The So-Called Right to Privacy

Jamal Greene*

The constitutional right to privacy has been a conservative bugaboo ever since Justice Douglas introduced it into the United States Reports in Griswold v. Connecticut. Reference to the “so-called” right to privacy has become code for the view that the right is doctrinally recognized but not in fact constitutionally enshrined. This Article argues that the constitutional right to privacy is no more. The two rights most associated historically with the right to privacy are abortion and intimate sexual conduct, yet Gonzales v. Carhart and Lawrence v. Texas made clear that neither of these rights is presently justified by its proponents on the Supreme Court as an aspect of constitutional privacy. Other rights that might be protected by a constitutional right to privacy, such as the right to refuse medical treatment or to direct the upbringing of one’s children, are typically justified on liberty grounds, or else are not constitutionally protected at all. The Court’s move from privacy to liberty as a constitutional basis for the freedom to make fundamental life decisions strengthens the right itself by anchoring it to constitutional text in a text-happy era, and represents a victory for Justice Stevens, who has long advocated such a shift.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 717
I. THE BEGINNING AND END OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE .......... 720
   A. A Right Is Born: Griswold v. Connecticut .................. 720
   B. Privacy’s Adolescence: Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade ........................................... 723
   C. Privacy Come Liberty: From Carey to Casey .......... 724
   D. The End of Privacy: Lawrence and Carhart .......... 729
II. JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE LIBERTY CLAUSE ............... 731

* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; J.D., 2005, Yale Law School. The author served as a law clerk to the Hon. John Paul Stevens during the October 2006 Supreme Court Term. Thanks to Vaughn Blackman, Suzanne Goldberg, Elora Mukherjee, Andrew Siegel, Neil Siegel, and the staff of the UC Davis Law Review for helpful comments and suggestions.
A. Justice Stevens and the Liberty Clause ........................................... 732
B. Reaching the Right Side of History .............................................. 734
III. THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY .................................................... 739
IV. THE LONG ARM OF LIBERTY .................................................. 743
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 746
INTRODUCTION

“Privacy” again? I'm afraid so, but I come to bury the benighted doctrine, not to praise it. It lived a tough life. Its best deed — freeing millions of American women from a Hobson’s choice — hardly went unpunished. Its father was branded an incautious fabulist and a womanizer. Its size and scope were ever changing, its very existence under attack even from its sympathizers. As for its enemies, they long ago took to name-calling. In a 1981 memo to Attorney General William French Smith, a young Justice Department lawyer named John Roberts wrote of the “so-called ‘right to privacy’” ; the same epithet appears in the 1988 Justice Department Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation and in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.

This Article argues that they protest too much. The doctrinal life of the constitutional right to privacy is over. By that I do not mean that there is no constitutional protection against compelled disclosure of private information or against unreasonable search or seizure. These constitutional rights live on under the rubric of the First and Fourth Amendments and are not the intended targets of the long-running assault on the right to privacy. Nor do I mean that the privileges that the right to privacy has served to protect — paradigmatically the rights to reproductive choice, including abortion, and to intimate sexual relationships — no longer enjoy constitutional status. Plainly, they do. What I mean, rather, is that those privileges no longer owe that status to any putative right to privacy. The right to obtain an abortion is now conceptualized by its defenders either in terms of women’s equality or, nonexclusively, as a specific application of a constitutional liberty right
to make fundamental life decisions. The rights to use contraception and to participate in a consensual, noncommercial sexual relationship are also defended as aspects of the right to liberty, protected against state abridgement by the Due Process Clause. The projects and activities that the right to privacy was crafted to protect owe it a debt of gratitude, but the right to privacy as such has no clothes.

This should be cause for celebration among progressives and libertarians. Privacy was never an apt moniker for the rights they have characteristically sought to protect. It is not impossible to construct a theoretical account that grounds a right to use contraception, to have an abortion, or to participate in intimate sexual relationships in a right to privacy, but doing so invites the troublesome corollary that the justice underlying these rights has anything at all to do with publicity, information-sharing, or discretion more generally. As importantly, the rights to equality and liberty can boast the textual hook that the right to privacy has always coveted. Beyond the intrinsic satisfaction of grounding constitutional rights in the text of the Constitution, this development has an obvious political benefit. To the extent the conservative textualist movement that Justice Scalia has pushed has won tactical turf battles over constitutional methodology, locating a textual basis for rights previously described under the privacy rubric beats back the infantry attack, even if it doesn't quite win the war.8

Eroding privacy doctrine without eroding privacy rights also marks a significant victory for the jurisprudence of Justice Stevens. He has long expressed discomfort with the constitutional right to privacy, dating back to his tenure as a Seventh Circuit judge, when he complained that classifying the right to make fundamental life decisions as a “so-called right of marital privacy” was “unfortunate.”9 He reiterated that sentiment, more diplomatically, in his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick.10 When the Court finally overruled Bowers in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy appeared to adopt Justice Stevens’s view, not once referring to the right to engage in consensual same-sex sodomy as an aspect of a constitutional right to privacy.11

This Article describes the life and declares the death of the constitutional right to privacy, with particular reference to the significant role Justice Stevens played in its demise. Part I briefly chronicles the history of the right, from Samuel Warren’s and Louis

---

8 The daunting but not insuperable enigma of “substantive” due process remains.
11 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
Brandeis’s celebrated recognition of the privacy tort in 1890\textsuperscript{12} to Justice Douglas’s opinion in \textit{Griswold v. Connecticut},\textsuperscript{13} through its judicial invocations in \textit{Griswold}’s progeny and \textit{Bowers}, and at last to its conspicuous absence in cases like \textit{Lawrence} and \textit{Gonzales v. Carhart}.\textsuperscript{14} This Part argues that the gradual transformation of the right to make fundamental personal decisions from an aspect of privacy emerging from the penumbras of the Bill of Rights into an aspect of constitutional liberty and equality protected by the Due Process Clause is now complete.

Part II locates the theoretical basis for that transformation within the jurisprudence of Justice Stevens. From his foundational Seventh Circuit opinion in \textit{Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital},\textsuperscript{15} to his dissenting opinion in \textit{Bowers}, to his extrajudicial writings on the subject, Justice Stevens has long advocated an emphasis on what he terms the “liberty clause” of the Constitution in deciding fundamental decision cases. This approach vindicates the concurring \textit{Griswold} opinions of Justices Harlan and White, though by affirming the rights to abortion and to same-sex intimacy, the Court has decisively rejected their constitutional conclusions and instead embraced those of Justice Stevens.

