Public Choice Theory, the Constitution, and Public Understanding of the Copyright System

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 2249

I. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY .......................................................... 2251
   A. The Copyright Laws .......................................................... 2253
   B. Public Choice and Copyright ........................................... 2254

II. EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COPYRIGHT LAWS .... 2256
   A. The IP Clause as a Limitation on Congressional Power .... 2256
      1. History of the IP Clause ........................................... 2258
      2. Constitutional Interpretation ...................................... 2260
   B. The IP Clause as a Limit on Other Congressional Powers ... 2261
      1. Unclear Case Law ..................................................... 2262
      2. Nearly Uniform Academic Literature ....................... 2263
   C. Copyright Laws Do Not Serve Their Constitutional Goal .... 2265
      1. Failure to Create New Incentives .............................. 2266
      2. The Public Domain, Dissemination, and Promoting the Progress ...................................................... 2269
   D. Judicial Deference to Congressional Mandate .................... 2271

III. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT COPYRIGHT .......................................................... 2276
   A. Google Consumer Surveys .............................................. 2277

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B. The Survey ................................................................. 2280
C. Results................................................................. 2284
D. Analysis.............................................................. 2286

IV. PROPOSALS TO RETURN TO A UTILITARIAN COPYRIGHT
REGIME................................................................. 2287
A. Avoiding Collective Action Problems: Lessons from PIPA
   and SOPA.............................................................. 2288
   1. Organizing Interested Companies................... 2290
   2. Incentivizing Individual Action .................... 2293
   3. Effective Issue Presentation......................... 2296
B. Status Quo Bias ................................................... 2298
C. Strategic Framing of the Issue......................... 2300

CONCLUSION............................................................ 2302
INTRODUCTION

Samuel Clemens — better known as Mark Twain — is recognizable in the history of copyright law for tirelessly advocating to dramatically extend copyright’s term. In his early life, however, Clemens enjoyed inexpensive books drawn from a broad public domain, which he and others celebrated as a public good that encouraged literacy. What caused this shift in Clemens’ beliefs, and why did the legislature eventually choose to expand copyright’s term and diminish the public domain? This Article explores these themes by examining the interface of public choice theory, copyright policy, and constitutional law in light of new survey evidence on the public’s understanding of basic copyright doctrine.

The United States Constitution permits Congress to create a utilitarian copyright system, whereby law promotes the public good by advancing learning and knowledge. Authors are incentivized to create new works through the promise of a copyright, but the breadth of this encouragement must not unduly encroach on the citizenry’s interest in a robust public domain. This Article draws on a host of academic fields to develop a cohesive narrative explaining the ever-increasing scope of copyright and addresses a void in the literature by analyzing real-world impediments to reversing this trend and discussing potential remedies.

The analysis finds that copyright’s expansion has diverged from the Constitution’s utilitarian mandate, and this issue can only be corrected through reform activities by the electorate. The citizenry is unfortunately ill-equipped to effect this change; new survey evidence establishes the public lacks the basic understanding of copyright policy necessary to recognize the problem and advocate for reform. Proposals to remedy the situation are then presented.

2 Vaidhyanathan, supra note 1; see also Ashley Packard, Copyright Term Extensions, the Public Domain and Intertextuality Intertwined, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 25 (2002).
4 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The first substantive part of this Article introduces public choice theory, a field in which economic methods are used to explain the behavior of public actors. Part I continues by discussing the interplay between public choice theory and copyright laws, and describing why rationally behaving legislators have chosen to continually expand the protections afforded copyright owners.

Part II explains why the ever-broadening scope of copyright protection runs afoul of the constitutional requirement that these laws “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” Drawing from a variety of fields including history, economics, and legal theory, this portion of the Article establishes that Congress is limited to passing laws in satisfaction of this constitutional mandate, and at present, the legislature is exceeding its authority. The Part closes with an analysis of the courts’ refusal to engage in substantive judicial review of this extra-constitutional activity.

