Digital Antitrust Collectivism
Countervailing power from grassroots users has long been underexplored in digital antitrust debates. Recent large -scale users’ collective actions in cyberspace, such as X–Bluesky, TikTok–RedNote in the United States (U.S.), and Meituan–JD.com in China, have demonstrated a critical and novel possibility that collectively empowered users can generate countervailing power and effectively discipline those incumbent digital empires.
This Article, different from traditional antitrust discourse, raises that possibility by proposing Digital Antitrust Collectivism to guide future institutional design. The main theoretical contribution of this Article is that it views widely discussed harm s, such as weakened data protection, distorted content moderation, and algorithmic manipulation, as derivative harms of the vertical power gap between digital service providers and scattered users. It argues that the vertical power gap and horizontal competition deficits constitute more fundamental, structural market failures. They are two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and jointly entrenching the platform dominance.
Echoing John Kenneth Galbraith’s well-known recognition of vertically countervailing power in highly concentrated markets, this Article proposes a policy blueprint, the Collective User Empowerment Scheme (CUES), to ignite users’ countervailing power in digital industries. With five integral components — collective knowledge, collective bargaining, collective switching, collective data management, and collective offlining — CUES can bridge the vertical power gap between tech giants and powerless users by narrowing information asymmetry, flipping network effects, and reshaping the techno -political nexus.
Economically, CUES will mitigate digital market failures, creating more opportunities for innovative startups and invigorating digital market competition that effectively disciplines incumbent businesses. Politically, CUES will enable and enhance users’ “voice” and “exit” in digital space governance that would otherwise be dominated by authoritarian rule. Users’ collective actions constitute a form of contentious politics, which reshapes the structural foundations of the digital commons. As a result, CUES acts as the Sword of Damocles, which effectively checks the power of digital empires. Ultimately, this research will offer U.S. and other democracies’ antitrust scholars and lawmakers a novel lens for understanding the digital market ecosystem and redesigning their governance approaches.