The Materiality of Sponsorship Confusion

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The question of whether and when confusion over product sponsorship should be actionable is one of the most vexing in trademark law. Mark owners often claim that the use of their marks in movies and on merchandise will mislead consumers to believe that their companies have approved these other products, and that these uses therefore must be controlled. But overzealous enforcement of sponsorship rights can chill valuable speech and unnecessarily prevent competition in merchandising domains. In an effort to rein in overreach by trademark owners, several prominent scholars have proposed adding a materiality requirement to the sponsorship confusion analysis. They want to require mark owners to show not only that consumers assume a particular product is sponsored by the mark owner, but also that this assumption materially affects consumer behavior. The data gathered and presented here show that requiring materiality would alter the treatment of several classes of products, but would not have nearly as broad an effect as many would have expected: sponsorship confusion is material to about half of consumers. The implications of these findings for other proposed limiting doctrines are discussed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE PROBLEM OF THE MERCHANDISING RIGHT ...................... 1916
II. THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF A MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT 1924
   A. Participants ................................................................. 1927
   B. Products ................................................................. 1931

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1. Sports merchandise .................................................. 1933
2. Automotive merchandise ......................................... 1934
3. Colleges and universities........................................... 1935
4. City, museum, and government agency souvenirs .......... 1935
5. Parody ...................................................................... 1937
6. Movie naming ........................................................... 1938

C. Origin and Sponsorship Confusion Questions ................. 1938
   1. Materiality of sponsorship confusion ....................... 1944
   2. Equity ................................................................... 1952
   3. Relationships between materiality metrics .......... 1956

III. MATERIALITY AS A WAY FORWARD ............................... 1957
   A. Presuming (Partial) Materiality ............................... 1957
   C. Materiality Affects the Shape of the Debate .......... 1960

APPENDICES**

** In addition to the printed material, this study also comprises two Appendices, which are on file with both the author and the UC Davis Law Review, and available at http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/files/50-5_Kugler_appendices.pdf. Appendix A consists of the images and product descriptions used in the survey. Appendix B lists the survey questions.
Trademark merchandising rights are a multi-billion dollar business.\footnote{See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, *The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?*, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 461 (2005); cf. Jessica Litman, *Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age*, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1726 (1999) (discussing how trademarks have become an independent merchandising and advertising device).} NFL merchandising alone accounted for 2.1 billion dollars in 2010, and that was actually a decline from the previous year.\footnote{Daniel Roberts, *The Biggest Losers in an NFL Lockout? Everyone*, FORTUNE (Mar. 4, 2011, 4:45 PM), http://archive.fortune.com/2011/03/03/news/companies/nfl_lockout_losers_labors.htm.} Trademark owners now license their logos for use on everything from sports jerseys, to car license plate covers, to souvenirs and memorabilia, to university sweatshirts. But this was not always the case. Up until the 1970s, many of these products were made by unlicensed manufacturers. It was only in the late 1970s and early 1980s that it became common for trademark owners to bring cases against such manufacturers, and only when those cases were won was the modern licensing industry was born.\footnote{See Irene Calboli, *The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandising*, U. ILL. L. REV. 865, 877-86 (2011) (giving a somewhat more sympathetic account of that history); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 464 (recounting the history of trademark merchandising); see, e.g., Bos. Prof'l Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).}

At the core of this revolution in merchandise licensing is the problem of sponsorship confusion. Seeing the words “Chicago Cubs” on a t-shirt leads a meaningful number of people to believe that the Cubs have sponsored or approved that shirt. These people understand that the Cubs are not in the business of garment manufacture, but they still believe that the team was involved. And for the last several decades, courts have generally treated this misattribution of sponsorship as legally actionable trademark confusion and permitted mark owners to control these uses of their names.\footnote{See Calboli, supra note 3, at 892-96.}

Many scholars are skeptical of this merchandising revolution because they believe that it is inconsistent with the primary goals of trademark law. Though their objections are many and varied, the proposed solutions converge: only treat sponsorship confusion as actionable under trademark law if that confusion is material to consumers.\footnote{See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, *Irrelevant Confusion*, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414-16 (2010); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., *Trademark Monopolies*, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 483 (1999) (“[W]hen confusion concerns something other than source, courts should expressly require the plaintiff to establish that the confusion concerns material...”) Specific solutions are offered in the notes to this section.} Specifically, scholars have proposed that an incorrect
attribution of sponsorship should only be actionable if it affects the purchase decision or leads consumers to believe that the alleged sponsor is responsible for the quality of the finished product.\textsuperscript{6}

Despite the extensive discussion of confusion materiality in the literature, no one has empirically investigated just how often consumers care about this type of sponsorship.\textsuperscript{7} Some believe that most people don’t care whether the makers of Batman approved the use of his logo on a shirt or whether the owners of the Chicago Cubs have given permission for the “C” on a cap; they just want the images.\textsuperscript{8} But others think that consumers are highly sensitive to whether a football jersey is “official” and would be much less willing to buy an unsponsored version.\textsuperscript{9} Both of these perspectives are plausible, so absent empirical evidence we have little sense of the stakes of this debate. If most or all sponsorship confusion is material, then merchandising cases would generally reach the same results even information, just as we do with implicit false advertising claims more generally.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{6} See infra notes 38–48 and accompanying text (describing how scholars are divided on what the key question should be regarding materiality). In Part II, the consequences of each materiality possibility are considered.

\textsuperscript{7} There is literature examining whether corporate sponsorship of sporting events produces returns for the corporation. See, e.g., T. Bettina Cornwell, Stephen W. Pruitt, & John M. Clark, \textit{The Relationship Between Major-League Sports' Official Sponsorship Announcements and the Stock Prices of Sponsoring Firms}, 33 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 401 (2005). There is also similar literature on the value of celebrity endorsements. See, e.g., Anita Elberse & Jeroen Verleun, \textit{The Economic Value of Celebrity Endorsements}, J. ADVERT. RES. 149 (2012). But I have found no paper looking specifically at the key trademark materiality question: authorized vs. unauthorized use of a mark or name.

\textsuperscript{8} See, e.g., Bone, supra note 5, at 1364 (“Most consumers probably do not care whether the merchandise is officially authorized.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 500-01; Litman, supra note 1, at 1727; Lunney, supra note 5, at 397-98 (“Consumers will likely place little value on that information in making a decision whether to purchase . . . .”); Gerald T. Tschura, \textit{Likelihood of Confusion and Expressive Functionality: A Fresh Look at the Ornamental Use of Institutional Colors, Names and Emblems on Apparel and Other Goods}, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 873, 885 (2007); see also Greg Lastowka, \textit{Trademark's Daemons}, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 803-05 (2011).

were materiality required. This would make the entire doctrinal exercise relatively pointless: that which now needs to be licensed would still need to be licensed. If most sponsorship confusion is irrelevant, as many of these commentators implicitly assume, then a materiality requirement would effectively destroy the multibillion dollar trademark licensing industry.

The study presented here was designed to determine both how often sponsorship confusion is material to consumers and also how it is material. The results show that, across a wide range of products and domains, sponsorship confusion is rarely material to more than half of potential consumers. And, if only material confusion is counted, a number of products that would need to be licensed under current law would instead be unrestricted. Adopting a materiality requirement would therefore change the law of trademark merchandising to a meaningful degree. The requirement would not, however, complete a revolution in trademark sponsorship law. Sponsorship is material often enough that a great many products would still need to be licensed. Most sports merchandise licensing, for example, would remain secure even after discounting for materiality. This is a notable omission: sports merchandising is a huge industry and team products are frequently used as examples by those who hope that a materiality requirement will transform trademark law.

The types of products that are affected by requiring materiality suggest that thinking in terms of materiality helps to justify some of the limiting doctrines in trademark law, such as parody and nominative fair use. Those who support such doctrines sometimes run afoul of the “gravitational pull” of likelihood of confusion; the defenses are seen as in conflict with the “normal” rule prohibiting confusing uses. These results suggest that this conflict may be more imagined than real if one thinks in terms of material confusion. Confusion about the sponsorship of public symbols, parody products, and incidental uses of names is not commonly material. Though some consumers are indeed confused, the majority of them don’t care. Adding materiality to the likelihood of confusion framework therefore removes a considerable tension between that framework and other limiting doctrines.

10 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 5, at 1364; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 473; see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 440.

11 See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 112-13 (2008) (commenting on the “gravitational pull of likelihood of confusion” and how it often interferes with the promotion of limiting doctrines in trademark law).
There is also an interesting tension between what consumers care about and the goals of trademark law. In traditional trademark thinking, the whole point of a mark is to indicate a given level of quality, so consumers’ willingness to pay should be affected by sponsorship when a mark indicates quality. But instead consumers are willing to pay more for a product when it is the kind of product that consumers think the trademark owner should be able to control. This equitable impulse is very defensible on moral grounds but is inconsistent with most trademark thinking.

Part I of the paper reviews the existing discussion of merchandise licensing and explains the various perspectives on sponsorship materiality. Part II presents the empirical study and shows both how often sponsorship is material to consumer decision-making and how different measures of materiality relate to each other. Part III concludes by evaluating how a materiality requirement could work, the likely consequences that adopting one would have, and the extent to which it would fulfill the goals that its advocates desire.

I. THE PROBLEM OF THE MERCHANDISING RIGHT

Claims of sponsorship confusion have been ubiquitous in recent years. Little league teams named in honor of professional baseball franchises have been threatened with lawsuits and forced to change their names.12 TV shows and movies have been forced to obscure logos on real products because manufacturers did not want to be associated with how those products were used on camera.13 Parody products and joke apparel have been the subject of hostile demand letters and expensive lawsuits.14 In the words of two leading trademark scholars “[w]hat unifies all the cases . . . is that courts found actionable confusion notwithstanding the fact that consumers couldn’t possibly

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12 See Katie Thomas, In Cape Cod League, It’s Tradition vs. Trademark, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B11 (discussing a number of such changes).
have been confused about the actual source of the defendants' products.”

The principal alleged negative consequences of these efforts are a shrinking of the public domain and a chilling of lawful trademark use. Even plainly baseless demand letters raise fears of uncertain litigation outcomes and the extreme expense of actually defending a trademark lawsuit. Put in the context of the chronicle of absurdities above, and the numerous articles similarly despairing over the ever-extending reach of trademark law, one rapidly gets the sense that settlement and accommodation are the safest responses when confronted by an angry mark owner. The result is a world in which actors are highly reluctant to explore the legal extent of trademark fair use for fear of overzealous litigation.

As a matter of equity, the aggressive efforts by trademark owners to control all possible uses of their marks are not obviously unjustifiable. People only want Ford keychains because they own Ford cars and would prefer to have keychains with matching logos. Allowing anyone other than Ford to produce Ford keychains is permitting a kind of free riding; only from the efforts of Ford does the product have any value. And similarly the makers of an apparently perfectly safe garbage disposal might well have a rational reason to mind watching that unit mangle a character’s hand on a popular TV show; why should they suffer that underserved negative association? So — in this line of argument — it was right for courts to dismiss attempts to prevent the Reagan administration from naming its Strategic Defense Initiative “Star Wars,” but licensing control over NFL jerseys and car memorabilia is justly accorded to those whose labor made the insignia valuable.

Persuasive though some may find this equitable story, it is a poor fit for the primary purposes of trademark law. The main, perhaps even sole, point of trademark law is to allow consumers to quickly and

15 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 421.
16 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 61-66.
17 See Bone, supra note 5, 1336-37; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 417-18; McGeveran, supra note 11, at 51-52.
18 See also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 461-62 (giving more examples of trademark absurdities).
19 See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687 (1999); Litman, supra note 1; Lunney, supra note 5.
20 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 115-21 (arguing for the creation of simple affirmative defenses to trademark claims because complex fair use doctrines deter legitimate uses).
efficiently determine the origin, and therefore the likely quality, of products.\textsuperscript{22} This is the search costs theory of trademark law.\textsuperscript{23} When trademark rights are protected, consumers know that a product bearing Alpha’s mark will have Alpha’s traditional level of quality. They can therefore use the mark as a shortcut, saving them the time and effort needed to investigate each product individually. The principal harm that the law must prevent is the false belief that a product actually made by Beta was instead made by Alpha.\textsuperscript{24} When a consumer is confused in this manner, they mistakenly expect Alpha’s level of quality from the product, and will blame Alpha if the product falls short. Over time, this leads to two problems. First, it reduces Alpha’s incentives to maintain consistent quality in its products because free riders like Beta are exploiting the resultant good will. And, second, consumers need to spend more resources investigating product quality because their proxy, the trademark, loses its predictive value and they would otherwise risk buying the wrong product.