Part III explains why this doctrinal development is not only, as Justice Stevens might say, eminently reasonable,\textsuperscript{16} but also makes good political sense. The right to privacy has become more symbol than substance. Its frequent invocation in confirmation hearings is entirely out of proportion to its significance in constitutional doctrine; it does no more than to signal, obliquely, comfort with or hostility to the continuing validity of \textit{Roe v. Wade}.\textsuperscript{17} Partly in response to the politics of abortion, political conservatives have, with moderate success, built a movement around attacking the methodological grounding of abortion rights (among others) in a nonoriginalist and nontextualist approach to interpretation.\textsuperscript{18} Abandoning the right to privacy liberates

\textsuperscript{13} 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
\textsuperscript{14} 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
\textsuperscript{15} 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975).
\textsuperscript{17} 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
progressives to support politically popular and, some would say, morally requisite constitutional claims, such as the rights to contraception and to abortion, while at the same time distancing themselves from a formless, atextual, and much-maligned right.

Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the doctrinal migration from privacy to liberty for other as-yet unrecognized constitutional rights, particularly the rights of same-sex couples to marry and to adopt children and the right of individuals to purchase and use sex toys. I contend that the change I have identified argues in favor of constitutional protection for the first two rights and against protection for the last. That bit of clarity should be welcome, regardless of one's views on the rights themselves.

I. THE BEGINNING AND END OF PRIVACY DOCTRINE

I begin with an obituary. This Part traces the right to privacy from its early years as a key figure in the Warren Court's cautious embrace of unenumerated constitutional rights; to its role in creating a right to an abortion; and finally to its abandonment by its opponents and, eventually, its initial supporters. The right to privacy is now dead, even as its contributions to constitutional law endure.

A. A Right Is Born: Griswold v. Connecticut

The right to privacy is polysemous, and it is important to distinguish its many meanings before proceeding. The same label may refer to the right to prevent dissemination of one's name, creative works, or photographic image; to be free from eavesdropping or physical search by government agents; to associate with others without unjustified intrusion or exposure by the state; or to exercise reproductive or sexual freedom. The potential for confusion arises from the fact that these disparate rights share a common and relatively pedestrian ancestry. As Justice Black wrote in dissent in Griswold, recognizing a constitutional right of privacy “appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing grounds for tort relief.”

When Warren and Brandeis wrote of a right to privacy in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article, they had in mind civil suits against gossip-mongers and paparazzi, not constitutional defenses against abortion

---


prosecutions. Nearly every one of the fifty states recognizes tort privacy, and it is not this Article’s ambition, nor could it be, to challenge it. Nor does this Article call into question the Fourth Amendment’s continuing protection of one’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” however shrinking that expectation might be. And the freedom to associate protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments still presupposes the right to do so in private. Each of these rights to privacy has been tugged at and remolded in the ordinary course of common-law adjudication, but none has wilted away.

The right to privacy this Article inter is the one Justice Douglas announced in his majority opinion in *Griswold*. The *Griswold* Court could have taken any number of doctrinal avenues to strike down Connecticut’s ban on contraceptive use. It could have declared, in harmony with the opinions of Justice Harlan and Justice White, that the right of a married couple to use contraceptives is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” that the state’s criminal prohibition of that use is not sufficiently justified in light of the significance of that right, and that the Connecticut law therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court might have bolstered that view, as Justice Goldberg urged, by reference to the Ninth Amendment, which provides that “the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

Justice Douglas chose none of the above. He instead married Justice Black’s view, that the Fourteenth Amendment should be understood to

---


22 See *RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS* § 652A cmt. a (1977). Invasion of privacy encompasses the distinct torts of “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another,” “appropriation of the other’s name or likeness,” “unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life,” and “publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.” *Id.* § 652A.


26 *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
apply the Bill of Rights to the states, to his own firmly held view that “the Bill of Rights is not enough” and should therefore be interpreted broadly. Douglas’s Madison Lecture of that title, an apparent response to Justice Black’s Madison Lecture of three years earlier, lamented the “default of the judiciary, as respects the Bill of Rights” and the erosion of civil rights by “[j]udge-made rules.” Privacy is protected by the Bill of Rights, Justice Douglas seemed to say in Griswold, but not in so many words. The right to privacy is to the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments what the right to association is to the First, an unspoken implication lying within the Amendment’s interstices and penumbras.

Justice Douglas’s initial draft in Griswold did not ground the right of a married couple to use contraceptives in a right to privacy, and the briefs had not urged a privacy-based holding. Rather, that first draft had treated the intimacies of the marital relationship as protected by the First Amendment right of association. It is ironic in retrospect that this narrower rationale might not have commanded a majority. “Penumbras and emanations” has become an in-joke around the law schools as shorthand for activist constitutional adjudication, an invitation for the Court “to protect those activities that enough Justices to form a majority think ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little sympathy.”

But the initial criticism of Justice Douglas’s opinion — and there was plenty — went less to its promiscuity than to its inscrutability. Privacy has a common-sense connection to the marital bedroom, but as a doctrinal term of art it had never been used in quite this way. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments had been understood to protect

---

29 Id. at 216, 220.
30 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
31 See DAVID J. GARRISON, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 245-46 (1994). The discussion of privacy rights in the final draft was included at the urging of Justice Brennan. Id. at 246.
32 See generally id. at 246-52 (describing Justice Brennan’s opposition to First Amendment holding and Justice Douglas’s difficulties in securing majority for his opinion).
34 It was Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, after all, that took the most open-textured approach to the Due Process Clause. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (finding “unacceptable” majority’s implication that “the ‘incorporation’ doctrine may be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process”).
“privacy” from government interference for certain purposes, namely on suspicion of untoward activity or to secure evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution.\footnote{See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959) (“Certainly it is not necessary to accept any particular theory of the interrelationship of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to realize what history makes plain, that it was on the issue of the right to be secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions or for forfeitures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was fought.”).} Those protections were of no use to individuals seeking to avoid the reach of the criminal law altogether, much less those, like Estelle Griswold and Lee Buxton, who had publicly advertised their crimes and made no claim of any unwanted physical invasion.\footnote{See Garrow, \textit{supra} note 31, at 201-07.} It is easy enough to understand such a right as sounding in liberty, but grounding it in privacy could well be read as restrictive — confined, perhaps, to hidden activities — rather than generative.

\textbf{B. Privacy’s Adolescence: Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade}

As the constitutional right to privacy grew, it became more awkward. In \textit{Eisenstadt v. Baird}, the Court relied on \textit{Griswold} to invalidate a Massachusetts ban on the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people.\footnote{Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).} Bill Baird had been arrested for giving vaginal foam to an apparently unmarried woman at the close of a lecture before at least 1,500 people at Boston University.\footnote{See Garrow, \textit{supra} note 31, at 320-21.} Over only one dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”\footnote{Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.} A differently inclined Justice might have written, “If the right of \textit{privacy} means anything, it does not license a birth-control activist to dole out medical devices to an overflow crowd of college students.” But by the time of \textit{Eisenstadt}, “privacy” had become a constitutional metonym, a word that resonates with the vocabulary of common experience but carries a more complicated meaning in the pages of the U.S. Reports.

