in order to garner additional protections, they would be likely to face stiff resistance from users and consumers, who would, in turn, draw upon other fundamental rights in order to articulate a competing vision that focuses on the need to restrict, rather than expand, intellectual

property rights in order to protect fundamental freedoms.\textsuperscript{216} So, for example, national courts in Europe have been using the right to freedom of expression, protected by the European Convention, towards this end, particularly in the area of copyright to protect the creation of exceptions to the law.\textsuperscript{217}

Another main theme involves the question of whether these disputes concerning antibranding are best explored through the lens of the classic division between speech and property, or whether it makes sense to turn to other areas of law, such as the internal architecture of trademark law, to resolve these disputes.\textsuperscript{218} And, as a related matter, how much should claims like defamation and disparagement be employed as part of the dispute? Is there a benefit to not looking solely to fundamental rights to address parody, but instead by crafting exceptions \textit{within} trademark law instead? Does only allowing a defendant recourse to fundamental rights to speech allow the property right of trademarks to grow even further, without having internal safety valves in its architecture?

Part of this question, of course, addresses the context of the protection of parody in other jurisdictions. Constitutionalizing the right to antibrand, for example, might actually suggest that the right is comparable to that of an intellectual property right — which is interesting, given that in the United States fair use is not considered to be a constitutional right, but rather seems to be characterized as a privilege.\textsuperscript{219} The more a jurisdiction protects parody and freedom of speech, or the more uncertain of the outcome, one might argue, the more likely it will be that a plaintiff will seek to bring in other areas of law to restrict the defendant’s speech, like defamation and disparagement, or moral rights, to defend its intellectual property. As a result, other areas of law become employed in the service of trademark law, reflecting areas that trademark law has really failed to conclusively address. For example, in the United Kingdom, the author of a parodied work can also bring an action for derogatory treatment — that it distorted or mutilated the work, or that it was prejudicial to the intellectual property owner’s honor or reputation.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{217} See id.
\textsuperscript{218} See, e.g., William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, \textit{Confusion isn't Everything}, \textit{89 Notre Dame L. Rev.} 253 (2013) (arguing for a deeper deployment of competition and communication values in trademark confusion cases).
\textsuperscript{219} Geiger, “\textit{Constitutionalising},” supra note 133, at 401.
\textsuperscript{220} Visser, \textit{supra} note 125, at 337.
Even in the United Kingdom, where there are no specific mentions of the right to parody within the statutory language, scholars have argued that the trademark statute (which protects marks against unfair advantage or detriment “without due cause”) suggests some possibility that the term “due cause” might provide some support for parody. 221 Others have suggested the use of the “fair dealing” exception to protect parody in the copyright context. 222 (The same is also true in South Africa, where fair dealing is used instead of “fair use.”) 223 And still other cases have protected parody on the grounds that the plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of confusion. 224

In the context of antibranding, it may not always be necessary to carve out specific protections for parody if there are other means of protection available. Often, these other means can come from other constitutional principles, or even other parts of the trademark architecture of that jurisdiction. In a German case, for example, the country’s Supreme Court defended a postcard publisher that produced a satirical image that alluded to the trademark MILKA (a chocolate company), and also employed the distinctive lilac color in its artwork. 225 Yet although the Court classified the use as a trademark use, and also noted that the use of the lilac color did evoke MILKA’s reputation, it opted to protect the use — not under freedom of expression or human rights principles per se — but under what has been described as a “constitutional right of freedom of the arts,” a specific version of the right to freedom of expression. 226 Here, even though it recognized that the defendant was referencing the plaintiff’s reputation, it chose to honor the principle of artistic freedom over intellectual property rights, noting

if the postcard (the media of the parody) does not debase the claimant’s trade mark and if it is not proved that the defendant acted exclusively for a commercial purpose, the protection of

221 See Mohammad Amin Naser, Revisiting the Philosophical Foundations of Trademarks in the US and UK 206-07 (2010).
222 See Visser, supra note 125, at 337.
223 Id.
224 Ellen Gredley & Spyros Maniatis, Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 2: Trademark Parodies, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 412, 418 (1997) (discussing case where plaintiff, Miss World Productions, was unable to prevent a showing of “Miss Alternative World,” a sadomasochistic film given the lack of showing of likelihood of confusion). The Australian Trademarks Office, in another set of examples, has simply found that parodic marks are not deceptively similar in response to a series of oppositions filed from established companies. See Ramsey, supra note 96, at 414, n.44-46.
225 Rahmatian, supra note 169, at 349 (discussing this case).
226 Id.
artistic freedom has to prevail in the present litigation over the protection of property rights of Article 14(1) of the German Basic Law.\textsuperscript{227}