Courts therefore recognize trademarks based on a wide variety of product features when the features are source identifying and non-functional. And, consistent with this source-signaling story, it is not enough that one company’s products look similar to those of another. The similarity needs to be such that consumers confuse the source of the products.\textsuperscript{25} Broad though source identification can be, it is not a blanket license to prohibit free riding. Even a near copy of a design is not inherently a trademark problem if it does not result in source confusion.\textsuperscript{26}

As most people understand, however, neither the University of Chicago nor the Chicago Cubs make t-shirts. So confusion in the context of merchandising is not about product origin but instead about product sponsorship. This need not be a problem for trademark law if the mark is still principally a signal of responsibility for quality. When McDonalds licenses a franchise it is, fundamentally, sponsoring the new restaurant. But this sponsorship obliges a degree of oversight. When one walks into a McDonalds in a random American city, one has a fairly good idea what levels of service and nutrition to expect. In

\textsuperscript{24} Misattributing the products of Alpha to Beta leads to a similar breakdown of efficient incentives.
\textsuperscript{26} See id.
fact, a mark is held to be abandoned if it is licensed to a franchisee and
the mark owner makes no attempt to ensure a consistent level of
quality.\footnote{27 See Eva's Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., Inc., 639 F.3d 788, 790-91 (7th Cir. 2011). Note, as Judge Easterbrook does there, that the key requirement is a consistent level of quality, not a high level. Id. at 790.} This is what is called a “naked license” and results in a loss of trademark rights.\footnote{28 See Freecycle Sunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 515-16 (9th Cir. 2010).} So long as the sponsor does monitor product quality, however, the principal goal of trademark law is still furthered
by this sort of licensing arrangement: the mark conveys substantial information about who is responsible for the product's quality.

But many have alleged that the responsibility-for-quality story does not work for much of trademark merchandising. As one scholar put it, children want the cereal box with the cartoon character on it because they want to have breakfast with Batman.\footnote{29 Litman, supra note 1, at 1727.} The added value of Batman's presence is social, aesthetic, and emotional, but it implies nothing about the quality or origin of the cereal. This could also be true in the domains of sport and college merchandising. One's preference between a Harvard University sweatshirt and a Stanford University sweatshirt is generally not driven by an expected difference in the quality of the fabric. This is instead a matter of social signaling and tribal allegiances.\footnote{30 See id. at 1735 (discussing the interplay between consumers and producers in giving marks subjective value).}

These examples raise the possibility that it may be irrelevant to the consumer whether the product merely bears a socially important mark or is actually sponsored by the mark owner; they may just want to signal affiliation with the team, institution, or cause. And it is not obviously the business of trademark law to correct consumer confusion if the feature the consumer is confused about is frankly not important to them. As the Supreme Court observed “[t]he words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”\footnote{31 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2003).}

It also poses a problem for trademark law if the mark is serving this functional expressive purpose. The Supreme Court has recognized that trademark protections cannot extend to functional product features.\footnote{32 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).} Design features, whether aesthetic or otherwise, are functional if they are “essential to the use or purpose” of a
product, “affect[ ] [its] cost or quality,” or if the exclusion of them would put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” These merchandising marks, then, are arguably functional to the extent that their primary purpose is not to signal quality or origin but instead to do something else, perhaps express affiliation or beliefs. And, though Batman is still protected under copyright, Harvard’s name and seal were both established in the Nineteenth Century and are therefore outside of even current ever-lengthening copyright terms.

Yet this type of functionality argument has not been successful in some lower courts despite the Supreme Court’s guidance. As Greg Lastowka observed, “[c]ourts seem to give lip service to the goal of preventing consumer deception, but then go on to reach bizarre conclusions that seem to serve invisible and unarticulated goals,” often preventing anyone other than the mark owner from benefiting financially from the community that they have created. And empirical analysis has shown that courts are extremely likely to find a likelihood of confusion in cases where they find bad faith, which can sometimes be done by merely showing intentional use of another’s mark even if there is no intent to deceive.

Despite the resistance of some lower courts to restricting trademark law, many scholars faced with this Batman problem have wanted to narrow trademark rights and allow for competition in these secondary markets. They have called for adding a materiality requirement to the

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33 Id. at 33-35.
34 The Fifth Circuit entirely rejects the doctrine of aesthetic functionality and has ruled against employing it or any similar doctrine in a case involving school colors. Bd. of Supervisors for Louisiana State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487-90 (5th Cir. 2008). The doctrine has, however, been embraced elsewhere, though it has not been put to this particular use. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2nd Cir. 2012) (red shoes); Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2010) (circular beach towel).
35 Lastowka, supra note 8, at 788.
36 See id. at 804 (“Courts are treating teams like celebrities—they believe that these groups should have the exclusive right to reap the popular value associated with their identifying symbols.”).
37 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1626-31 (2006). Defendant’s intent (also known as bad faith) is a very awkward factor in trademark law. Though some courts require more than mere use of another’s mark to establish bad faith, Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 622 (5th Cir. 2013), others find it merely due to intentional copying of the defendant’s mark, even if there is no particular reason to assume the goal was source confusion, see, e.g., Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d at 490.
2017] The Materiality of Sponsorship Confusion 1921

trademark confusion analysis. Under this revised doctrine, Beta’s use of Alpha’s mark would only be actionable if (1) some meaningful percentage of consumers believed that Alpha sponsored Beta’s product; and (2) those consumers actually cared whether Alpha had sponsored Beta’s product. Sponsorship confusion would be legally irrelevant if the only added value of the mark on a product is the ability to signal that one’s child goes to Harvard or that one is a fan of the Cubs. Implicit in these various proposals is the belief that most consumers merely want the words “Harvard University” on a shirt and do not care whether Harvard is connected to the product.

The scholars calling for a materiality requirement, however, are divided on exactly what should count as material. Lemley and McKenna focus on responsibility for quality. When “consumers believe the brand owner guarantees the quality of the product [it] leads to consumer harm if their belief is misguided.” They “therefore would define the category of trademark infringement to include cases involving confusion as to whether the plaintiff is responsible for the quality of the defendant’s goods or services in addition to those involving actual source confusion.” Responsibility for quality confusion, then, is presumptively material. Other kinds of sponsorship confusion should be dealt with under the law of false advertising.

Returning to the example of the Cubs Jersey, Lemley and McKenna would be most concerned about sponsorship confusion if the consumer thought that the Cubs affiliation meant that the Cubs were in charge of the quality of the jersey.

Taking a contrasting view, Robert Bone sees the materiality of sponsorship confusion in merchandising style cases through a wide lens of trademark-related harm. Though he does not rule out any

38 See Bone, supra note 5, at 1310 (arguing for a showing of a significant trademark-related harm along with morally blameworthy conduct); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 414 (arguing that trademark law should be refocused away from “sponsorship and affiliation confusion . . . that do[es] not affect consumers’ decisionmaking process’ and back to “confusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions”); Lunney, supra note 5, at 483 (“As a result, when confusion concerns something other than source, courts should expressly require the plaintiff to establish that the confusion concerns material information, just as we do with implicit false advertising claims more generally.”); Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1365 (arguing that trademark should “return materiality to the role it played in trademark’s earlier development”).

39 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 415.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Bone, supra note 5, at 1363-71 (describing his test for non-competing goods, which would presume harm in cases with directly competing goods).
potential type of harm, one of his major concerns is the risk of negative feedback — known as relation-back — between a low-quality piece of merchandise and the overall reputation of the trademark owner.\footnote{See id. at 1366-67 ("Moreover, if consumers have a bad experience with the defendant's products, they might transfer some of the blame to the plaintiff and thus discount the reliability of the mark in the plaintiff's market as well.").} Though some have questioned whether such relation-back actually occurs, Bone himself is unconvinced by that work and believes it to be a major risk even in cases where consumers do not believe the mark owner is responsible for quality.\footnote{See id. at 1366-69.} For Bone, therefore, confusion is material when it leads the consumer to blame the mark holder for negative experiences with the product or affects the purchase decision. In the Cubs context, Bone would be most concerned if the consumer's impression of the jersey would relate back to the Cubs reputation, particularly if the Cubs would be blamed for a low-quality jersey.

Consistent with the broader perspective advocated by Bone, Glynn Lunney and Rebecca Tushnet both define materiality in terms of factors that would change consumer behavior.\footnote{See Lunney, supra note 5, at 483; Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1353.} Their support for adding a materiality requirement comes from a comparison between trademark law and false advertising and, thus, is more concerned with purchasing behavior.\footnote{See Lunney, supra note 5, at 483; Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1352-73.} Lunney and Tushnet, then, would be most concerned if the consumer's belief about sponsorship of the jersey influenced their purchase decision. Perhaps the consumer paid more because they thought that their purchase would support the team. Notably, Lemley and McKenna do not disagree with the broad consumer behavior framing advocated by Bone, Lunney, and Tushnet.\footnote{See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 450 ("[T]he law should require that trademark owners claiming infringement based on confusion regarding anything other than source or responsibility for quality must demonstrate the materiality of that confusion to consumer purchasing decisions.").} They merely believe that responsibility for quality should be at the core of sponsorship materiality.

There are therefore at least three different ways of viewing confusion materiality. Lunney and Tushnet speak broadly of whether consumer behavior is affected. And, though neither Bone nor the Lemley–McKenna team would disagree with their expansive framing, each has their own particular focus. According to Lemley and McKenna, the concern is that consumers will believe that the sponsor is responsible

\footnote{See id. at 1366-69.}
for the quality of the junior good.\footnote{Id. at 415.} According to Bone, the responsibility for quality test is insufficiently protective because consumers may still blame a senior mark owner if they believe it has licensed its good name to a foolish junior firm, even if they do not think that quality is being monitored.

Though there is a strong intuition that much merchandising confusion is rarely material under any of these definitions, this has never been tested and may be questionable in some contexts. Perhaps those buying university or team shirts really want their money to go to the alleged sponsor and would feel meaningfully misled if it did not. Or perhaps consumers believe that official MLB jerseys are higher quality than unofficial ones and are willing to pay a premium for that. One might easily imagine that organizations such as the Cubs, Harvard University, and Porsche have a strong motivation to monitor the quality of all products bearing their brand, and actually do ensure that low-quality products do not appear in the market. Scholars may have strong and reasonable intuitions about whether consumers care about sponsorship in this or that merchandising case, but they could easily be mistaken in any or all domains. In particular, scholars drawing on the pre-merchandising revolution experience to predict current consumer preferences may not be able to sufficiently account for the changes in consumer preferences wrought by the last several decades of market conditioning; there is a circularity problem here.\footnote{Several of those writing in this area have speculated regarding this effect. See id. at 414; Lunney, supra note 5, at 396.}

Thus, as this debate over whether to impose a materiality requirement occurs, no party actually knows what consumers want and expect.

This discussion of materiality occurs in the shadow of a fundamental debate over the nature of trademark law. Is trademark law about the protection of consumers, or is it primarily for the benefit of mark owners? Is trademark law like the law of fraud, with an extremely limited (if important) purpose, or are trademark rights a species of property, to be exploited in any way the owner sees fit? Many of those calling for materiality-based reforms want trademark law to be about consumers, warning of the dangers of trademark monopolies (Lunney), explicitly invoking parallels to consumer fraud statutes (Tushnet), and focusing heavily on the consumer experience (Dogan, Lemley, McKenna).\footnote{See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 469-70, 485-89; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 427; Lunney, supra note 5, at 483; Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1344-73.}

But as Bone has documented, the war
over the soul of trademark law is not a new one, and there has always been a strong countervailing “seller protection” impulse that has more to do with preventing free riding that avoiding any (other) concrete harm.\textsuperscript{51}

The materiality proposal is best understood as an effort to use a consumer focus to rein in the trademark law excesses of the recent decades, latching onto choice phrases from the Supreme Court’s trademark cases from the early 2000s that suggest that it is time for a renewed emphasis on the limitations of trademark law. By examining the beliefs and preferences of actual consumers, this paper adds to this discussion not by assessing whether it is “good” to further this mission, but instead by showing how much this consumer focus buys its advocates. If we take consumer views seriously, do we get a more limited law of trademark?