To be fair, the Court was hardly engaged in doublespeak. The privacy right at issue was in substance the woman’s, not Baird’s, and when we speak of “private” decision making, we may mean not only that it is physically cached but that it is closed to external influence or
input. The right to privacy emerges from a powerful, and powerfully American, intellectual strain. In a liberal society, an individual decision either to risk or to invite pregnancy is simply not the community’s to make, and there is nothing malapropos in conceiving of that decision as grounded in a right to privacy. A difficulty arises, however, when the right has to bear the weight of justification for an exemption from abortion restrictions, as it did the following year in Roe v. Wade.

Apart from its much-maligned trimester framework, Roe is not a doctrinal aberration. As Justice Brennan certainly knew, his words in Eisenstadt could as easily have been describing the right to obtain an abortion. The Roe Court’s conclusion — that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation” — was virtually unassailable as doctrine went. The problem was that the doctrine was inadequate to its broader task. The state’s interest in preserving potential human life is spectacularly weighty, and only an equally weighty interest could counteract it in a minimally satisfying way. Framed in privacy terms, the abortion right seems not to outweigh the state’s interest but to reject it altogether: asserting a constitutional right to privacy is precisely a declaration that the state may not legitimately be interested. To be private is, after all, not to be public. Extending privacy doctrine to abortion thereby abides conceiving of the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy as a zero-sum duel between state and woman, rather than as a respectful weighing of competing but equally legitimate interests.

C. Privacy Come Liberty: From Carey to Casey

The Court recognized its mistake, at least implicitly, earlier than is often thought. With the exception of Carey v. Population Services International, which applied Griswold to the distribution of contraceptives to minors, the right to privacy has not been used to

---

40 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1162 (2004) (“American anxieties . . . tend to be anxieties about maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within our own walls.”).

41 Justice Brennan in fact circulated his Eisenstadt draft, including that momentous sentence, on the day Roe v. Wade was argued for the first time. See Garrow, supra note 31, at 541-42; see also Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s Supreme Court Journey 86 (2005) (remarking that Eisenstadt language “was obviously crafted to apply in the abortion context”).


extend constitutional protection to previously unprotected acts since \textit{Roe}. Feel free to reread the previous sentence, because this fact is easy to lose sight of amid the sequins and pyrotechnics of judicial confirmation hearings and talk radio. To the extent the Court has expanded the scope of substantive due process in the decades since \textit{Roe}, it has generally done so under the auspices of “liberty,” in harmony with the \textit{Griswold} opinions of Justices Harlan and White and, as we will see in Part II, with the longstanding views of Justice Stevens.

Thus, in \textit{Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur}, the Court invalidated a school board’s policy of requiring unpaid maternity leave for pregnant employees, lasting from five months before their expected delivery date until three months after the child’s birth.\footnote{Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974).} Justice Stewart, who had joined the \textit{Roe} majority but had made clear his distaste for a constitutional right to privacy,\footnote{See \textit{Roe}, 410 U.S. at 167 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).} referred in \textit{LaFleur} to “a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion” in the “decision whether to bear or beget a child,” but he conspicuously avoided any reference to the word “privacy.”\footnote{\textit{LaFleur}, 414 U.S. at 640 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).}

Likewise, in \textit{Moore v. City of East Cleveland}, the Court struck down the city’s cramped definition of “family” for the purpose of public housing eligibility.\footnote{Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).} Justice Powell’s plurality opinion referenced a longstanding “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life” and “a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter” but did not rely on any right to privacy as such.\footnote{Id. at 499. Powell’s reference to a “private realm of family life” derives not from \textit{Griswold} and its progeny but from \textit{Prince v. Massachusetts}, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), which upheld application of the child labor laws of Massachusetts to the niece of a Jehovah’s Witness.} If there was any doubt that the plurality was self-consciously distancing itself from the right to privacy, Justice Powell put those doubts to rest by quoting extensively from Justice Harlan’s dissent in \textit{Poe v. Ullman} and concurrence in \textit{Griswold}, both of which spoke in terms of liberty rather than privacy.\footnote{Moore, 431 U.S. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also id. at 503 n.12 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Harlan’s \textit{Poe v. Ullman} dissent recognized a right to privacy in the home embraced within the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). But Harlan made clear that the privacy inherent in the institution of}
Later, in *Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health*, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.” But elsewhere in the opinion he was careful to note that “[a]lthough many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held [and] believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.” And again, in *Troxel v. Granville*, in affirming the right of a mother to refuse visitation to her children’s paternal grandparents, Justice O’Connor grounded the Court’s decision in liberty interests and made no reference to a constitutional right to privacy.

Whatever might be said of cases like *Cruzan* and *Troxel*, the right to privacy had no better bellwether than *Bowers v. Hardwick*. For if there is no privacy right to a consensual, noncommercial sexual relationship in a private home with the partner of one’s choice, then there is no right deserving of the name. Michael Hardwick was arrested after a police officer happened upon him engaged in oral sex with another man in his own bedroom. In his majority opinion rejecting Hardwick’s claim to constitutional protection, Justice White wrote, “We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with respondent that the Court’s prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy and for all intents and purposes have decided this case.” Although the Court of Appeals had indeed relied on the right to privacy in invalidating the statute, Laurence Tribe’s Supreme Court oral argument on Hardwick’s behalf had made no reference to any general right to privacy. Indeed, at oral argument, only Michael Hobbs, counsel for the State of Georgia, had framed the requested right in constitutional privacy terms, and he had done so at three different points in his argument. Likewise, the state’s merits brief had

51 *Id.* at 279 n.7.
55 *Hardwick* v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985).
57 *Id.* at 5 (“Thus far this Court has concluded that the right of privacy includes marriage proves a special case for protection that does not extend, for example, to “adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest . . . however privately practiced.” See *id.* at 552-53.
mentioned “the right of privacy” at every available opportunity, even using the phrase as the title of a section of the brief, whereas the respondent’s brief had focused much more on the inadequacy of Georgia’s purported state interest. Any right invoked more enthusiastically by its enemies than its friends is not long for this Earth.

To be sure, Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion opted to “analyze respondent Hardwick’s claim in the light of the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy.” But Justice Blackmun was a jealous guardian of his opinion in Roe, as his brooding partial dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey made clear, and he is perhaps to be forgiven for missing the writing on the wall.