The following Part III discusses why the only path to copyright reform is advocacy by the electorate and why such advocacy is impossible if the citizenry is insufficiently educated about copyright. Specifically, if the public does not realize that copyright law should “promote the progress of science and useful arts,” it cannot be motivated to action when copyright falls short of this threshold.

The Article then presents the first academic survey to quantify the public’s understanding of basic tenets of the U.S. copyright system. The multiple-choice questions found low levels of understanding with regard to three principles of copyright law: (1) copyright serves utilitarian goals (7.8% of respondents answered correctly), (2) all works eventually fall into the public domain (9.2% correct), and (3) the public has unfettered access to works in the public domain (44.1% correct). Premised upon this low level of understanding, it is unlikely the public will protest the continued divergence from copyright’s utilitarian goals absent a deviation from the status quo.

Part IV concludes the Article with a series of proposals to effect copyright reform in the face of an uninformed populous. The first section uses the study of public goods, collective action, and public choice theory to describe means to encourage individuals and corporations to participate in activities to correct the copyright regime. The Part finishes by drawing on the field of behavioral economics to propose additional strategies to effect reform.

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6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Public choice theory posits that government officials behave in a manner that maximizes their personal gain, rather than furthering the public’s interests. The theory is consistent with historically accepted approaches to economic analysis, but diverges from traditional assumptions in political science, including the belief that political actors work primarily to benefit their constituency. Public choice adherents have, in simplified terms, implemented basic economic tenets into political science analysis. The following Part discusses public choice theory’s intersection with the legislative process and how this informs the understanding of an ever-expanding copyright system.

Democratically elected legislators depend on reelection to make a living. To this end, they are incentivized to take actions that will appeal to the electorate under the assumption that popular policies are rewarded with votes. The incentive to pass popular legislation should not be confused with motivations to pass laws representing sound policy. That distinction may create perverse incentives when enacting statutes. This phenomenon shows itself in situations where the public lacks sufficient knowledge to recognize good policy — as is discussed in Part III with regard to the public’s lack of understanding about copyright law.

Legislators also further their personal interests by amassing large campaign funds, which increase their chance of reelection. Politicians are thus incentivized to promote policies that appeal to...
special interest groups in order to satisfy potential donors. Of course, a legislator would not back a statute that represents a significant and apparent detriment to the electorate, as this risks antagonizing voters and losing future elections. Special interest laws are therefore most likely to pass where the costs are distributed over a large, diffuse section of the citizenry. Similarly, legislation is expected to favor special interests where the benefits are highly concentrated in a small group, as the preferred parties are able to overcome free-rider problems endemic in large groups and lobbying costs are likely outweighed by future gains.

It should not be ignored that the literature contains a significant body of criticism of public choice. The theory has been attacked for misplacing assumptions of hyper-rationality in the decisions of public actors despite research establishing that not all parties behave in their own interest. This criticism is notable in light of the ever-growing body of behavioral economics literature, which describes expected displays of irrationality. Similarly, others posit that public choice unduly oversimplifies the motives of public actors to suit the theory.

Recognizing the existence of these criticisms (and a host of others), the Author does not — and has no need to — present public

16 Dan M. Kahan, The Economics — Conventional, Behavioral, and Political — of “Subsequent Remedial Measures” Evidence, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1616, 1648 (2010); Sachs, supra note 15. Conversely, legislation that creates a large, but diffuse, benefit for society is unlikely to pass where a small, concentrated cost will befall a small group. Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 72.
20 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011).
22 See Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1269, 1309 n.127 (1993); see also Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 179, 180-81 (1996); Tom Ginsburg,
choice as an over-arching theory of public actors and their motivations. As argued by two public choice critics, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, while “public choice cannot support the sweeping empirical generalizations needed to justify grand theory, it does provide fruit for more particularized inquiries about the formation of public policy.”23 It is in this limited scope that public choice is discussed herein.24

Regarding the formation of copyright policy, application of public choice is apropos. As presented in the following sections, the theory has significant descriptive and predictive value for copyright legislation. With this in mind, this Article uses public choice to evaluate and explain current copyright policy.