To answer this question, I conducted a survey modeled after the types of consumer confusion studies that are often conducted in trademark litigation. The study tested consumer impressions of a variety of goods that are within the scope of the merchandising right. In addition to the standard product origin and sponsorship questions that are part of traditional trademark surveys, participants were also asked a series of questions intended to assess the importance of product sponsorship.\textsuperscript{52} The primary goal of the study was to determine how often consumers actually care about sponsorship attributions, and why they care.

\section*{II. THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF A MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT}

Consumer confusion surveys in trademark law currently operate under a relatively simple mathematical formula. The percentage of consumers who believe that the plaintiff made the defendant’s products is added to the percentage who believe that the plaintiff has not made the products but has instead endorsed, approved, or sponsored them. If the resulting percentage is greater than some threshold number — conventionally (but not strictly) 15%\textsuperscript{53} — then this counts heavily in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.

\[
\text{Plaintiff Makes} + \text{Plaintiff Sponsors} > \text{Threshold}
\]

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} See Bone, \textit{supra} note 5, at 1327-36.
\item \textsuperscript{52} The images, product descriptions and questions comprising the study are shown in the Appendices to this article, on file with the UC Davis Law Review, and available at http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/files/50-5_Kugler_appendices.pdf.
\item \textsuperscript{53} See \textit{infra} notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
The proposed revision to trademark law slightly modifies this formula. Rather than counting all those who believe that the plaintiff sponsors the product, the revised approach counts only those who believe that the plaintiff sponsors the product and for whom this belief is material.

Plaintiff Makes + (Plaintiff Sponsors * Percent Material) > Threshold

Though there is a strong intuition that confusion is entirely irrelevant some of the time, there is no clear understanding of how extensive, or how limited, this category of cases might be. One might imagine, for example, that movie-goers have little interest in whether or not Dairy Queen has endorsed a particular film. But many cases are not so clear. In the all-important domain of sports merchandising, one could easily imagine fans being just as happy with products that are not endorsed by the team; the whole point is to wear the team colors, not buy Cubs-quality jerseys. But those same fans do feel loyalty to the team, and buying unauthorized products may be seen as cheating a liked and respected organization. We simply do not know which narrative dominates; both accounts are plausible. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no prior empirical data on this question.

Some research from psychology should lead scholars to be skeptical of the claim that sponsorship is normally not relevant. Work from Francesca Gino and colleagues has shown that people wearing what they believe to be fake rather than authentic designer sunglasses view themselves as less authentic. Such “counterfeiting” participants are also more likely to cheat in real-money laboratory games and to expect unethical treatment by others. Similarly, the actual effectiveness of a placebo medication varies substantially depending on whether the medication is cheap or expensive. These types of expectation effects

54 See Bone, supra note 5, at 1371 (“[C]onfusion about whether the Dairy Queen company licensed use of its mark in a film about a Midwestern beauty contest called Dairy Queens is not likely to affect viewers’ decisions about whether to watch the film and thus not likely to satisfy the materiality requirement.”).
55 See Litman, supra note 1, at 1727.
56 See Francesca Gino, Michael I. Norton, & Dan Ariely, The Counterfeit Self: The Deceptive Costs of Faking It, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 712, 718 (2010). The sunglasses were actually genuine in all conditions. Id. at 713.
57 See id. at 714-18.
58 See Rebecca Raber, Baba Shiv, Ziv Carmon, et al., Commercial Features of Placebo and Therapeutic Efficacy, 299 JAMA 1016 (2008) (participants in the high-value pill condition reported experiencing less pain following electric shocks than participants in the low-value pill condition); see also Baba Shiv, Ziv Carmon, & Dan
suggest that the power of an authentic and expensive mark may extend far beyond any of the quantifiable product features, potentially making sponsorship attributions highly relevant; consumers know they are buying a frame of mind in addition to a product. As for the team-loyalty aspects of buying sports merchandise from the wrong vendor, one need only consider the case of American flags — which are often made in China — to recognize the kind of emotional factors that can be at play in such a context.59

Therefore even if one grants the theoretical premise that trademark law should only concern itself with material confusion, there is still the question of whether materiality is ever absent to a meaningful degree. If materiality is generally present, then the two formulas will yield approximately the same result. If only half or fewer of those who are confused are actually materially affected, however, then there can be a substantial divergence between the two approaches.

There are also multiple methods of defining materiality. As described in Part I, different theorists favor different formulations.60 Beliefs about sponsorship are arguably material when they lead the consumer:

1. To expect that the sponsor is partially responsible for the quality of the product.
2. To blame the sponsor if they are disappointed by the product.
3. To be more interested in the product.
4. To pay more for the product.

Though which framing is best is a normative question, there is no existing data on whether the framings are functionally equivalent or fundamentally different, or the extent to which they can serve as proxies for one another.

Not knowing the prevalence of materiality and the consequences of adopting each of the several meanings of materiality should give some pause to advocates of reform. Adding a new factor to the trademark confusion analysis is costly. It makes the jobs of judges, litigants, and

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60 See notes 39–47 and accompanying text.
survey consultants more complicated. It increases uncertainty, making it more difficult for parties to decide whether to litigate or settle. And it increases legal fees, as both difficulty and uncertainty will lead to a greater need to consult with experienced practitioners and experts. These transaction costs matter.\textsuperscript{61} If confusion materiality would rarely be outcome determinative, it would be hard to justify incurring these costs to get slightly “better” trademark outcomes.\textsuperscript{62} Those advocating for a materiality requirement therefore have the burden of showing that such a requirement would affect outcomes in a meaningful number of cases.

What is needed, then, is a sense of how many consumers think sponsorship matters in various trademark domains and how consumers view each of the meanings of materiality. An empirical study was therefore conducted to answer that question. The study was intended to mirror standard consumer confusion studies to the extent feasible. Consumers were recruited by a professional survey firm for a study of marketing attitudes. After being screened to ensure that they were in the market for the relevant classes of product, they were then presented with product advertisements that were very closely modeled on actual Amazon.com ads. Accompanying each ad were the traditional product origin and sponsorship questions, as well as a novel battery of questions aimed at assessing the materiality of sponsorship confusion.

A. Participants

Participants were recruited by Toluna Online, a professional survey firm with a large established panel. Toluna is an industry leader in online survey administration and surveys conducted through it have previously been used in trademark confusion expert reports.\textsuperscript{63} To ensure the quality of its panel, Toluna checks the location and identity information reported by its respondents against third party data


\textsuperscript{62} Robert Bone has expressed this concern about adding a materiality requirement. See Bone, supra note 5, at 1376.

\textsuperscript{63} Henry Ostberg's survey conducted on Toluna was found credible in Radiance Found., Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P., 25 F. Supp. 3d 865, 880-81 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Radiance Found., Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P., 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015) (on other grounds) (citing Deposition of Henry Ostberg, 302-04). The Toluna survey conducted by Hal Poret was also found to be credible. Expert Report of Hal Poret, GoSMiLE, Inc. v. Dr. Jonathan Levine, D.M.D. P.C., 769 F. Supp. 2d 630, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10CV08663).
sources, including postal service records and telephone directories. It also regularly examines its panel for respondents who appear to be “cheaters.” These participants, who give straight-line responses or repeatedly miss attention checks, are banned from the panel and prevented from rejoining if they receive three complaints.\textsuperscript{64} Toluna distributed the survey to a targeted segment of its panel, aiming to contact a subsample that was demographically weighted to match US census distributions.

The legally relevant universe for a traditional consumer confusion study consists of potential purchasers of the allegedly infringing product.\textsuperscript{65} For some categories of products, it is quite difficult to correctly define this universe. Big-ticket items are sometimes purchased infrequently and unpredictably, and someone who has recently bought a washing machine, for example, is unlikely to soon be in the market for another. But this task is greatly simplified for most non-durable goods such as clothing, food, and other consumables. For these, past purchase behavior is often an excellent predictor of future purchase behavior, and one can safely include in the survey universe both those who have recently purchased similar items as well as those who expect to be purchasing them in the near future.\textsuperscript{66} Most of the items sold under the merchandising right fall into the nondurable good category. They are basic pieces of clothing, small ornaments, and minor household goods. This survey therefore screened participants by asking whether they had purchased items of a given type in the last year, or were planning to do so in the next six

\textsuperscript{64} See E-mail from Stefanie Madison, Senior Project Manager for Toluna, to Matthew Kugler, Author (April 15, 2015, 5:00 PM) (on file with author).

\textsuperscript{65} See Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc. 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The appropriate universe should include a fair sampling of those purchasers most likely to partake of the alleged infringer’s goods or services”); see also Jacob Jacob, Trademark Surveys 289-90, 314-18, 327-28 (1st ed. 2013) (citing cases); William G. Barber, The Universe, in Trademark and Deceptive Advertising Surveys: Law, Science, and Design 27, 28-29 (Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre Swann eds., 2012). This is, appropriately, reversed in a reverse confusion case. There it is the prospective customers of the senior user (usually the plaintiff) who must be surveyed. See Jacob, supra, at 290-92.

\textsuperscript{66} See Jacob, supra note 65, at 314; see also J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 32:161 (4th ed. 2016).
months. Participants qualified for the survey if they either had or were planning to purchase a product from one or more of the listed categories.

A trademark survey prepared for use in litigation will often have an extremely refined definition of the survey universe. Beyond the mere propensity to purchase similar products, prospective participants may also be screened based on their geographic locations, their willingness to buy products of a particular value, and their preferred shopping venues. The goal is to ensure that all of those included are prospective customers of the allegedly infringing product and that no substantial subclass of prospective customers is excluded.

The products chosen for this survey were all available on Amazon.com. The only limit on Amazon’s reach within the United States is technological: the consumer must have internet access. Therefore every internet-capable American is a prospective Amazon customer. Further, no item in this survey retailed for more than one hundred dollars on Amazon, and many were comparatively cheap. These are not prestige products in the way a Louis Vuitton handbag would be. A survey targeting a diverse cross-section of internet capable American adults is therefore appropriate.

Courts have generally been accepting of internet samples in trademark surveys.

The principal insight here is that all survey

67 The categories, presented in random order, were:
1. Clothing that has the name or logo of a sports team on it.
2. Sports-related merchandise other than clothing.
3. Clothing that has the name or logo of a school, college, or university on it.
4. A souvenir mug, shirt, keychain, pen, or similar product.
5. Pet accessories, such as pet beds or pet toys.
6. Automobile accessories, such as floor mats, keychains, and similar products.
7. Ticket to a comedy movie, or a copy (DVD, Blu-ray, etc.) of such a movie.

68 See Barber, supra note 65, at 41; see also Jacoby, supra note 65, at 318-33. Particularly, consider the importance of the retail outlet. See id. at 328-29. Were a third party to sell knock-off MLB or NFL gear, the natural venue would be an online retailer, and the largest online retailer is Amazon. Therefore consumers seeing such products would likely be doing so in the shopping context of an Amazon.com product page.

69 See Jacoby, supra note 65, at 318-33; Barber, supra note 65, at 48.

70 The sports jerseys interestingly retailed for substantially more than one hundred dollars on other websites, but were under one hundred on Amazon itself.

71 See Jacoby, supra note 65, at 836-39 (reviewing 19 cases in which internet surveys were considered by courts); Roger Tourangeau & Shari Seidman Diamond, Internet Surveys For Evaluating Trademark Infringement and Deceptive Advertising, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS, supra note 65, at 287, 291-92 (also reviewing cases and concluding that courts have “generally been open to online surveys” and “their criticisms [of such surveys] focused primarily on methodological characteristics unrelated to the fact that data were collected online”).
methods have shortcomings and, as more and more people have internet access and fewer and fewer answer phone calls from unknown numbers, the shortcomings of internet surveys have become fewer and less worrisome than those of the alternatives. Mail surveys often have low response rates and limited surveyor control. Telephone surveys cannot include visual stimuli, often exclude cellphones, and have had lower and lower response rates in recent years. And the sample in a classic mall-intercept survey is arguably even more non-random than the one in an internet survey. It is estimated that 40% of all marketing surveys were done online in 2010.