It was more plain to Justice Stevens, whose Bowers dissent was joined by each of the other two dissenters, but not Blackmun. The opinion described “individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship” as “a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” Justice Stevens further stated, “In consideration of claims of this kind, the Court has emphasized the individual interest in privacy, but its decisions have actually been animated by an even more fundamental concern.”

Then, quoting from his opinion as a Seventh Circuit judge in Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital, Justice Stevens evidenced his discomfort with the privacy frame: “These cases do not deal with the individual’s interest in protection from unwarranted public attention, comment, or exploitation” but rather “the individual’s right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s, destiny.”

matters which involve marriage and family, procreation, abortion, child rearing and child education.

58 See Brief of Petitioner at 1-2, 6-8, 10-16, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140); Brief of Respondent at 4, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140).
59 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 923 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“And I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the light.”).
61 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 216.
63 Id. at 217.
64 Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The right to set one’s own fundamentally significant projects and plans — in short, to control one’s destiny — has succeeded “privacy” as the limiting frame for the Court’s substantive due process decisions. Thus, in creatively restating the holding in *Roe*, the authors of the *Casey* joint opinion not only ditched the trimester framework but stated early in the opinion that “[t]he controlling word in the cases before us is ‘liberty.’” The decision whether to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability must remain the woman’s not because it is none of the state’s business but because it is so very much hers: “The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.” The joint opinion mentions the right to privacy just twice, both times deep within: first, when the plurality discusses the informed consent provision of the Pennsylvania statute, which has inherently to do with information exchange rather than decision making; and second, in invalidating the spousal notification requirement, where citation to *Eisenstadt*s admonition that the “privacy” right attaches to the individual rather than to the marital couple is irresistible. The case is otherwise silent on the right to privacy.

---

65 *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 846.
66 *Id.* at 832.
67 *Id.* at 883, 896. Unsurprisingly, there are far more overt references of the right to privacy in the *Casey* dissents. See generally Nan D. Hunter, *Living with Lawrence*, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (2004) (“Justice Blackmun’s opinion is almost poignant in its repeated use of ‘privacy,’ as if he could resuscitate the *Griswold*-Roe formulation by simply declaring that the majority was using it.”). Justice Blackmun wrote that the joint opinion “reaffirms the long recognized right[] of privacy,” *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), he described the ways in which “[s]tate restrictions on abortion violate a woman’s right of privacy,” *id.* at 927, and he argued that state abortion restrictions “deprive[] a woman of the right to make her own decision about . . . critical life choices that this Court has long deemed central to the right to privacy,” *id.*; see also *id.* at 929 (“The Court has held that limitations on the right of privacy are permissible only if they survive ‘strict’ constitutional scrutiny.”). Chief Justice Rehnquist, purporting to respond to the joint opinion, nonetheless framed his argument around a proposition that the joint opinion did not contest: that the Court’s substantive due process cases through *Eisenstadt* “do not endorse any all-encompassing ‘right of privacy.’” *Id.* at 951 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This disjunction may result from the fact that Justice Rehnquist drafted his *Casey* opinion on the assumption that he was writing for a majority, unaware that the joint opinion was imminent. See *GREENHOUSE*, supra note 41, at 203.
D. The End of Privacy: Lawrence and Carhart

Given the fault lines on the Rehnquist Court, it was clear that virtually any majority opinion in a contested substantive due process case would require the agreement of at least two of the three authors of the Casey joint opinion — Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. So when the Court finally overruled Bowers with its 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas,68 it should not have been surprising that Justice Kennedy, echoing his own words in Casey, eschewed the language of privacy rights. The word “privacy” appears just thrice in the majority opinion: in restating the question presented, in restating the holding of Griswold, and in a verbatim quote from Eisenstadt.69 By contrast, the word “liberty” appears more than twenty-five times in the majority opinion, including three times in the opening paragraph:70

Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.71

From the beginning, one of the knocks on the right of privacy was that the Griswold Court “did not even intimate an answer to the question, ‘Privacy to do what?’” 72 “Liberty” may not be inherently better suited to answer that question, but it does at least invite conversation about the substance of the protected conduct rather than its location or circumstances — its “spatial bounds,” so to speak. Justice Kennedy was hinting at a freedom of self-definition, and accordingly, the Bowers dissent he found most fertile was that of Justice Stevens, not that of Justice Blackmun. Kennedy wrote, “Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.”73

---

69 Id. at 564-65.
71 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
72 BORK, supra note 33, at 99.
73 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Lawrence was overtly, and paradoxically, a mortal blow to the constitutional right to privacy, but the final nail in its coffin was more subtle. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court rejected a facial challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal prohibition on what is professionally known as the intact dilation and evacuation method of terminating a pregnancy, even though the act did not include an exception for the preservation of maternal health. The Court split 5–4, and Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. The Carhart dissent therefore represented the views of the Justices most likely to be sympathetic to a right to privacy. But earlier in her career, as a Court of Appeals judge, Ginsburg had said that the Roe Court “presented an incomplete justification for its action.” She would have preferred the majority in Roe to have “added a distinct sex discrimination theme to its medically oriented opinion.” Referring more to women’s equality would have recognized that, because of the social expectations that attend pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing, “[a]lso in the balance [in abortion cases] is a woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s course — . . . her ability to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”

Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent, her first significant abortion opinion in fourteen years on the Court, picked up where she had left off more than two decades earlier. She wrote:

As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control over her [own] destiny.’ . . . Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.
The commingling of equality and liberty interests also appeared in Lawrence, in which Justice Kennedy said that “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” On this conception, the liberty component of substantive due process protects an individual’s right to make fundamental life decisions on substantively equal terms with others.

Referring to the Court’s substantive due process cases through Carey v. Population Services International, Justice White wrote in Bowers that “none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.” Justice Kennedy in Lawrence and Justice Ginsburg in Carhart made clear that five members of the Court have settled on a nexus, and it is grounded not in privacy but in liberty and equality. Indeed, as Part III shows, the only members of the current Court likely to refer to the right to privacy are those who dissent either from its fecundity or its very existence. The next Part discusses the role Justice Stevens played in that remarkable doctrinal evolution.

II. JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE LIBERTY CLAUSE

As a naval intelligence officer during World War II, John Paul Stevens was part of a team charged with deciphering the Japanese naval code. Cryptanalysis requires the codebreaker to unlock the ciphering system that identifies the relevant numeric codes and then to translate those codes into words. A coding system must by necessity be mysterious to outsiders, but it must at the same time be transparent to insiders. Code — good code, anyway — is designed to be understood. Indeed, that’s the key to cracking it.

Law, too, is a kind of code, and it can be cryptic to the uninitiated. I have discussed the ways in which the right to privacy was put to work beyond its evident talents. This Part discusses Justice Stevens’s

Feminist Lawmaking 87-100 (2000) (suggesting that notions of marital privacy reinforce intrafamilial oppression of women).