A. The Copyright Laws

The United States’ copyright system is a utilitarian regime intended to benefit the public by expanding the scope of knowledge and culture.25 To this end, encouraging creation of new works of authorship is the historically recognized goal of copyright law.26 This narrow target is mandated by a unique constitutional grant of congressional power, which identifies a policy goal to be attained (i.e., “the Progress of Science and useful Arts”) and the manner to achieve this end (passing copyright laws).27 This provision is referred to as the “Intellectual Property Clause” or the “IP Clause.”

The constitutionally mandated advancement of public knowledge is achieved using a reward system whereby an author is financially incentivized to create new works for public consumption.28 A statutory quid pro quo is provided whereby the author is granted a limited monopoly to exploit their authorship and the public is granted


23 Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 117.

24 The Author takes no immediate position on the global application of public choice theory. No such position is necessary for purposes of this Article.


28 Golan, 565 U.S. at 345-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003)).
access to the work and unfettered usage thereof when it enters the public domain. Works are guaranteed to eventually become part of the public domain by the constitutional requirement that copyrights exist for a “limited [t]ime[] . . . .”

While this arrangement benefits the author, Congress has stated that this benefit is as an incentive and not a reward or natural property right. Consistent with its utilitarian mandate, the term of copyright’s limited monopoly theoretically maximizes the reward for creation of new works without unduly delaying their entrance to the public domain.

B. Public Choice and Copyright

Scholars agree that the copyright industry satisfies public choice theory’s requirements for disproportionate influence by small factions. Content owners (e.g., those in the entertainment and publishing industries) represent a concentrated group of homogenous interests that benefit when copyright’s protections expand. As the scope of those rights broaden, these parties’ intellectual property assets increase in value, making lobbying a rewarding enterprise.

The beneficiaries of the public domain and access to works of authorship (i.e., the general public) represent an enormous group of heterogeneous interests. Denial of access to copyrighted works is a cost dispersed across a large swath of the citizenry and — for works that would fall into the public domain many years from now — across multiple generations. In such a situation, minimal lobbying against the expansion of copyright is expected. Individuals will rationally abstain from contributing to collective action (e.g., lobbying) because they expect to obtain the benefit of the collective action (e.g., laws

30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33 Sachs, supra note 15, at 348-52.
34 Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119, 1154 (2007); see also Sachs, supra note 15, at 346-52.
36 Elkin-Koren, supra note 34.
37 Sachs, supra note 15, at 352.
protecting the public’s general interest) regardless of if they contribute. Unfortunately, where all actors engage in free-riding, no one will contribute to the collective action, and nothing is achieved.

This set of circumstances predicts significant lobbying to broaden copyright’s protections with little counter-pressure to protect the interests of the general public. The continuing expansion of the rights afforded copyright holders shows this expectation to be true. The initial term for a copyright in 1790 was fourteen years with the possibility of a fourteen-year extension. By the early 1900s, the term had doubled to twenty-eight years with a twenty-eight year possible extension, and at present, copyrights last for the author’s life plus seventy years.

The multifold extension of copyright’s term is good for content owners, but it is sub-optimal when evaluating aggregate social welfare. As fully discussed in a subsequent Part, there are strong arguments that the current scope of protection is not consistent with the Constitution’s utilitarian mandate that copyright laws “promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” Restated, content producers (e.g., authors) are overly incentivized to create new works when viewed in light of the societal cost of delaying a work’s entry into the public domain. This situation is attributable to the rationally

39 See id.
41 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see infra Section II.C.
46 Reuven Ashlar, Theft, Transformation, and the Need of the Immaterial: A Proposal for a Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 261, 280-82 (2009); Derek Khanna, Reflection on the House Republican Study Committee Copyright Report, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 49-50 (2013); infra Section II.C.
strong influence of content owners, as compared to rationally weak advocacy by the general public.