This survey included several safeguards to assure attentive respondents. First, an attention check was built into the market-screening questions. This question, which was intermixed with the others, asked respondents to select the negative response option for its line. Prior research has shown that this type of attention check works well to screen out participants who are not reading the questions and actually serves to increase the attentiveness of those who do notice it. Second, the survey contained numerous free response questions. Those few participants who gave gibberish or nonsensical answers to these questions were eliminated from the sample.

Because survey participants could qualify for participation if they were in the relevant universe for any of several products, most participants who began the survey qualified to continue. Of the 1,513 participants to begin the survey, 1,147 qualified based on their responses to the product screener questions and the initial attention check. Of these, 98 gave nonsensical responses to at least some of the free response questions. Since these were only a small fraction of the

72 See JACOBY, supra note 65, at 425-27, 472-73. See generally Tourangeau & Diamond, supra note 71 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of using the Internet to collect data for trademark and deceptive advertising surveys).
73 See generally Tourangeau & Diamond, supra note 71 (outlining the costs and benefits of internet surveys).
74 JACOBY, supra note 65, at 425.
76 Importantly, it was not necessary that participant responses be correct for the participant to be included; that would have biased the sample. The standard was merely responsive. Sadly the problem of insufficiently detailed or attentive responses to free response questions is an inherent risk of self-administered studies and very hard to avoid in the online context. See JACOBY, supra note 65, at 848.
broader sample, they were discarded. This left 1,049 cases for final analysis.77

B. Products

Trademark merchandising occurs across a wide range of brand types, and there is little ex ante justification for assuming that results found for one brand type, or even one product type within a brand type, will generalize to others. It is therefore necessary to cast a wide net if one wants to draw generalizable conclusions. Multiple product domains must be tested and, ideally, multiple products within a domain should be included.78 A review of the existing case law, the academic literature, and popular news reports suggested that the major merchandising domains are: sports, college and university, souvenir, automotive, and parody. These are therefore the target domains of the study.

It is necessary to present the products in as normal an environment as possible to accurately gauge a consumer’s degree of confusion.79 All of the products used in this study were selected from those available on Amazon.com, and so that site’s layout was the basis of the advertisements. Amazon has a fairly standardized product presentation format that lists the title of product at the top of the screen, a maker or distributor directly under the title, and a product image next to several brief bullet points about the product underneath the distributor. For example, a baseball jersey might be titled “MLB Chicago Cubs Home Replica Jersey” and be listed as “By Majestic.” Bullet points might

77 Toluna oversampled females and the excess data was included in the analyses rather than discarded to maintain statistical power. The final sample included 440 males, 602 females, 1 person who identified as “trans,” and 6 participants who did not report their gender. 83.9% of the sample identified as White, 10.5% as Black, 1.5% as Native American, and 2.9% as South or East Asian. On a separate question, 9.9% reported identifying as Hispanic or Latino. The median age was 52 (range 18-89, M = 49.49, SD = 17.32). 12.2% had graduate degrees, 26.3% had four year college degrees, 25.1% had two year degrees, 34.4% had high school degrees, and 2.0% had not completed high school. This is approximately what one would expect from a general population sample. According to the US Census Bureau, 12.7% of those 35–39 have graduate degrees, a further 22.6% have four year degrees, 10.8% have two year degrees, 42.8% have a high school degree but have not completed any college degree, and 11.2% do not have a high school degree. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012 — DETAILED TABLES (2012), http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html.

78 See Jacoby, supra note 65, at 360-61 (discussing the selection of product stimuli from the universe of all disputed products).

79 See Jerre Swann, Likelihood of Confusion, in, TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS, supra note 65, at 53, 76-77 [hereinafter Confusion].
include “100% Polyester Double Knit,” “Official Team Fonts,” “Full or left chest official logo,” and “Officially licensed by Major League Baseball.” 86.3% of participants had either bought products on Amazon in the last year or were planning to do so in the next six months, so they were familiar with this format and accustomed to making purchase decisions based on these types of descriptions and product images.

Figure 1: Actual Amazon Ad Compared to Study Ad
The product advertisements were modified so as to allow readers to draw their own conclusions about product sponsorship. Direct claims of sponsorship or affiliation were removed, as were any non-ornamental product tags. For example, baseball jerseys generally have a MLB tag below the beltline and Majestic tags on the right shoulder and on the inside of the collar. These were removed, as was the bullet point “Officially licensed by Major League Baseball.” Figure 1 shows the actual and modified ads for one product. When the product maker listed on Amazon was likely to be recognized by respondents (particularly a problem given the ubiquity of several manufacturers of sports merchandise), it was changed to something novel and genericsounding (i.e. “National Sportswear”). All product advertisements are presented in Appendix A.

1. Sports merchandise

Sports is one of the most pervasive of the merchandising domains and sports merchandising is often credited, or blamed, with starting a revolution in how courts viewed trademark merchandise claims.\(^80\) Sports merchandising classically focuses on attire, but team logos also appear on mugs, pennants, and a wide variety of other products.\(^81\)

Five sports products were included in the survey. Participants were eligible to view these products if they responded positively to either of the two sport-related screening questions and indicated that the merchandise they either had or were planning to purchase included merchandise for the relevant sport.\(^82\)

Two of these products were Major League Baseball Jerseys and National Football League t-shirts. These products were team-specific, and the jersey or shirt displayed to a particular participant was matched to the team from which the participant indicated they were most likely to purchase merchandise. To maintain consistency, the descriptions and precise wording of the ads accompanying each jersey or shirt were identical apart from the team name. The jerseys were the white home-team versions and lacked player names. These shirts were, when possible, plain grey t-shirts with the team name and logo printed.

\(^80\) See Calboli, supra note 3, at 880-82 (referring to cases such as Bos. Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) and Nat'l Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982)); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 471-78.

\(^81\) See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts v. Metro. Balt. Football Club, 34 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1994).

\(^82\) The wording for these categories are given in note 66.
in the team colors. For a small number of teams, such t-shirts did not exist on Amazon and other team t-shirts were substituted. A third product in this category was the USA World Cup Away Jersey. Soccer has fewer fans in the US than do baseball and football, but the 2014 World Cup attracted considerable American interest. World Cup merchandising is also the subject of one of the more ridiculous stories in trademark law: several hundred Dutch fans attended a 2006 game in their underwear because FIFA prohibited them from entering the stadium while wearing lederhosen in the team colors that were provided by a non-FIFA affiliate. This particular product is also interesting because it represents a national team rather than a privately-owned local club.

In addition to claiming trademark rights in their team names, colors, and logos, leagues also sometimes claim rights in the names of their signature events. In particular there have been law suits and demand letters related to March Madness in basketball and the Super Bowl in football. The survey therefore included t-shirts for each of these events.

2. Automotive merchandise

Automotive companies often license their trademarks for use on products such as jewelry, keychains, t-shirts, mugs, bumper stickers, and even furniture. Some of these products are tailored for use with a particular vehicle and serve a functional purpose. But many are not and do not. Rather than attempt to match customers with products from their own automotive brands — potentially problematic given the multiplicity of brands and sub-brands — participants instead were asked about products from two well-known brands whose logos are


widely recognizable and likely to be desired even by those who do not actually own the cars of the particular brand. The two chosen products were a Lamborghini Keychain and a mug with the Porsche Crest. Participants were eligible to view these products if they responded in the affirmative to the automotive screening question.

3. Colleges and universities

As in athletics, college and university merchandise includes a wide range of products. The central difference from a trademark perspective is that the colleges and universities are far more numerous, and this can inhibit brand recognition. According to the latest available figures, there are over 4,500 degree granting institutions in the United States.\(^{86}\) This has sometimes led to a labelling crunch, as multiple universities lay claim to the same acronyms. For example, the University of South Carolina’s effort to register its “SC” mark was opposed by the University of Southern California, which had previously registered an understandably similar “SC” mark.\(^{87}\) Nevertheless, there has been active litigation over university merchandising rights.\(^{88}\)

To avoid biasing the results in favor of not showing sponsorship confusion, a Harvard University product was chosen because Harvard has a distinctive and highly-recognizable name.\(^{89}\) The product was a standard university t-shirt in Harvard colors with the Harvard name and crest. The screening question for this product concerned college and university apparel.

4. City, museum, and government agency souvenirs

Trademark rights have been asserted for fire departments and police forces,\(^{90}\) museum facades,\(^{91}\) and even city skylines.\(^{92}\) Quasi-


\(^{87}\) \textit{Univ. of S.C. v. Univ. of S. Cal.}, 367 Fed. App’x. 129, 131 (Fed. Cir. 2010).


\(^{89}\) According to the Harvard University Trademark Program website “Harvard University’ is one of the most widely known and respected trademarks of any kind.” \textit{Use of the Harvard Name, Harv. C. Off. Student Life}, \url{http://osl.fas.harvard.edu/use-of-harvard-name}. This project was not sponsored by or conducted in affiliation with Harvard University.


\(^{91}\) See, e.g., \textit{Rock and Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods.}, 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998) (denying trademark protection to the image of the Rock and Roll Hall of fame).
governmental bodies and non-profit groups, like the International Olympic Committee, have also been persistent in asserting trademark rights in their logos.\(^{93}\) To capture this heterogeneity, six different products were employed. To qualify to view any of these, participants had to respond in the affirmative to the souvenir screening question.

Civic agencies sometimes license products bearing their logo, and some agencies have been very aggressive in defending their control over their marks. The New York Fire and Police Departments, for example, reached a settlement on the eve of trial with one unauthorized merchandiser.\(^{94}\) The survey therefore included an NYPD hat and an FDNY t-shirt to represent this part of the merchandising universe. There has similarly been litigation over public monuments and city skylines.\(^{95}\) These are arguably harder cases for trademark law because it is not even clear who would own the rights to these. Testing these more extreme cases were a Statue of Liberty figurine and a shirt displaying the skyline of St. Louis, including the famous Arch.

Though the NYPD is undoubtedly famous, it is not — generally speaking — in the business of selling merchandise; one does not buy an NYPD hat at one’s local police station. Museum gift shops, however, often sell items bearing the logo and name of the museum. These products are like the college and university shirts in that they bear the mark of an identifiable private institution and are generally sold in close proximity to that institution but are only a tangential part of that institution’s business. To represent this portion of the merchandise universe, a small charm bearing the name and facade of Chicago’s Field Museum was included.

Also representing the quasi-government and non-profit category was a plain white t-shirt bearing the rings of the Olympics. Some believe

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\(^{95}\) See Spence, supra note 92, at 527-30.
that events such as the Olympics and the various city marathons are fundamentally public and, as such, belong to everyone. One participant, commenting on why they believed this product was not sponsored, said “the Olympic rings, to the best of my knowledge, are public domain.” At a matter of copyright law, this would normally be correct: the rings were first used in their present form in 1914. But trademark law has no term of years, and the Olympic rings are actually protected by their own statute.96

5. Parody

Parody merchandise presents a particular puzzle for trademark law. Though parody receives some special treatment in other areas of law, for example copyright, parodic intent has only a small effect on the trademark analysis.97 Nevertheless, there have been numerous cases involving parody merchandise. In one, Mutual of Omaha was able to block production of a shirt with the message “Mutant of Omaha” using a sponsorship confusion claim.98 In another, Louis Vuitton brought suit against Haute Diggity Dog over parody pet toys that emulated several signature products made by the high-end European fashion house.99 Somewhat surprisingly given the other merchandising cases, the defense was actually successful here, and the Chewy Vuiton line of products is still unlicensed and available.

Two products from Haute Diggity Dog were included in the survey. One was a dog bone shaped toy that lampoons the famous Louis Vuitton mark. The other was a bottle shaped toy bearing the mark “Dog Julio,” lampooning Don Julio Tequila.