84 See id.
recognition that, circa 1975, constitutional privacy doctrine was in need of a better idiom. Subpart A articulates Justice Stevens's vision of liberty, which was, like Justice Harlan's and Justice White's, more grounded conceptually but at the same time more generative than privacy. Subpart B then explains how Justice Stevens's conception of liberty has generated doctrine consistent with his substantive constitutional views.

A. Justice Stevens and the Liberty Clause

In trying to bridge the divide between Justice Black and Justice Harlan, Justice Douglas had created a paradox: an unenumerated right grounded in positive law. Such rights are not unknown to constitutional law; Justice Douglas sought to demonstrate this with his reference in *Griswold* to the right of association, which lives in the long shadow of the First Amendment. But as such rights expand into realms not originally contemplated by their begetters and not welcomed by their detractors, they become too easy a target to sustain a controversial doctrine. Abortion rights do not sound in privacy. That does not mean, of course, that such rights do not deserve constitutional protection, but having to speak in the language of privacy unduly complicates the task of those who would defend them.

Then-Judge Stevens, a Nixon appointee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, faced the paradox of constitutional privacy in full form in 1975, when he had before him a case in which several married couples sued for paternal access to the delivery room of a public hospital during the birth of their children. The plaintiffs were claiming a privacy right, not to preclude state access to an intimate event or decision, but to obtain it for themselves; the state's presence was not only conceded as legitimate but was in fact invited. This was all profoundly strange, and Judge Stevens effectively said so:

It is somewhat unfortunate that claims of this kind tend to be classified as assertions of a right to privacy. For the group of cases that lend support to plaintiffs' position do not rest on the same privacy concept that Brandeis and Warren identified in their article in the 1890 Edition of the *Harvard Law Review*. Significantly, however, in distancing himself from the right to privacy, Judge Stevens did not retreat to the strict formalist position associated

---

87 *Id.* at 719.
with Justices Black and Stewart in *Griswold*. Rather, Stevens laid out an affirmative vision of constitutional liberty that is tethered neither to the concept of privacy nor to any formula dictated by the Constitution’s text. Referring to *Griswold*, *Eisenstadt*, and *Roe*, he wrote, “The character of the Court’s language in these cases brings to mind the origins of the American heritage of freedom — the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable.”

This should sound familiar, of course, since it approximates the Court’s current doctrine. As Part I discusses above, Justice Stevens, in his *Bowers* dissent, wrote his *Fitzgerald* opinion into the U.S. reports, and Justice Kennedy in turn relied on that dissent for the majority in *Lawrence*. Crucially, Justice Stevens’s formulation is no more restraining than Justice Douglas’s or Justice Blackmun’s, and it is in some respects less so. In *Fitzgerald* he quoted Justice Harlan’s statement in *Griswold*:

> Judicial self-restraint will not . . . be brought about in the “due process” area by the historically unfounded incorporation formula advanced by [Black and Stewart]. It will be achieved in this area, as in other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.

One is reminded of Justice Sutherland’s statement, dissenting in *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish*, that “[s]elf-restraint belongs in the domain of will and not of judgment.” A belief that judicial restraint is a constitutional value, but an endogenous one, enables Justice Stevens to be comfortable taking the constitutional term “liberty” at face value, as the freedom to follow the dictates of one’s conscience bound only by the competing needs of a reasonable sovereign.

---

88 See *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“I think this is an uncommonly silly law. . . . But we are not asked in this case to say whether this law is unwise, or even asinine.”).

89 *Fitzgerald*, 523 F.2d at 719-20.

90 Id. at 720 n.14 (quoting *Griswold*, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

91 *W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish*, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).

Justice Stevens made the point more explicitly in his dissenting opinion in *Meachum v. Fano*, in which the Court held that prison inmates have no constitutional liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a prison facility with materially worse conditions. Justice Stevens criticized the majority's implication that a protected liberty interest must originate either in the Constitution or in a statute. Stevens wrote:

> If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct. But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source.

Like Justice Harlan and Justice White before him, Justice Stevens countered Justice Douglas's expansive positivism with a careful naturalism. Rather than protecting an unenumerated right grounded in positive law, Justice Stevens's Due Process Clause — what he has called the "liberty clause" — protected an enumerated right grounded in natural law.

**B. Reaching the Right Side of History**

Quite unlike Justice Harlan's or Justice White's, however, Justice Stevens's substantive views on the reach of the Due Process Clause...
have carried the day. Justice Harlan intimated in *Poe v. Ullman* that the moral judgments of the community may justify State prohibitions on, for example, “adultery, fornication and homosexual practices.”97 That is very nearly the opposite of the position Justice Stevens espoused in his *Bowers* dissent, and which Justice Kennedy in *Lawrence* lifted verbatim from Stevens: “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”98 And although Justice Harlan left the Court two months before (and died two weeks after) *Roe* was argued, Charles Fried, who drafted *Poe*, has suggested quite plausibly that “[t]he argumentation of Harlan’s dissent in *Poe*, as well as his refusal to condemn laws proscribing adultery, fornication, and homosexuality leave little doubt that he would have held with the dissenters in *Roe*.”99 For his part, Justice White of course dissented in *Roe* and wrote the now-discredited majority opinion in *Bowers*.100

99 Charles Fried, *The Conservatism of Justice Harlan*, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 33, 52 n.121 (1991) (citation omitted); see also *Poe*, 367 U.S. at 547 (“Certainly, Connecticut’s judgment [as to contraception] is no more demonstrably correct or incorrect than are the varieties of judgment, expressed in law, on marriage and divorce, on adult consensual homosexuality, abortion, and sterilization, or euthanasia and suicide.”). Unlike the unusual Connecticut law banning contraceptive use, antiabortion regulations were common in the years leading up to *Roe*. Compare *id* at 554 (“[C]onclusive, in my view, is the utter novelty of this enactment. Although the Federal Government and many States have at one time or other had on their books statutes forbidding or regulating the distribution of contraceptives, none, so far as I can find, has made the use of contraceptives a crime.”), with *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that “a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century”). Of course, Justice Harlan’s views in 1961 cannot be presumed to be the same as what they would have been in 1973. See John Paul Stevens, *Learning on the Job*, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1567 (2006) [hereinafter Stevens, *Learning on the Job*] (“[L]earning on the job is essential to the process of judging.”). Harlan was a firm believer, moreover, in the capacity of constitutional protections to evolve with society. See *Poe*, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance . . . struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.”).
It is difficult to know what gives one judge a better eye for doctrinal progression than another. I want to suggest, though, that crucial to Justice Stevens’s conception of constitutional liberty is an appreciation for its connection to equality, and a law sense that enables him to follow their respective arcs to their inevitable convergence. As discussed above, a majority of the current Court has come to the view that denial of certain particularly significant liberty interests inexorably effects a denial of equal protection of the laws. Restricting a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy subjects her body and her subsequent life to a set of physical and social burdens that cannot befall a man. Denying someone the right to sexual intimacy with the partner of his choosing denies him a choice that he may consider central to his humanity, and that others not so denied consider central to theirs.

