View videos of our 2016 Symposium, Disjointed Regulation: State Efforts to Legalize Marijuana, here.
Congratulations to Niall Mackay Roberts for winning the 2016 Patrick J. Hopkins Memorial Writing Award. Niall's award-winning Note appears in Vol. 49, Issue 4.
Congratulations to Volume 49 Executive Editor David Ligtenberg for winning second place in the California Supreme Court Historical Society's 2015 Student Writing Competition. His paper, "Inverse Condemnation: California's Widening Loophole," will be published in the Society's journal California Legal History in December 2015.
Ranked thirty-first among legal journals in the United States, the UC Davis Law Review publishes scholarly articles from legal academics, practitioners, and student editors. The Review's staff prides itself on consistently meeting deadlines while working with authors to produce the highest quality scholarship. Each academic year, the student staff publishes one volume composed of five issues. This year, the Review staff is excited to publish its forty-ninth volume.
Against Administrative Judges
The single largest cadre of federal adjudicators goes largely ignored by scholars, policymakers, courts, and even litigating parties. These Administrative Judges or “AJs,” often confused with well-known federal Administrative Law Judges or “ALJs,” operate by the thousands in numerous federal agencies. Yet unlike ALJs, the significantly more numerous AJs preside over less formal hearings and have no significant statutory provisions that preserve their impartiality. The national press has recently called attention to the alleged unfairness of certain ALJ proceedings, and regulated parties have successfully enjoined agencies’ use of ALJs. While fixes are necessary for ALJ adjudication, any solution that ignores more widespread, less independent, and less litigant-protective AJ adjudication falls woefully short.
This Article argues that, contrary to agency orthodoxy and regardless of regulated parties’ interests, agencies should choose ALJs over AJs to further their own interests. With broad direction to choose AJs or ALJs, agencies prefer the former because of increased control over AJs’ job performance and policy implementation in flexible, informal proceedings — all for less cost. Yet, not only are the relative informality and cost savings of AJ proceedings exaggerated (based on data that this Article is the first to consider meaningfully), but the use of AJs has overlooked downsides. Agency control of AJs undermines their perceived impartiality, creating unacknowledged due process concerns under two recent Supreme Court decisions — Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB — and complicating agencies’ missions. Choosing ALJs also increases the likelihood of agencies receiving deferential judicial review and absolute official immunity for agency adjudicators. Thus, this Article broadens and contextualizes the current ALJ controversy by highlighting the more pervasive and problematic phenomenon of AJs in administrative adjudication.
Article featured in The Wall Street Journal. Click here for WSJ piece.