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97 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 261 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that determining a product is a parody only informs the likelihood of confusion analysis and does not resolve it).
98 See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (because consumers might believe that the insurer Mutual of Omaha “goes along” with the antiwar message on the shirts).
99 Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d 252.
6. Movie naming

One of the more infamous sponsorship confusion cases involved a complaint by the restaurant chain Dairy Queen against planned release of a movie entitled “Dairy Queens.” The movie, later released as “Drop Dead Gorgeous,” was a satirical presentation of a beauty pageant in Minnesota.100 Though one might assume that (1) very few people would believe Dairy Queen made or sponsored a movie, and (2) very few consumers would consider that information material, there was no survey in that case. The extreme distance between the core product (dairy goods) and the sponsored product (a movie) makes this a particularly hard case to justify under any of the theories of sponsorship materiality. This survey therefore incorporated the movie “Drop Dead Gorgeous” and attributed to it the original title “Dairy Queens” because it can serve as an example of what McKenna and Lemley have termed a “pure sponsorship case[].”101

C. Origin and Sponsorship Confusion Questions

The standard method of measuring likelihood of confusion is the Eveready protocol, so named for its use in Union Carbide v. Ever-Ready.102 The protocol presents the test stimulus (either the product or the ad) and, leaving the stimulus in view, asks “Who do you think
puts out the [product] shown here?” and “What makes you think so?” Though the wording of the questions varies slightly from expert to expert, Eveready designs are now the standard way of conducting likelihood of confusion studies.\(^{103}\) There is some concern that leaving the stimuli in view turns the confusion questions into a reading task, but the balance of opinion favors allowing the participant to examine the product or ad as the question is asked rather than relying on the participant’s memory.\(^{104}\) The wording of the questions used in this survey was borrowed from that recommended by Jerre Swann.\(^{105}\) On the same page as the advertisement was displayed, participants were asked “Who makes or puts out this product?” and “Why do you say that?” These questions were preceded by an instruction that informed participants that they should not guess and that it was acceptable to respond that they did not know the answer to a particular question.\(^{106}\)

Though there is near-consensus on the appropriate way to ask Eveready questions about product source, there is some dispute over the best way to ask about product sponsorship.\(^{107}\) One problem here is that the term of art in the trademark literature, “sponsor,” colloquially means something close to “benefactor,” which is not at all the intended technical meaning. Here, I follow the recommendation of Jacob Jacoby who prefers using the words “permission” and “authorization” as they have more appropriate lay meanings and, especially in the case of “permission,” are far more frequently used by general audiences.\(^{108}\)

The second issue in framing sponsorship questions is that courts have been divided on exactly what participants should be asked. Most courts have accepted some variant of “do you believe that whoever makes or puts out this product did get the permission or approval of

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\(^{103}\) See McCarthy, supra note 66, 32:174; Jerre Swann, Likelihood of Confusion Studies and the Straitened Scope of Squirt, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 739, 739 (2008) (“Over time, this format has become the gold standard in cases involving strong marks, i.e., in cases where the senior mark is highly accessible (internally available) in memory.”); Swann, Confusion, supra note 79, at 56-58.

\(^{104}\) See Jacoby, supra note 65, at 566-68.

\(^{105}\) Swann, Confusion, supra note 79, at 56-58.

\(^{106}\) Instructions not to guess are extremely common in trademark surveys. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Control Foundations: Rationales and Approaches, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS, supra note 65, at 201, 205.


\(^{108}\) Jacoby, supra note 65, at 628-29.
another company.”

Others, however, have preferred “do you believe [they] needed to get the permission or approval of another company.” The former question is arguably a question of fact of which the participant has no knowledge — they were not witness to any contractual negotiations that may have occurred between the parties — whereas the latter is arguably a question of law on which the participant’s opinions are irrelevant. Though courts have excluded surveys for asking the “wrong” version of the question, some scholars believe the debate to be “largely a waste of judicial resources,” and there is a small amount of evidence suggesting that both approaches will yield equivalent results.

Thinking about this debate from another angle, the main issue may be the word “believe.” Imagine two substitutions. If a consumer is asked “do you know that the producer had the permission of another company” then there is a problem because they have no way of “knowing” that information. This appears to be the stumbling block for the courts and scholars who object to that wording; they are interpreting believe as if it means know and recognizing the impossibility. But imagine instead participants are asked whether they “assume that the producer had the permission of another company.” The participant is perfectly capable of reporting their assumptions, removing the logical problem raised by the substitution of “know,” and the participant’s assumptions are precisely what matters. Also, since participants actually answer the “believe” question, they likely are interpreting “believe” to mean something more like “assume” and less like “know.”

109 See Jacoby, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 107, at 70-75 (noting widespread acceptance of the “did get” variants).
110 See cases cited and discussed in Swann, Confusion, supra note 79, at 57-59, and Jacoby, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 107, at 75-83.
111 See Jacoby, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 107, at 75-83.
112 See e.g., Swann, Confusion, supra note 79, at 59 n. 39.
113 See Jacoby, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 107, at 92 (describing a case in which both wordings were used to assess confusion regarding the same product in separate surveys. The results were within 5% of each other. The author is not aware of any more rigorous testing of this question).
This survey therefore asked a variant of the traditional “did get” wording:

Do you assume that whoever makes or puts out this product:

- Has the permission or authorization of another company to produce this product; or
- Does not have the permission or authorization of another company to produce this product; or
- You don’t know or have no opinion about whether they have the permission or authorization of another company.

If the participant reported that they did assume sponsorship, they were then asked “What company do you assume gave permission or authorization for the production of this product?” and “Why do you say that?” This closed-ended question format, the inclusion of the “don’t know” option, and the use of the follow-up questions are all standard in the Eveready protocol.\(^{114}\)

The order of the response options for all closed-ended questions was partially randomized. Though the “don’t know” response always appeared last for questions that included it, the other choices appeared in random order as a way of minimizing order effects. Therefore approximately half of the time the “has permission” response came first and half the time the “does not have” response came first. This type of answer rotation is strongly recommended in trademark surveys.\(^{115}\)

Since the main question here is the materiality of sponsorship confusion, it was sensible to be liberal in coding who counted as a “correct” sponsor. If a person believes the t-shirt bearing the St. Louis Arch is sponsored by St. Louis, or the National Park Service, or “the people who own the Arch,” all of those can count as confusion about sponsorship for which materiality can then be assessed; it is not important that the participant does not know exactly which level of government is responsible. Similarly, a respondent who believes that the Field Museum of Natural History is run by the City of Chicago is mistaken but can still meaningfully contribute to our understanding of

\(^{114}\) See, e.g., Swann, Confusion, supra note 79, at 57 (showing examples of “don’t know” as a response).

\(^{115}\) See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Are Closed-Ended Questions Leading Questions?, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS, supra note 65, at 261, 280-81 [hereinafter Closed-Ended Questions].
sponsoring materiality. It would be much harder to justify such an expansive approach in the context of litigation, but it is appropriate given the goal of this research which was, primarily, to assess what percentage of sponsorship confusion is material.\footnote{116}

Further, the confusion estimates may be slightly inflated because the survey lacked a control condition, and control conditions always lower confusion estimates. Were one litigating over the NFL t-shirt, for example, one would normally also test reactions to a t-shirt that is as similar as possible to the allegedly problematic shirt and lacks only the key infringing elements.\footnote{117} Likely the logo and name on the shirt would be swapped with ones not linked to NFL teams but the coloration would remain constant. The proportion of people who attributed the control shirt to the NFL would be subtracted from the confusion estimate of the allegedly infringing shirt. The goal is to eliminate from the confusion estimate the proportion of people who are confused for reasons other than the elements at issue in the litigation, or who were encouraged to guess due to a suggestive study design.

Despite these limitations, the results shown in Table 1 are consistent with those found in actual litigation surveys for several products. The NYPD baseball cap is at 42.63% combined maker and sponsor confusion, which is fairly consistent with the surveys finding 38.3% and 43% confusion actually conducted in Elovitz.\footnote{118} The baseball jersey and football t-shirt are slightly above 60%, which is consistent with litigation surveys showing 58% and 59% confusion for NFL jerseys.\footnote{119} So the survey numbers may be somewhat inflated because liberal coding was used, but they are not unreasonably so.

In trademark litigation, the threshold for actionable confusion is conventionally approximated as 15%.\footnote{120} This is not strictly a rule, however, and courts have sometimes both accepted as significant

\footnotesize{\begin{enumerate}
\item[116] The problem of subjective coding judgments is inherent in the use of open-ended questions. For a discussion of some common coding difficulties, see Jacoby, Closed-Ended Questions, supra note 115, at 264-65, 271-72.
\item[117] See Jacoby, supra note 65, at 514-33. The ideal control is a function of the elements alleged to be infringing in the litigation and constructing a proper control requires careful consideration of both the essential features of the product as well as the exact causal claim one wishes to make.
\item[118] See Jacoby, Sense and Nonsense, supra note 107, at 92.
\item[119] See id. at 71.
\item[120] See Daniel Gervais & Julie M. Latsko, Who Cares About the 85 Percent? Reconsidering Survey Evidence of Online Confusion in Trademark Cases, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 265 (2014) (arguing that the “15% Rule” “amounts to a reductionist view of consumer interests and, more importantly, one which can lead to sub-optimal outcomes.”).
\end{enumerate}}
lower rates of confusion and rejected as *de minimis* higher rates.\textsuperscript{121} The general rule appears to be that rates below 10% rarely win and those above 20% rarely lose, but the treatment of surveys with confusion estimates between 10% and 20% vary depending on the other confusion factors.\textsuperscript{122}

As can be seen in Table 1, nearly every product would qualify as confusing at a 15% threshold. The two parody products are marginal, but the various souvenir products average approximately 31% combined maker and sponsor confusion.

### Table 1: Traditional Confusion Estimates for All Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>95% Confidence Intervals</th>
<th>Number of consumers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makes + Sponsors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makes but does not</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souvenirs</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pet Parody</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie</td>
<td>95% Confidence Intervals</td>
<td>Number of consumers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{122} See *id.*
Notable in Table 1 is that many products are only above threshold, or only meaningfully above threshold, due to the contribution of sponsorship confusion. Very few people believe the parody products are actually made by the companies whose likenesses are being used, and the souvenir category only averages 11% maker confusion despite the liberal coding. Even the Harvard, March Madness, and Super Bowl shirts would be hard cases were sponsorship confusion not counted. This underscores the importance of correctly quantifying sponsorship confusion.

A sufficient number of data points were collected to draw meaningful conclusions for all of these products apart from the World Cup Jersey. Though courts have not been consistent in their sampling requirements, a review of the case law suggests that surveys with fewer than 100 data points are at meaningfully increased risk of rejection and those above 100 tend to be acceptable, at least in terms of sample size. From a purely statistical standpoint, the 95% confidence interval for the 17.46% confusion estimate for the World Cup Jersey is ±9.37%. Were there 153 participants rating this product — as there were for the next lowest — the confidence interval would be ±6.02%, a substantial improvement. Nevertheless, the World Cup Jersey is getting reliably fewer attributions of sponsorship than any of the other sports products.

1. Materiality of sponsorship confusion

The main goal of this paper is to examine how often attributions of sponsorship matter to consumers. This was assessed with a series of four questions that were only asked if the participant indicated that they believed the product was sponsored. Importantly from a methodological perspective, this type of internal analysis minimizes the impact of the lack of a control condition because it looks at the characteristics of those who were confused rather than their total number. The question here is not “how many assume sponsorship”

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123 See JACOB, supra note 65, at 439-44.

124 The confidence interval for a proportion is a function both of the sample size and of the extremity of the estimate. Here I used the Wilson procedure with a continuity correction, as described at Richard Lowry, The Confidence Interval of a Proportion, VASSAR STATS, http://vassarstats.net/prop1.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). This is based on the work of Robert G. Newcombe, Two-Sided Confidence Intervals for the Single Proportion: Comparison of Seven Methods, 17 STATISTICS IN MEDICINE 857, 858 (1998) (describing the problem of not adjusting confidence intervals when the estimated proportion is near 1 or 0).

125 This is the primary reason that a control condition was omitted. Though it is
but instead “of those who assume sponsorship, how many also assume [for example] that the sponsor monitors product quality?”

The first sponsorship materiality question was exactly that: it asked who the consumer believed was responsible for the quality of the product. The choices were: the company identified as the maker of the product, the company identified as having permitted or sponsored the product, both, neither, or don’t know. 126 The results are shown in Table 2 and reflect only those participants who identified the correct sponsor for a particular product. As can be seen there, about half of the consumers evaluating each product believed that the appropriate sponsor was at least partially responsible for product quality. For the six souvenir items, for example, the average was 48.2%. Even Lemley and McKenna, who are extremely skeptical of sponsorship confusion claims, recognize that there is a “strong interest in protection when the defendant’s use of a mark suggests the plaintiff controls the quality of the defendant’s products or services.” 127 From their perspective, this nearly 50% finding may be rather high; almost half of sponsorship confusion is material.