Conversely, denying an individual certain public benefits on an arbitrary basis, such as the color of her skin, denies her a liberty interest without sufficient justification. That, as Justice Stevens has noted, was the basis for the Court’s decision in *Bolling v. Sharpe*. “The self-evident proposition enshrined in the Declaration [of Independence] — the proposition that all men are created equal — is not merely an aspect of social policy that judges are free to accept or reject,” he told a University of Chicago Law School audience in 1991. “[I]t is a matter of principle that is so firmly grounded in the ‘traditions of our people’ that it is properly viewed as a component of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment.” On this view the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive.

Linking the liberty interests in obtaining an abortion or in engaging in homosexual conduct to the constitutional equality concerns that they implicate would not likely have impressed Justice Harlan. The Equal Protection Clause was first applied to sex discrimination in *Reed v. Reed*, which was argued the month after Harlan retired from the Court. No Court majority was willing even to apply heightened scrutiny to sex discrimination until 1976, five years after Justice

---

101 See supra Part I.D.
104 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, *Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses*, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (“A considerable number of constitutional clauses are redundant in a certain sense; they illuminate and clarify what was otherwise merely implicit.”).
Harlan’s death. It was not that the Court just hadn’t gotten around to reaching such claims or applying such standards; rather, the same women’s movement that pushed passage of the Equal Rights Amendment altered the cultural landscape and, consequently, the Court’s case law in the 1970s. Justice Harlan authored the Court’s unanimous opinion in Hoyt v. Florida, which upheld Florida’s practice of presumptively excluding women from jury service on the ground that “woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life.” Questioning an abortion ban on sex equality grounds would have been an impossibly difficult leap for him.

Likewise, Justice Harlan did not live to see the full flowering of the gay rights movement. Although the Warren Court did not have much opportunity to confront gay rights issues, we get a glimpse of Justice Harlan’s attitude towards gays in Manual Enterprises v. Day, in which the Court reversed the Postal Service Department’s determination that a number of gay soft porn magazines were obscene. Writing only for himself and for Justice Stewart, Justice Harlan announced the opinion of the Court but wrote gratuitously that the magazines were “dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry” and described their readers as “unfortunate persons.”

At the time of Harlan’s death, gays and lesbians were not only subject to antisodomy laws in many states but also remained ineligible for federal civil service employment. In a due process challenge to that exclusion in 1960, the Court had denied certiorari without any internal dissent. Five years after Harlan’s death, the Court summarily affirmed — without merits briefing or oral argument — the denial of a challenge to Virginia’s sodomy ban. Three Justices indicated that they would have noted probable

---

110 Id. at 490.
jurisdiction and scheduled the case for oral argument: Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens.\footnote{114}

It may be surprising that a well-bred Republican antitrust lawyer would be so responsive to the sexual revolution, but Justice Stevens’s writings on and off the bench have long emphasized a judge’s capacity for change. At a symposium on his career hosted by Fordham Law School in 2005, Justice Stevens said that “learning on the job is essential to the process of judging.”\footnote{115} He has explained, for example, that when he first became a federal judge, he believed that the Due Process Clause “provides procedural safeguards, but has no substantive [content].”\footnote{116} He changed his view after rereading the opinions of Justice Holmes in \textit{Lochner v. New York}\footnote{117} and Justice Brandeis in \textit{Whitney v. California}.\footnote{118} Justice Stevens has also said that careful examination of the relevant precedents and arguments likewise changed his view over whether political patronage in civil service violated the First Amendment.\footnote{119} Witness as well his transformation into a death penalty abolitionist,\footnote{120} a generation after coauthoring the controlling opinion in \textit{Gregg v. Georgia}, which lifted the Court’s nationwide moratorium and announced, inter alia, that “the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”\footnote{121} Instead of assuming that that view must be true for all time, Justice Stevens in \textit{Baze v. Rees} “relied on [his] own experience” in concluding that the death penalty has become cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.\footnote{122}

Like a conscientious jurist, law itself can change as the society that sustains it grows older and wiser. Justice Stevens’s confidence in that quality underwrites his lack of formalism. Unlike Justice White, for example, Justice Stevens has long insisted that the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis that remains a feature of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence too rigidly describes the proper analysis.\footnote{123} Lacking the

\footnote{114} \textit{Id.}

\footnote{115} Stevens, \textit{Learning on the Job}, supra note 99, at 1567.

\footnote{116} \textit{Id.} at 1561.

\footnote{117} 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

\footnote{118} 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see Stevens, \textit{Learning on the Job}, supra note 99, at 1561-62.

\footnote{119} See Stevens, \textit{Learning on the Job}, supra note 99, at 1562-63.


\footnote{122} \textit{Baze}, 128 S. Ct. at 1551 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

\footnote{123} See \textit{Craig v. Boren}, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal
formalist’s preference for clear rules likewise has sensitized Justice Stevens, I think, to the interdoctrinal overlay that drives his view of the importance of liberty to equality, and vice versa. A judge who believes there is, in effect, more than one Equal Protection Clause is bound to have a difficult time in seeing which one dovetails with the Due Process Clause, and how. By contrast, Justice Stevens can approach his task unburdened by any compulsion to maintain sharp cleavages between doctrinal areas, and self-conscious about the need to be receptive to new arguments and perspectives.

III. THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY

The decaying of the right to privacy described in Part I and effectively presaged by Justice Stevens as early as 1975 has gone largely unnoticed in our constitutional politics. At the 2006 Supreme Court nomination hearing of Justice Samuel Alito, the very first question Alito was asked, by Senator Arlen Specter, was whether “the Liberty Clause and the Constitution carries with it the right to privacy.” At Chief Justice Roberts’s hearing months earlier, Senators Specter, Joe Biden, Herb Kohl, Charles Schumer, and Dianne Feinstein all asked Roberts whether he believed in a constitutional right to privacy; Biden and Schumer asked the same question in two separate rounds of questioning. Senator Specter opened the hearing by confronting Roberts with a memo Roberts had written in 1981 as an
attorney in the Justice Department in which he had referred to the "so-called 'right to privacy.'" 127

Both Roberts and Alito answered that there is a right to privacy in the Constitution deriving from Griswold, even though I have suggested that Lawrence v. Texas effectively marked constitutional privacy's doctrinal end. That doesn't mean Roberts and Alito were necessarily wrong. Both surely recognized that the questions they were being asked were not doctrinal but political. In the latter realm, of course, describing oneself as opposed to the right to privacy is but shorthand for declaring one's hostility to the constitutional right to an abortion. That is so even if, in the realm of doctrine, the abortion right is no longer conditioned on a right to privacy. A judge who describes herself as opposed to the right to privacy also risks the demonization that befell Robert Bork in 1987. Try as he did to argue, in the way of many academics, that the Connecticut ban on contraceptive use might have been struck down on desuetude or some other ground, Bork's rejection of the right to privacy is widely viewed as having doomed his nomination.128 His was a fate Roberts and Alito were doubtless eager to avoid.