An additional area of dispute, stemming from this last point, involves the question of whether the antibrand should be treated differently than a brand. Often antibrands can be sold, as well as circulated, raising questions of what to do when there are expressive as well as commercial interests present. Not dissimilarly to the United States, it appears that parody is protected so long as it does not conflict with the commercial interests of the plaintiff — so long as the mark is being used for critique or parody.\textsuperscript{228} Of course, there are costs with an approach that focuses solely on trademark use, since it is not always entirely clear what a use “in the course of trade” can comprise.\textsuperscript{229} Yet scholars have expressed fear that the line between commercial and noncommercial expression (parody and the like) becomes extraordinarily blurred, given the expansion of trademark rights as property rights, a risk that only becomes exacerbated by recent rulings by the European Court of Justice.\textsuperscript{230}

But there are also a number of cases that involve, like the South African case above, the sale of goods that represent parodies or antibrands. Here, despite the South African outcome, the case law is decidedly more mixed internationally, especially in the United States, where case law has lined up on either side. The same is true internationally, where the case law is also split. For example, despite the \textit{Laugh it Off} outcome, a German court had issued an injunction against the sale of shirts that had the Shell logo with a skull, finding that the use was commercial and therefore fell within the Unfair Competition Act.\textsuperscript{231} At times in trademark-related cases, courts have even attributed commercial motivations to media that has traditionally received the highest level of constitutional protections — like newspapers and other forms of editorial media. In one such case from the United Kingdom, a court even interpreted “use in the course of trade” to include a magazine’s use of the logo of Philips Company that

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{227} Geiger, “Constitutionalising,” supra note 133, at 396 (quoting case).

\textsuperscript{228} See Rahmatian, supra note 169, at 352.

\textsuperscript{229} See id. at 351.

\textsuperscript{230} See id. (discussing the Arsenal case).

\textsuperscript{231} Baud, supra note 166, at 32. Canadian courts, in addition, have held that such uses can be confusing; one case used a spoof mark of the water brand Perrier; the mark was called “Pierre-Eh” in reference to Pierre Trudeau, who was Prime Minister of Canada at the time. See Gredley & Maniatis, supra note 224, at 417 (discussing this case and others).}
substituted the logo’s stars with Nazi swastikas to draw attention to a story it was publishing on the company’s activities during the Second World War. The use was considered to be commercial in the sense that it was intended to increase sales of the magazine, but the risks to the concept of freedom of expression were obvious.

There are, however, a number of options to address the absence of clear protections for parody. States can easily specifically exempt noncommercial expression and political speech, and interpret parody as falling within these parameters. Or states can choose to refrain from enacting strong dilution laws. Still another option is for courts in member states to decline to award injunctive relief, as we saw in the Tata case, opting instead to focus on damages in order to preserve the interest in freedom of speech, or require the use of disclaimers to obviate confusion. A final option, also stemming from Tata, could be for member states to enact SLAPP-like statutes, or fee-shifting provisions that would force overly aggressive trademark owners to reconsider filing suit in non-meritorious cases.

A final suggestion could be a broad one. Member states could amend the Paris Convention or TRIPS to state a direct commitment to “freedom of expression” when implementing their trademark protections. Although the obligation to protect freedom of expression is already part of the international treaty world, and certainly relevant to the interpretation of treaty terms, a more specific declaration for freedom of speech might be vital to ensuring a greater balance.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have suggested a link between contemporary accounts of cosmopolitanism and the growing case law on both global branding and antibranding. As I have suggested, the world of global

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232 Id. at 418.
233 See Ramsey, supra note 96, at 409. TRIPS Article 16 (1), for example, requires states to prevent uses of marks that cause a likelihood of confusion “in the course of trade.” However, TRIPS Article 17 permits states to enact “limited exceptions” to trademark rights — these could easily include non-trademark or nominative uses, parodies, satire, and other commentaries. Id.
234 See also id. at 409-10. Since Article 16(3) of TRIPS requires only that member states prohibit third party registrations or uses of “well known” trademarks to “indicate a connection between [the third party’s] goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark,” there is room for underenforcement or to avoid enacting dilution statutes altogether.
235 Id. at 434.
236 See id.
trademarks can be characterized in terms of a major shift from national to global branding strategies.

Many cosmopolitanist ideals, I have suggested, have taken root in a variety of different political, economic, and social contexts, including intellectual property regulation and the international trademark system. In the trademark context, I would argue each of these areas have a variety of different facets, some that are more culturally oriented, and focused on the emergence of global brands and an accompanying transnational culture of consumption; and others more doctrinally or institutionally oriented that center on designing a legal architecture that focuses towards harmonization.

At the same time, trademark lawyers often extol the virtues of harmonization and globalization without grappling with its complex dynamics as applied to the localized interpretation and expression of intellectual property protections. We see this particularly in the growing set of case law regarding the conflicts between the transnational brand, activist movements, and freedom of speech. As I have suggested, the dyadic relationship between the global branding — and antibranding movements — has exposed both the idealism and the fragility of cosmopolitanist ideals, offering us significant challenges for the future.