The next materiality question assessed what is known as relation-back, whether the consumer would blame the parent brand for bad experiences with the product. This question asked whether the participant would have a better, worse, or unchanged opinion of the sponsor of the product if they had a bad experience with the

obviously useful to have a sense of how many people are assuming sponsorship for each product, the main goal of the product was to investigate the characteristics of those who actually did assume sponsorship.

126 The exact wording of the response items is given here:

- The company you listed as the MAKER of the product
- The company that you listed as having PERMITTED or AUTHORIZED the product
- Both of the companies you listed
- Neither of the companies you listed
- Don’t know/Have no opinion

127 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 432.
product.\textsuperscript{128} Answers to this question interestingly differ from those to the quality question. Only about 26.0\% of those rating the six souvenir products would have blamed the sponsor for a bad experience. More than twice as many (57.4\%) would have had an unchanged opinion. The difference was similar for the two automotive products (34.7\% vs. 54.2\%), if slightly less stark.

Some scholars believe that marketing research has established that relation-back will not be a problem. Lemley and McKenna have argued that “the research suggests that consumers generally do not alter their global evaluations of brands . . . when they encounter negative information about related products offered under the same mark.”\textsuperscript{129} But others are more skeptical of that literature and believe that, at best, this is an open question.\textsuperscript{130} Resolving this debate is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is interesting to note that (1) a meaningful proportion of consumers believe they would blame the perceived parent company to some degree; and (2) of the four measures of materiality, this one would show the lowest proportion of material confusion. Of course, the usual disclaimers about the ability of people to correctly predict their own behavior still apply.\textsuperscript{131}

Both preceding questions assessed indirect forms of trademark harm in that they undermine the integrity of the trademark but do not affect consumer decision-making in the immediate case. The final two questions, however, address the consumer’s purchase intentions. The first of these asked the participants to imagine that the maker of the

\textsuperscript{128} The exact wording was:

If you had a bad experience with this product, would you:

- Have a worse opinion of the company that you said PERMITTED or AUTHORIZED the making of the product,
- Have a better opinion of the company that you said PERMITTED or AUTHORIZED the making of the product,
- Have no change in opinion regarding the company that you said PERMITTED or AUTHORIZED the making of the product
- Don’t know/don’t have an opinion

A similar question regarding the maker of the product was asked regardless of whether the participant believed the product was sponsored.

\textsuperscript{129} Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 429; see also Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law’s Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 97-111 (2009).

\textsuperscript{130} See Bone, supra note 5, at 1367-68.

\textsuperscript{131} See generally Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977) (finding that people may not be able to access higher order cognitive processes); Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565 (2007).
product did not have the permission or authorization of any other company, and that the company they had believed had sponsored the product was completely uninvolved. Further, they were asked to assume that this was perfectly legal. Given that the product was now unsponsored, were they more or less interested in purchasing it? 

For the two major sports items — the jersey and the NFL t-shirt — over 50% of participants would have been less interested. Across the six souvenir items, 41.9% would have been less interested. For the automotive items, 53.1% would have been less interested. As can also be seen in Table 2, there is a growing divergence between the main line of the products and Dairy Queens, which has reassuringly dropped to 15.8% less interested. Since Dairy Queens was, ex ante, predicted to be the most extreme of the merchandising cases, it can be taken as some validation of participant attention that they so clearly distinguish it from the other products.

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132 Imagine you learned that the maker of this product did not have the permission or authorization of any other company, and that the company you thought authorized it was completely uninvolved. Assume that this is perfectly legal, and that the maker of the product did not need anyone’s permission or authorization to make it.

If this product were made without permission or authorization:
- I would be more interested in purchasing it.
- I would be less interested in purchasing it.
- I would be equally interested in purchasing it.
- I have no opinion.
Table 2: The Materiality of Sponsorship Across Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sponsor partially responsible for quality</th>
<th>Relation back:</th>
<th>Less interested if unsponsored</th>
<th>Explicitly equally interested</th>
<th>Pay more if sponsored</th>
<th>Explicitly pay equally</th>
<th>Number of Consumers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLB Jersey</td>
<td>47.92%</td>
<td>27.08%</td>
<td>56.25%</td>
<td>58.33%</td>
<td>35.42%</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>29.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFL Shirt</td>
<td>53.00%</td>
<td>34.00%</td>
<td>43.00%</td>
<td>51.00%</td>
<td>28.00%</td>
<td>45.00%</td>
<td>41.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC Jersey</td>
<td>62.50%</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
<td>87.50%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>62.50%</td>
<td>37.50%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>63.64%</td>
<td>40.91%</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
<td>31.82%</td>
<td>54.33%</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
<td>63.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madness</td>
<td>49.13%</td>
<td>33.99%</td>
<td>49.19%</td>
<td>66.10%</td>
<td>22.03%</td>
<td>47.46%</td>
<td>38.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Bowl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Shirt</td>
<td>40.14%</td>
<td>28.45%</td>
<td>57.76%</td>
<td>52.59%</td>
<td>34.48%</td>
<td>39.66%</td>
<td>43.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Souvenirs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPD Hat</td>
<td>46.27%</td>
<td>32.84%</td>
<td>32.24%</td>
<td>41.79%</td>
<td>37.31%</td>
<td>34.33%</td>
<td>37.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDNY Shirt</td>
<td>49.23%</td>
<td>21.50%</td>
<td>18.46%</td>
<td>49.23%</td>
<td>36.92%</td>
<td>46.15%</td>
<td>40.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympics Shirt</td>
<td>48.05%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>51.95%</td>
<td>41.56%</td>
<td>37.66%</td>
<td>38.96%</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Statue</td>
<td>52.17%</td>
<td>36.96%</td>
<td>45.63%</td>
<td>36.96%</td>
<td>45.63%</td>
<td>34.78%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Museum</td>
<td>47.62%</td>
<td>11.90%</td>
<td>71.43%</td>
<td>35.71%</td>
<td>38.10%</td>
<td>30.95%</td>
<td>54.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Louis Arch</td>
<td>45.93%</td>
<td>24.32%</td>
<td>64.86%</td>
<td>45.93%</td>
<td>29.73%</td>
<td>37.84%</td>
<td>56.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pet Parody</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Julio Toy</td>
<td>56.25%</td>
<td>22.92%</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>41.67%</td>
<td>35.42%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>52.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chewy Vuiton</td>
<td>45.16%</td>
<td>25.81%</td>
<td>48.39%</td>
<td>48.39%</td>
<td>32.26%</td>
<td>29.03%</td>
<td>35.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automotive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamborghini Key Chain</td>
<td>58.43%</td>
<td>38.20%</td>
<td>48.31%</td>
<td>55.06%</td>
<td>30.34%</td>
<td>38.20%</td>
<td>44.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porsche Key</td>
<td>51.11%</td>
<td>31.11%</td>
<td>60.00%</td>
<td>51.11%</td>
<td>34.44%</td>
<td>42.22%</td>
<td>43.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Queens</td>
<td>42.11%</td>
<td>26.32%</td>
<td>57.89%</td>
<td>15.79%</td>
<td>47.37%</td>
<td>21.05%</td>
<td>63.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The final materiality question asked participants whether they would be willing to pay more if the product were sponsored or unsponsored.133 Table 2 displays both the proportion of respondents who would pay more if the product was sponsored, as well as the proportion that would explicitly pay an equal amount regardless (the remainder expressing a preference for unsponsored products or having no opinion). Apart from the baseball jersey, there is no product for which a majority of consumers would pay more if it were sponsored. For the six souvenir products — which are much like those so fiercely questioned by scholars such as Dogan, Lemley, and McKenna — a mere 37.2% of those who believed the products were sponsored would have paid less if they were not. Fully 48.7% explicitly state that they would pay the same amount regardless.

Those who said they would require a discount to purchase an unsponsored version of a product were also asked how large that discount would need to be (in percentage terms) for them to buy it over a sponsored version.134 The median response and the number of people selecting the “I would never buy [the unsponsored product]” option are reported in Table 2A.

This data represents a subset of a subset of a subset: those who thought each product was sponsored, selected the correct sponsor, and said they would pay less if the sponsor was not involved. The sample size is therefore very small in some cases, and far too small to be worth taking seriously for, say, the World Cup Jersey, the Dairy Queens movie, and the March Madness shirt. But the overall pattern is notable. For every product with a meaningful number of responses, the median discount demanded would be at least 50%. And for many of the products, an appreciable proportion of those saying they would pay less were the product unsponsored are actually saying that they are only interested in the product if it is sponsored; they are not in the market for it otherwise.

133 Which of the following statements best describes your perspective on this product?

- I am willing to pay more for this product if it is made with the other company’s permission or authorization.
- I am willing to pay more for this product if it is NOT made with the other company’s permission or authorization.
- I am willing to pay the same amount either way.
- I have don’t know or have no opinion on this issue.

134 The scale ranged from Less than 10% off; to 10% off; 20%; . . . 90%; More than 90%; I would never buy it. The median reported treated “I would never buy it” as a maximal response.
Table 2A: Among those who would pay less for an unsponsored product, what discount would they demand?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Median Discount Demanded</th>
<th>Would Never Buy</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLB Jersey</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFL Shirt</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC Jersey</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March Madness</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Bowl</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Shirt</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Souvenirs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPD Hat</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDNY Shirt</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympics Shirt</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Statue</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Museum Charm</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Louis Arch Shirt</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pet Parody</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Julio Toy</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chewy Vuiton Toy</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automotive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamborghini Key Chain</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porsche Mug</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Movie</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Queens</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But these people are a minority, if a vehement one. Only 38% of those assuming the correct sponsor said they would pay less were the product unsponsored, and only 44% said they would be less interested in it. Across all products, responsibility for quality is the most sponsor-friendly measure and relation-back is the least. On average, 51% said that sponsors monitored quality, but only 28% would blame the sponsor for a low quality product.

Sponsorship therefore counts for (at most) half. For only four of the seventeen merchandising products are more consumers willing to pay a premium for sponsored goods than are explicitly indifferent to whether the goods are sponsored. Yet reformers should also take note: sponsorship counts for (almost) half (in most cases).
The Materiality of Sponsorship Confusion

Table 3 updates Table 1 to show how the imposition of a materiality requirement based on this willingness to pay measure would impact confusion estimates. As described at the beginning of Part II, this materiality calculation discounts the sponsorship confusion estimate to only take into account those respondents who would pay less were the product not sponsored. Several products that were previously firmly above the traditional confusion threshold are now below or in play, including the Field Museum Charm, the Statue of Liberty, and the St Louis Arch shirt. The pet parody products went from being marginal cases — just above 15% — to meaningfully below threshold. Imposing a materiality requirement would therefore matter, particularly if these numbers are somewhat liberal due to the lack of a control condition.

Table 3: Traditional and Material Confusion Estimates for All Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Confusion</th>
<th>Material Confusion</th>
<th>95% Confidence Intervals</th>
<th>Difference Between Traditional &amp; Material</th>
<th>Number of Consumers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Upper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLB Jersey</td>
<td>62.09%</td>
<td>49.02%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>13.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFL Shirt</td>
<td>61.30%</td>
<td>42.53%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>18.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC Jersey</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
<td>7.94%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March Madness</td>
<td>27.75%</td>
<td>19.08%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>8.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Bowl</td>
<td>43.22%</td>
<td>34.75%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>8.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>College</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Shirt</td>
<td>54.43%</td>
<td>37.03%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>17.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Souvenirs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPD Hat</td>
<td>42.63%</td>
<td>27.09%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>15.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDNY Shirt</td>
<td>35.67%</td>
<td>24.67%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>11.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympics Shirt</td>
<td>36.27%</td>
<td>21.57%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>14.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Statue</td>
<td>26.60%</td>
<td>16.84%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>9.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Museum Charm</td>
<td>25.79%</td>
<td>15.08%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>10.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Louis Arch Shirt</td>
<td>19.34%</td>
<td>12.79%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>6.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pet Parody</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Julio Toy</td>
<td>15.07%</td>
<td>9.13%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>5.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chewy Vuiton Toy</td>
<td>15.91%</td>
<td>12.27%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>3.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Automotive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamborghini Key Chain</td>
<td>56.63%</td>
<td>43.69%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>12.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porsche Mug</td>
<td>58.87%</td>
<td>46.48%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>12.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Movie</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Queens</td>
<td>7.82%</td>
<td>4.61%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But those who are critical of the merchandising right should note the products that are still firmly above the confusion threshold. The core of sports merchandising is generally immune; baseball jerseys and NFL shirts are both well above 40%. The March Madness and Super Bowl shirts do not fare quite as well, but the NFL and NCAA likely have little reason to sweat 35% and 19% confusion ratings. The World Cup jersey is an exception but, again, note that the sample size is quite small for that product. Even the NYPD hat is still safe. The exact values in the Table should not be taken as gospel — there are limitations to the design used in this survey — but there is every reason to think they are fairly close.\(^{135}\)

Revisiting Table 2, it is clear that adopting the other metrics of materiality would yield fairly similar results. Slightly more sponsorship confusion would be deemed material under responsibility for quality, meaningfully less under negative relation-back, and approximately the same under interest in purchasing. But always in the same range of 30–50%. Therefore, endorsing any single test for sponsorship confusion creates a 50+ percent haircut in most merchandising cases.