The Bork nomination demonstrated that disclaiming a right to privacy was no way to ingratiate oneself with certain segments of the public. But just as surely, applying the "so-called" label signals fraternity with many of the rest, becoming something of a secret handshake on the right.129 The "so-called" formulation boasts a distinguished pedigree within conservative legal circles: it was used not only by Roberts in that 1981 memo, but by the Reagan Justice Department in its 1988 Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation;130 by Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Lawrence;131 and by Federalist

127 See id. at 146; Memorandum from John Roberts to William French Smith, supra note 5.
129 That, indeed, was the substance of Roberts' defense of the phrase at his hearing: that, at the time, he was informing Attorney General Smith about a speech of Erwin Griswold's and knew that Smith was skeptical of the right to privacy. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 126, at 147.
130 GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION, supra note 6, at 8 (“The so-called 'right to privacy' cases provide examples of judicial creation of rights not reasonably found in the Constitution.”).
131 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594-95 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Griswold] expressly disclaimed any reliance on the doctrine of 'substantive due process,' and grounded the so-called 'right to privacy' in penumbras of constitutional provisions other than the Due Process Clause.”).
Society cofounder Steven Calabresi in his introduction to a volume on the history of the originalism debate.\textsuperscript{132}

The label had more humble beginnings. The formulation appears to have first been used by New York Court of Appeals Judge Alton Parker in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.\textsuperscript{133} Abigail Marie Roberson’s claim had nothing to do with contraception, abortion, or sexual intimacy. Rather, she wanted equitable relief and damages for the unauthorized use of her likeness — “said to be a very good one” — in an advertisement for Franklin Mills Flour.\textsuperscript{134} Referring to the celebrated Warren and Brandeis article, Judge Parker dismissively wrote that “[t]he so-called right to privacy is . . . founded upon the claim that a man has the right to pass through this world . . . without having his picture published, his business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments written up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented upon . . . .”\textsuperscript{135} Roberson lost, but the (so-called) “so-called right to privacy” has since peppered the opinions of state and federal courts. Nearly all such references echo that of Prosser and Keeton on Torts, which speaks of “the so-called ‘right of privacy’ ” in the context of unwanted publicity or commercial exploitation rather than immunity from state morals legislation.\textsuperscript{136}

The strange career of the right to privacy may suggest an amendment to Robert Dahl’s famous observation that “the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”\textsuperscript{137} Dahl’s suggestion is that the political branches have a certain corrective capacity that makes the legal doctrine of the Court tend to follow the political predilections of majorities rather than those of minorities. But defenses of the right to privacy show a converse order of influence. Biden’s belief “with every fiber of [his] being” in a general right to privacy is one that he shares with perhaps no one on the Court.\textsuperscript{138} The Court invented, and then abandoned, the right to privacy, but its initial

\textsuperscript{132} Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 1, 24 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (writing that “[o]bviously, the so-called right to privacy” is not “deeply rooted in history and tradition”).

\textsuperscript{133} 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).

\textsuperscript{134} Id. at 442.

\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 443.


\textsuperscript{138} Roberts Hearing, supra note 126, at 18.
use as a justification for politically relevant doctrine nominated it as a
litmus test in the politics of the confirmation process. Its potency as
such a test makes it insensitive to the Court’s doctrinal evolution. Jack
Balkin and Sanford Levinson have argued that political parties change
positive constitutional law over time by using the appointments
process to effect what Balkin and Levinson call “partisan
entrenchment.”139 Certain doctrinal formulae and rhetoric, such as the
right to privacy, can likewise influence constitutional politics through
what one might call “doctrinal entrenchment.” Confirmation fights are
prime locales for both forms of entrenchment: a judicial formulation
can infest the politics of judging every bit as much as a President’s
politics can take over the Court.

There are good reasons, however, for progressives to take the
Court’s more recent cues on the right to privacy. I have argued that
the right to privacy faces certain rhetorical challenges in justifying a
right to abortion.140 Those challenges are more acute in the current
methodological climate on the Court and within the legal academy.
Consider the words of Chief Justice Roberts at the Rehnquist Center
Lecture at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law:

When Justice Rehnquist came onto the Court, I think it’s fair
to say that the practice of constitutional law — how
constitutional law was made — was more fluid and wide-
ranging than it is today, more in the realm of political
science. . . . Now, over Justice Rehnquist’s time on the Court,
the method of analysis and argument shifted to the more solid
grounds of legal arguments — what are the texts of the
statutes involved, what precedents control.141

Roberts’s perspective is somewhat hortatory, but it is safe to say that
the Court, and the legal and academic discourses that encircle it, are
less hospitable than they once were to nontextual arguments.142 The
transformation of sexual intimacy and abortion from privacy to liberty
rights accommodates both politically popular liberal demands for a

139 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,
140 See supra Part I.B.
141 John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 2009 Rehnquist Center
Lecture (Feb. 4, 2009), available at mms://www.law.arizona.edu/archive/events/
RehnquistCenterLecture2009.wmv.
142 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, 1513-14 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)).
progressive Constitution and legally ascendant conservative demands for a Constitution whose text is authoritative.\textsuperscript{143}

It was Justice Douglas’s aim to ground the substantive due process right to use contraceptives more firmly in the text of the Bill of Rights than Justice Harlan or Justice White would have it, but he failed to do so. “Liberty” is hardly self-defining, but it can boast three appearances in the Constitution, including in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments\textsuperscript{144} — that is of course three more appearances than “privacy.”\textsuperscript{145} A case like \textit{Lawrence}, then, was not an example of finding a new right in the Constitution but rather defining an ancient and enumerated one. Justice Stevens made that point to great rhetorical effect in \textit{Meachum v. Fano}: “I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.”\textsuperscript{146}

IV. THE LONG ARM OF LIBERTY

One might dismiss all of the above as mere semantics. It may seem naïve to imagine that the labels judges apply to doctrine drives the results in actual cases. Perhaps this is so much inside baseball, and the actual winning and losing is responsive to other discourses. An Article of this scope is not the place to stake out and defend a position in the great debates over the elements of judicial decision making. If doctrinal labels are nothing more, then the interment of the privacy label remains a point worth making. Nonetheless, more can be said. Whether the Court is hospitable to certain substantive claims seems to depend in significant part on the work done to change the language in which the Court speaks. The decision in \textit{District of Columbia v. Heller}, striking down the District’s handgun ban, required that the profile and


\textsuperscript{144} The Constitution’s other reference to liberty is in the Preamble. U.S. \textit{Const.} pmbl.

