To accuse of genocide — what does it mean? Genocidal accusation is ubiquitous today, evident more in the public square than in any courtroom. At first glance, such accusation seemingly relies on a central assumption: genocidal accusation is critical to preventing atrocity. This Article argues that this widespread assumption is incomplete, obscuring genocidal accusation’s dual nature. In fact, genocidal accusation encompasses not only laudable atrocity prevention (for example, the Rwandan genocide), but also problematic punitive, carceral discourse that brands the “other” as morally polluted (such as President Putin’s Ukraine invasion). It is thus challenging to evaluate such accusation in the abstract — the best way to gauge a genocidal accusation is within broader mechanisms of genocidal justice, honoring the twin imperatives of atrocity prevention and mitigation of escalatory punitiveness. Genocide is the darkest of all human acts. Thus, we should never hesitate to identify it — but likewise never invoke it lightly. An Epilogue — written by a professor and former student — first centers victims, drawing from the experiences of two families affected by genocide, atrocity, and armed conflict.