Taking seriously the variations across the materiality measures, however, raises the question of why participants would pay less for an unsponsored product if they do not, say, believe the sponsor ensures the product’s quality. When asked to explain their purchase interest judgements, many of the participants who said they would be less interested were the product unsponsored cited fairness to the mark owner as their principal motivation. Though the answers were generally not extensive enough to allow for a serious quantitative analysis, they were suggestive. This brings us to the final substantive portion of the survey: equitable beliefs.

2. Equity

After making confusion judgments about each product they were eligible to rate,\(^{136}\) participants entered the final phase of the survey. The instructions here explained that they were being asked “about whether it SHOULD be legal for a company to make this product without the permission of the LISTED company.” Here they were being told to make normative judgments and to think about the rights of a specific

\(^{135}\) To the extent that there are baseline ratings from actual litigation surveys, these data map onto them fairly well. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.

\(^{136}\) The survey was coded so as to cut off the rating process at ten products even if the participant qualified for more.
company rather than to report their assumptions about the status quo. They were then again presented with the product ads one at a time.

The question asked for each product was deceptively straightforward “Should it be possible to make this product without the permission of the [mark owner]?” The available responses were “Yes, any company should be able to make this [product],” “No, companies should only be able to make this [product] with the permission of [mark owner],” and “I have no opinion on this question.”

The main problem with this question, and the reason why this battery of questions was placed at the end of the survey, is that it is impossible to ask the question this pointedly without providing some suggestion as to the appropriate response. Many of the participants in this study did not believe that the products shown were made or sponsored by their mark owners. It may have not even occurred to them, for instance, that the National Park Service has any claim to the Statue of Liberty, or that Dairy Queen has any connection to a movie titled “Dairy Queens.” This question directly raises these possibilities and implies that “Yes” is a plausible response. But, unlike with the sponsorship materiality questions — which were only relevant for those who believed the product was sponsored — these questions were meant for the entire sample. Therefore it was necessary to propose a sponsor and, having done so, attempt to mitigate the accompanying risks.

To minimize the risk of the question being leading, careful attention was given to response balance. The two main alternatives were therefore written with equal levels of elaboration, and their order was rotated across person and product. Though this does not entirely dispel the concern that the question is leading, it does help minimize the costs of using a closed framework while still allowing for the benefits of consistency and clarity.

As can be seen in Table 4, there was a strong inclination to believe that sponsorship should be required for most products. Given the relatively low rates of sponsorship materiality, it is hard to interpret

137 See Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 24-40 (1989) (positing that listeners generally presume that a speaker is speaking truthfully, informatively (saying no more and no less than necessary), and relevantly, and that listeners will interpret statements to make them intelligible).

138 See Jacoby, supra note 65, at 738; Jacoby, Closed-Ended Questions, supra note 115, at 275.

139 See Jacoby, Closed-Ended Questions, supra note 115, at 283 (explaining his view that “[p]roperly constructed closed-ended questions are not leading and possess as much scientific legitimacy as do properly constructed open-ended questions,” each having their own advantages and disadvantages).
these findings. One possibility is that the closed-ended format prompted a form of post-hoc reasoning. It may not naturally occur to participants that there is a restaurant named Dairy Queen and that, perhaps, the restaurant is connected to a movie named “Dairy Queens.” But once participants have been reminded that there is such a restaurant and the connection has been made presumptively relevant, they may then have concluded that the restaurant should have rights to the name “Dairy Queen.”

The opinion that Dairy Queen should own the name “Dairy Queens,” is fundamentally distinct from the questions of a traditional confusion analysis. Recall that virtually no participants were actually confused by the movie title. This is more of a moral judgment that the popularizer of a brand has a right to its proceeds than a statement about consumer expectations.

Table 4: Equity Beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should Sponsorship Be Required?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval +/-</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLB Jersey</td>
<td>71.90%</td>
<td>7.12%</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>9.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFL Shirt</td>
<td>71.65%</td>
<td>5.47%</td>
<td>16.48%</td>
<td>11.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC Jersey</td>
<td>53.97%</td>
<td>12.31%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>17.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March Madness</td>
<td>43.68%</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
<td>43.10%</td>
<td>13.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Bowl</td>
<td>58.05%</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
<td>26.69%</td>
<td>15.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Shirt</td>
<td>64.56%</td>
<td>5.27%</td>
<td>26.58%</td>
<td>8.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souvenirs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYPD Hat</td>
<td>62.15%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>25.90%</td>
<td>11.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDNY Shirt</td>
<td>60.67%</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
<td>27.00%</td>
<td>12.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympics Shirt</td>
<td>53.59%</td>
<td>5.90%</td>
<td>33.01%</td>
<td>13.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty Statue</td>
<td>33.67%</td>
<td>5.37%</td>
<td>51.52%</td>
<td>14.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Museum Charm</td>
<td>50.79%</td>
<td>6.17%</td>
<td>34.92%</td>
<td>14.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Louis Arch Shirt</td>
<td>32.79%</td>
<td>5.27%</td>
<td>50.82%</td>
<td>16.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pet Parody</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Julio Toy</td>
<td>53.50%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>30.36%</td>
<td>16.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chewy Vuiton Toy</td>
<td>47.20%</td>
<td>4.66%</td>
<td>36.47%</td>
<td>16.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamborghini Key Chain</td>
<td>67.96%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>18.77%</td>
<td>13.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porsche Mug</td>
<td>66.48%</td>
<td>4.91%</td>
<td>21.97%</td>
<td>11.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy Queens</td>
<td>36.45%</td>
<td>4.22%</td>
<td>44.02%</td>
<td>19.52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This pro-ownership public reaction is consistent with a trend in intellectual property law recently described by Mark Lemley. He observes that many IP scholars have abandoned arguments that utilitarian considerations can justify current intellectual property rights and instead have begun to treat intellectual property as a moral end in itself.\textsuperscript{140} And, certainly, there has been a lot of recent attention to moral psychology in the IP community and increased use of moral reasoning in IP discussions.\textsuperscript{141}

This trend toward moralizing IP is also present in trademark law. Several trademark theorists would place moral blameworthiness at the heart of trademark confusion. Bone, who otherwise supports a materiality requirement, would hold that morally blameworthy conduct should itself be a basis for trademark liability even absent consumer confusion.\textsuperscript{142} His particular interest is informed by his understanding of the development of trademark law in the mid-twentieth century, when competing judges on the Second Circuit debated whether trademark law should focus more on consumer harm or more on blameworthy conduct.\textsuperscript{143} Others, writing in opposition to scholars like Dogan, Lemley, McKenna, and Tushnet, have taken a dim view of what they see as morally problematic free riding on the goodwill created by mark owners.\textsuperscript{144} But even given the historical framework explained by Bone, it is hard to distinguish between pro-competitive copying and impermissible free-riding without reference to some broader theory of what intellectual property is trying to do.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{140} See generally Mark Lemley, \textit{Faith-Based Intellectual Property}, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 1328 (2015) (discussing how intellectual property can be a moral end in itself).


\textsuperscript{142} See Bone, \textit{supra} note 5, at 1310.

\textsuperscript{143} See id. at 1316-34.


These data suggest that scholars who want to interject more morality into IP are reflecting a fairly strong popular impulse. Given the purposes of trademark law, however, popular opinion may have little intrinsic relevance here unless there is a relationship between moral judgments and consumer behavior.

3. Relationships between materiality metrics

Scholars calling for a materiality requirement have not generally drawn hard edges between the different possible meanings of materiality. Here, however, it is possible to examine whether the four materiality metrics rise and fall together. An analysis was therefore conducted that treated each of the 17 merchandising-right products as individual cases. Table 5 presents the correlations between the proportions of the sample finding materiality on each metric from Table 2 and the proportion of the sample that believed sponsorship should be required on the equity question.

Table 5: Relationships Between Equity Beliefs and Materiality Among Merchandising Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Willingness to Pay</th>
<th>Purchase Interest</th>
<th>Responsible for Quality</th>
<th>Relation-Back</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purchase Interest</td>
<td>.69**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible for Quality</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation-Back</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Beliefs</td>
<td>.63**</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<.01.

Purchase interest and willingness to pay were strongly related, as one would expect. The correlation between these two proportion scores is $r = .69$ and is significant at the $p = .01$ level. A product's score on one of those measures is therefore an extremely good predictor of its score on the other. Importantly, however, neither of those measures is related to beliefs about the sponsor's role in product quality or the willingness to relate back their experience with the product to the sponsor. Those two measures of materiality are unconnected to whether consumers actually think they would want to purchase the item and how much they think they would be willing to pay. They were also not significantly related to each other. Also interesting, especially in light of this disconnect between materiality
metrics, are the extremely high correlations between equity beliefs and the purchase interest and willingness to pay measures. Equity beliefs correlated with both of these at above $r = .60$.

Taken together, these findings show that the effect of perceived sponsorship on willingness to pay and purchase interest is likely not driven by a belief that the sponsor is somehow policing the quality of the product. Instead, the effect of sponsorship on these factors appears to be a function of whether people believe that the sponsor should have a right to control the use of their mark on a particular good. This interrelationship suggests that lay moral judgements may have some role in trademark law, albeit an indirect one.

Recall the data presented in Table 2A, showing how those who are willing to pay more for sponsored products view unsponsored alternatives. Many of those consumers would have been unwilling to purchase unsponsored products at any price, and others would have demanded very steep discounts. This pattern supports an equity-driven story. When 47% of consumers who are willing to pay more for an official NYPD hat say that they would never purchase an unofficial one, they are not questioning the quality of knockoff hat producers. It is far more likely they are saying that an unofficial hat should not be allowed to exist. Indeed, 92% (166/180) of the times when a respondent said they would “never buy” the unsponsored version of a product they also said that licensing should be required for that product when they reached the equity question.

III. MATERIALITY AS A WAY FORWARD

A. Presuming (Partial) Materiality

These data support a presumption that sponsorship attributions in merchandising cases are only material to about half of consumers. If one wanted to impose a materiality requirement — consistent with the work of Bone, Lemley, Lunney, McKenna, and Tushnet — one should expect that to involve discounting sponsorship attributions by 50%, or slightly more if one looks to purchase interest rather than responsibility for quality. Given these data, it is likely that parody products and products that contain only incidental overlap with existing trademarks will generally have greater discount rates and that strong, commercially-active marks — such as those belonging to sports teams and automotive product lines — will have rates closer to or slightly in excess of the 50% baseline.

Adding a materiality requirement to the sponsorship confusion analysis would affect outcomes in some cases, but it would not
completely change merchandise licensing. The owners of many strong marks, particularly sports franchises and automotive product lines, have very little to fear; their marks will be protected regardless. The products of which scholars have been most skeptical, however, go from being easy wins for mark owners to close cases. It is much safer to make parody products and souvenir representations of museum facades and city skylines in a world that uses a materiality requirement.

B. What Is Materiality?

The four different versions of the materiality question reflect three distinct underlying concepts. Interest in purchasing and willingness to pay correlate very strongly and, though not perfect substitutes, are likely conceptually interchangeable. If one approaches trademark law from the standpoint of consumer protection, as Tushnet does by drawing on the law of fraud, then willingness to pay is the best measure of sponsorship materiality; it is closest to actual behavior.\textsuperscript{146} It could also lend itself to a more behaviorally-focused experimental design: one could easily conduct a mall-intercept study that concluded by offering people an opportunity to purchase allegedly sponsored and unsponsored products and examining what sorts of tradeoffs they were willing to make. Would those who said they would “never buy” an unofficial jersey really pick the official one over an unofficial one and $20?