\textsuperscript{145} Of course, the text of the Due Process Clauses appear to modern readers to give solely procedural, and not substantive, protections to individual liberty. This is an obstacle for textualists, but surely easier to surmount than the complete absence of the word “privacy” from the document.

credibility of originalism be enhanced.\textsuperscript{147} The decision in \textit{Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1}, invalidating voluntary public school integration plans in Seattle and Louisville, required a makeover of the idea of a colorblind Constitution.\textsuperscript{148} More than for any other public institution, the Court’s word is its bond; it takes language — of statutes, of regulations, of its own prior opinions — seriously, more seriously perhaps than language is usually meant to be taken. Referring to a potential class of rights as deriving from liberty rather than privacy is not merely cosmetic. The limited doctrinal reach of privacy, as this Article has endeavored to show, reflects the limitations of language itself.

Going forward, the shift in language here identified might carry consequences for three of the most active doctrinal areas falling under the rubric of substantive due process: marriage rights for same-sex couples, adoption by gays and lesbians, and the purchase and use of sex toys. Although the constitutional right to privacy has its origins in the desire to protect the institution of marriage from state interference,\textsuperscript{149} the language of privacy rights is an exceptionally poor fit for extending constitutional protection to same-sex marriage. Marriage is a quintessentially public institution — the notoriety of the commitment is a source of its symbolic gravity. As Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Marshall wrote in \textit{Goodridge v. Department of Public Health}, requiring legal recognition of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, “[M]arriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family.”\textsuperscript{150} Just as the deeply felt public interest in abortion makes “privacy” a nonstarter for many abortion rights opponents, reliance on privacy interests to extend constitutional marriage rights to same-sex couples would give opponents an inviting target for criticism.

Likewise, resorting to a privacy rubric to defend the rights of gays and lesbians to adopt children is too easily characterized as discounting — rather than overcoming — the traditional public concern for the best interests of the child, particularly one in the


\textsuperscript{148} Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709-11 (2007); see \textit{id.} at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s decision.”).


state’s care. Indeed, the plaintiffs in *Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services*, in which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld Florida’s ban on adoption by “homosexual[s],” raised a marital privacy claim and were rebuffed precisely on the ground that adoption is inherently a public affair. Judge Birch wrote:

> The decision to adopt a child is not a private one, but a public act. At a minimum, would-be adoptive parents are asking the state to confer official recognition . . . on a relationship where there exists no natural filial bond. In many cases they also are asking the state to entrust into their permanent care a child for whom the state is currently serving as in loco parentis. In doing so, these prospective adoptive parents are electing to open their homes and their private lives to close scrutiny by the state.

In the absence of *Griswold* and its progeny, no one would think to argue that the right to legal adoption presupposes state indifference to the fitness of the prospective parents. But the privacy rationale encourages that distracting line of argument, to the detriment of the equality rights of gays and lesbians.

Focusing instead on liberty, and by extension on equality, is no guarantee of success, and in *Lofton* it was no more successful than the privacy argument. But a conversation about equality in marriage or family planning invokes an interest that is both compelling and, unlike the right to privacy, exogenous to the interest of the state. Even the most monumental of interests in state intervention must still remain competitive with the independent mandate to treat persons equally in matters of fundamental importance. Adoption and marriage may never sound in privacy. But the Constitution’s words do not admit limitation to the prejudices of any particular age. Over time, as society evolves — and judges, too — it may come to be axiomatic that any reasonable conception of equality must overcome the speculations of public officials bearing social theories.

---

151 *Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs.*, 358 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir. 2004); see *Fla. Stat.* § 63.042(3) (2002) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”).

152 *Lofton*, 358 F.3d at 810-11 (citations omitted).

153 See id. at 811-17.

On a third active substantive due process issue, the right to purchase and use sex toys, the shift from privacy to liberty offers far less comfort. There is currently a circuit split over whether a state may ban the sale of sexual gratification devices, with the Eleventh Circuit upholding Georgia's ban under rational basis review and the Fifth Circuit invalidating Texas's prohibition without specifying a level of scrutiny. Both panels assumed without discussion that the same analysis applies to a ban on sale as would apply to a ban on use. Unlike same-sex marriage or gay adoption, a right to sex-toy use fits comfortably within the rubric of privacy. If there is a constitutional right to use sex toys, it is very likely because the state has no legitimate business regulating, as such, the means through which its constituents reach orgasm. By contrast, extending the liberty right recognized in Casey and in Lawrence to the right to use sex toys threatens to trivialize it, and thereby unwittingly to undermine efforts to protect same-sex marriage and adoption rights. Whatever the merits of these three rights, our law and our legal discourse will benefit from recognizing that they attach to distinct sets of interests.

CONCLUSION

The right to privacy has what a PR man would call bad optics. It is missing from the text of the Constitution; it is freighted with the baggage of terms like “penumbras” and “emanations”; and it seems at first blush to bear little relationship to some of the specific rights with which it has been associated, such as abortion and same-sex marriage. Justice Stevens saw as much more than three decades ago, when he wrote for a panel of the Seventh Circuit that privacy was an “unfortunate” label for the set of decisional rights warranting protection under what he has called the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the years since, Justice Stevens has played although Equal Protection Clause was not originally thought to outlaw segregated schools, it was adopted in recognition that its capacious language was capable of growth.

155 See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740, 744-45 (5th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007).
158 See, e.g., Nick Paumgarten, The Death of Kings, NEW YORKER, May 18, 2009, at 40, 43 (describing “optics” as new corporate jargon for “‘appearances’ — something that looks good or bad, in a public relations sense”).
The Justices supporting the rights to abortion and sexual intimacy no longer speak in terms of privacy but instead, like Justice Stevens, affiliate those rights with an individual's interest in control of her destiny. Justice Stevens and the Court have both recognized that interest as sounding in liberty and equality alike.

Retiring the right to privacy may have salutary effects on the framing of marriage and adoption rights for gays and lesbians, but both liberals and conservatives perceive political benefits in its continued service. Losing privacy would deprive conservatives of a favorite bogeyman and, in the eyes of many liberals, would endanger the right to an abortion. But just as doctrine must change to accommodate our politics, politics must sometimes change to accommodate the Court's doctrine. And so, eventually, it will.