Focusing on willingness to pay gives rise to two possible study designs. One is the procedure used here, asking each participant to make sponsorship attributions and discounting those who would not pay more for the sponsored version. But there is an alternative, more like the behavioral study mentioned above. One could run an experimental study that asked participants in one condition to supply a willingness to pay estimate for a version of the product that was explicitly authorized and participants in another condition to supply an estimate for a version that was explicitly not. This would divide products into those for which sponsorship is material and those for which it is not. But this would not allow for a direct estimate of how many consumers cared.\textsuperscript{147} Since trademark law generally asks how

\textsuperscript{146} Consumer behavior being the principal test for scholars such as Tushnet. See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1353.

\textsuperscript{147} A quantitatively sophisticated judge might appreciate seeing data from both approaches as it would give indications of both the prevalence of sponsorship materiality as well as the intensity of feeling. But the same information can be
many are confused rather than how much they are confused, this alternative approach does not fit neatly in the current trademark confusion analysis. It would, however, be consistent with the treatment of materiality in false advertising cases.\footnote{See the discussion in Tushnet, \textit{supra} note 5, at 1347-51.}

The close parallels between a law of trademark based on purchase-interest or willingness-to-pay and the law of consumer fraud may actually indicate a shortcoming of using those factors as the standard for trademark materiality. We already have a law of consumer fraud, and it has its own set of protections and affirmative defenses. Trademark law is, fundamentally, a different enterprise. The concepts of dilution and post-sale confusion, for instance, have no place in a fraud analysis but are arguably central to modern trademark law. Also, the law of consumer fraud would be happy with a clear disclaimer indicating that the sponsor was not associated with the products, the law of trademark far less so.\footnote{See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2010).} This may be a good reason to instead look at attributions of responsibility for quality. Even though the baseline for this other materiality metric is also “about half,” it is fairly unrelated to willingness to pay at the product level. And inclination to relate-back experiences with the junior good to the senior mark owner is also unrelated to purchase interest.

It should not be too surprising that these measures do not perfectly track one another: even brands strongly associated with prestige or loyalty may have no product-relevant quality connotations. The merchandising cases involve classic non-competing goods. As Harvard does not make t-shirts, it also has no particular qualifications to supervise their manufacture. And though Ferrari is known for making excellent cars, there is no reason to believe that hats made under its supervision will likewise be excellent. Even if a consumer has a psychological desire to get the official product — and thus is willing to pay more for it — there is little reason for that loyalty to also take the form of an assumption of quality control. And the story for why one should blame Harvard or Ferrari for the quality of their sponsored apparel is rather strained. Relation-back may be the principal harm.
that flows from mark infringement for competing goods, but — as McKenna has observed\textsuperscript{150} — the world of merchandise licensing may be fundamentally different.\textsuperscript{151}

This divergence between the materiality measures reveals an underlying tension in the materiality debate: one must decide whether to protect what consumers \textit{do} care about, or what trademark law thinks they \textit{should} care about. Those who argue for a materiality requirement often speak in terms of restricting trademark law to its original purpose: allowing marks to reliably signal a given level of quality. But the data here suggest that what consumers actually care about — as indicated by willingness to pay and the equity measure — is instead something related to identity signaling and moral judgment, not these attributions of quality. The materiality debate, then, forces a reexamination of the foundational question: what should trademark law be trying to accomplish?

\textbf{C. Materiality Affects the Shape of the Debate}

These data could be read as showing that materiality fails to accomplish its own main goals. Materiality, by whatever definition, was meant to be part of a solution to the Batman problem. The strong intuition is that people just want Batman to be there; no one cares who sent him. Though this intuition might be true of children and superheroes, the data show that it is not true of adults and treasured sports logos. People do care who sent the Cubs logo. Materiality is therefore not the solution Dogan and Lemley need if they want to slay the merchandising right; too much confusion is material.

The problem here may be one of circularity. The data show that people care about whether a product is authorized because they feel the mark owner \textit{deserves} to control these uses of their mark. Though the present results cannot speak to what is driving that intuition, Lemley and McKenna themselves speculated that the last few decades of merchandising experience have not been lost on consumers, and

\textsuperscript{150} See McKenna, \textit{supra} note 129, at 97-111 (arguing that relation-back occurs only to a \textit{de minimis} extent outside of principal product lines).

\textsuperscript{151} One problem with putting too much faith in the noncompeting goods argument is that it is actually very difficult to determine when a company is in a particular business. It is tempting to say that Hershey’s is in the business of making chocolate, Porsche is in the business of making cars, and neither is in the business of making mugs or t-shirts. Anyone making those products is surely not competing with them, only their licensees. The awkward fact, however, is that both companies actually do make their own mugs and t-shirts.
many others have made similar comments.\textsuperscript{152} It may be that consumers once believed that college shirts need not be licensed because, at one time, they \textit{were} not licensed. Now, however, they generally are licensed. Given that people are confronted with this reality daily, it is not surprising that they have, first, noticed, and, second, come to accept it as justified. It is well established in the psychology literature that people have a tendency to justify the status quo; there is natural slippage between “is” and “is right.”\textsuperscript{153} To quote Lemley and McKenna slightly out of context, “sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on a life of its own.”\textsuperscript{154} What may once have been irrelevant to the consumer’s decision-making process is now relevant, at least half the time. Requiring materiality can therefore only do so much. If courts want to rein in the merchandising right wholesale, they are going to need to do more than merely impose a materiality requirement.

The apparent endorsement of broad trademark rights on the equity question may be a reason to resist calls for further action to rein in merchandising protection. After all, merchandising rights are primarily distributional. When such rights are strong, entrants are discouraged, competition is limited, and consumer surplus is transferred to mark owners.\textsuperscript{155} The principal alleged harm is to consumers, who must pay more in a non-competitive marketplace. If the consumers themselves do not object and may actually be in favor of broad trademark rights,\textsuperscript{156} perhaps it is not necessary to drastically rewrite trademark defenses to protect them.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{152} See Lemley & McKenna, \textit{supra} note 5, at 414 (“But sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on a life of its own, leading courts to declare as infringing a variety of practices that might be confusing in some sense, but that do not affect consumers’ decision-making process.”); \textit{see also} Lunney, \textit{supra} note 5, at 396 (“Consumer expectations concerning marketing practices are not formed in a vacuum, but grow out of what consumers experience in the marketplace.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{153} \textit{See generally} Scott Eidelman et al., \textit{The Existence Bias}, 97 \textit{J. PERSONALITY \& SOC. PSYCHOL.} 765 (2009); John T. Jost \& Mahzarin R. Banaji, \textit{The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness}, 33 \textit{BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL.} 1 (1994) (discussing the tendency to justify the status quo); John T. Jost et al., \textit{A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo}, 23 \textit{POL. PSYCHOL.} 881 (2004) (discussing the tendency to justify the status quo).
  \item \textsuperscript{154} Lemley & McKenna, \textit{supra} note 5, at 414.
  \item \textsuperscript{155} \textit{See generally} Lunney, \textit{supra} note 5 (discussing trademarks as monopolies).
  \item \textsuperscript{156} Given the expanded dilution protection in the 2006 Act, there does not appear to be any legislative or popular push to rein in merchandising rights. See Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, P.L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
\end{itemize}
On the other hand, consumers answering the final equity question are likely not fully understanding the tradeoff that they are endorsing. If they are imagining a $40 t-shirt with a university logo on it, the real choice they are making is between a world in which the shirt costs $40 and the university gets some portion of the sale price (say, $10), and a world in which the shirt costs $30 and the university gets none. Consumers may have difficulty understanding the behavior of this kind of dynamic system, and it may be worth confronting them with the choice more directly in future research. It may be too soon to declare that consumers are uncompromisingly in favor of strong trademark rights if they are not realizing the effect on product cost.

And though materiality may not be the hero that trademark public domain advocates need to slay the merchandising dragon, it may be the hero trademark law needs to tame it. Consider carefully Dairy Queens. This was the only product in this study that did not plainly fall within the merchandising right. The name is almost identical to the senior mark, but its use is the kind of incidental overlap that is increasingly common given the proliferation of marks rather than an attempt to capitalize on existing good will.

A materiality requirement has the effect of making it virtually impossible to prove a likelihood of confusion in this kind of incidental case. Only 20% of those confused rated their confusion material. On one hand, this number is higher than many would have expected. On the other, it is really difficult to win a likelihood of confusion case if you only get to count one confused consumer in five. You would need 75% sponsorship confusion to clear threshold at that discount rate. And this result — that a strong majority of consumers could be confused and it would not give rise to liability — is perfectly consistent with the view of trademark law expressed by the Supreme Court in *Dastar*. There the Court said that trademark law “should not be stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.” Even widespread confusion should not be actionable if consumers are unaffected by it.

The consequences of this discount rate have important implications for an alternative method of solving the chilling effects problem. Rather than relying on a potentially-costly materiality requirement, some scholars have advocated greatly expanding trademark defenses in cases involving certain types of expressive uses, third party

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157 Reactions at conferences have often included variants of “Seriously? That many?”

promotions, and the like. One recurring problem for these scholars is that courts are extremely reluctant to endorse a trademark defense that trumps a finding of consumer confusion. William McGeveran has termed this reflexive tendency on the part of some judges the “Gravitational Pull” of likelihood of confusion.

Thinking in terms of a materiality requirement serves to justify these innovations from within the likelihood of confusion framework, potentially avoiding the gravitational pull problem. Take the example of New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that certain descriptive uses of a mark do not create sponsorship confusion “as a matter of law.” This doctrine of nominative fair use has been criticized for, among other things, “displac[ing] the likelihood of confusion analysis.” And, in fairness, the court might well have been wrong about consumer perceptions as a strictly factual matter. Maybe a survey would have shown 15% confusion in that case; it is a low bar, and people seem to attribute sponsorship generously. But we can be fairly confident that such a survey would not have shown 15% material confusion given the kind of results we saw for the parody products and Dairy Queens. Further research might well support a presumption of lack of materiality in such cases. In a world with a materiality requirement, such results would mean that nominative fair use does not need to be viewed as a weird exception to the normal operation of trademark law; it instead would merely be a doctrinal shortcut that conserves resources and lowers the cost of defending a trademark lawsuit. Normal trademark law would eventually reach the same result, it would just cost several hundred thousand dollars more. Notably the law of false advertising has made similar use of materiality, allowing for materiality (or its absence) to be assumed in certain kinds of recurrent cases.

159 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 54 (arguing that there should be simpler affirmative defenses). See generally William McGeveran & Mark McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253 (2013).

160 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 67 (noting that various courts and Professor McCarthy have advocated using the likelihood of confusion test in almost all expressive use cases); McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 159, at 255 (describing a Second Circuit case); id. at 286-98 (describing similar issues in comparative advertising, nominative fair use, parody, and third party promotion cases).

161 See McGeveran, supra note 11, at 112.

162 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).

163 Chad J. Doellinger, Nominative Fair Use: Jardine and the Demise of a Doctrine, 1 NW. J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 66, 67 (2003); see also McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 159, at 287 n. 154-56 (citing cases).

164 See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1344-51.
Materiality may therefore serve to help justify the kinds of per se rules that courts sometimes use in cases that directly pit free expression interests against trademark rights more generally. Taking seriously the Dairy Queens and parody findings, it is unlikely that even those technically confused in cases where trademarks appear incidentally in movie and TV clips, or where marks are parodied artistically, would rate their confusion material. So, though materiality may only rein in the edges of the merchandising right, it may serve to drastically restrict the kind of sponsorship confusion arguments that pose the greatest threats to free expression. This is a hypothesis that can be tested in future work.

A materiality requirement would not reset merchandising law to the status quo of the 1960s. The NFL is safe, and Louis Vuitton loses only the pet-toy parody market. But such a requirement would do much to justify the kinds of limiting doctrines that courts have tried to invent when faced with hard questions at the boundary of trademark law and free speech. It therefore may be a useful area for those concerned with the problems of mark proliferation and chilling effects to explore.

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167 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 5, at 417-21; Mark Lemley & Mark McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 137, 138-40 (2010).

168 Reasonable minds can differ on how upset Louis Vuitton should be at this result.