It is notable that occasional, unexpected shows of public strength do occur in this space; legislation expanding the scope of copyright protection does not always pass unchallenged.\(^47\) A recent example of public outcry in response to expansionist intellectual property proposals is the protest over the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and its counterpart, the Protect IP Act (“PIPA”), in 2012.\(^48\) Unfortunately, responses such as these rare\(^49\) and are unlikely to arise to challenge each attempt to expand copyright protections.

II. EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COPYRIGHT LAWS

Building upon the above discussion of public choice theory and the disproportionate influence wielded by content owners, this Part argues that this state of affairs has caused the copyright system to come unmoored from its utilitarian, constitutional mandate. The initial sections explain why constitutionally sound copyright legislation “must promote the progress of science and the useful arts.” The following parts describe the present copyright system’s failure to satisfy its mandate and the courts’ unwillingness to address the problem though judicial review.

A. The IP Clause as a Limitation on Congressional Power

The Constitution’s IP Clause is the only grant of congressional power that includes a specific statement of legislative purpose — namely, the promotion of science and the useful arts.\(^50\) Intended uses of other constitutional grants of power are, at best, implied.\(^51\) The IP Clause’s declaration of utilitarian purpose was included to “encourage the production of useful [works]”\(^52\) and subsequent “public
exploitation” thereof. This statement embodies two competing concerns; authors must be incentivized, but without unduly encroaching on the public’s interest in a robust public domain.

Recent precedent proffers that laws can also “promote the progress” by encouraging the dissemination of works. This is not a traditional goal of copyright as it is in patent law. Historical references to dissemination cite it as a positive externality arising from the generation of incentives to create — not a goal unto itself. To the extent dissemination is presented as a part of utilitarian copyright, it is not representative of the traditional aims of the regime and — as discussed in Section II.D — has only been adopted by courts that are unwilling to properly limit the scope of congressional authority.

The utilitarian goals of domestic law contrast with a variety of other justifications for intellectual property. Continental Europe’s copyright

56 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[Copyright] is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors . . . .”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[T]he ultimate aim [of copyright] is . . . to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The Copyright Act was intended to promote creativity . . . .”); Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990) (stating, in his seminal work in copyright, that the law “is designed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public”); Robert E. Shepard, Note, Copyright’s Vicious Triangle: Returning Author Protections to Their Rational Roots, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 731, 799 (2014) (referencing the “novel principle” that dissemination is a goal in copyright).
58 See Ansehl v. Puritan Pharm. Co., 61 F.2d 131, 133-34 (8th Cir. 1932); J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1897) (“The object of [copyright] . . . was to promote the dissemination of learning, by inducing intellectual labor in works . . . .”); Donald P. Harris, An Unconventional Approach to Reviewing the Judicially Unreviewable: Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Copyright, 104 KY. L.J. 47, 77 (2016) (“[D]issemination contributes to authors’ incentives; absent this, dissemination for the sole benefit of disseminators is outside the goal of copyright.”).
59 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429.
laws largely espouse a natural rights theory based on John Locke’s idea that humans are morally entitled to the fruits of their labor. Others extrapolate Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of property and personhood into copyright, asserting that authors inherently own creations arising from their personality. While the justifications for these theories may be furthered by the U.S. copyright system, such effects are secondary to the regime’s utilitarian mandate.

Looking to the IP Clause as a whole, the Supreme Court holds it to be “both a grant of power and a limitation,” such that copyright laws passed thereunder must “promote the progress.” Regardless, some commenters argue that the Clause’s statement of purpose bears no legal significance and presents no limitation on Congress’s power to legislate. Beyond disagreeing with the Supreme Court, this argument runs into issues when confronted with the below-discussed history of the Clause and basic tenets of constitutional construction.

1. History of the IP Clause

The original intent behind the IP clause is not easy to glean. Notes and records from the 1787 Constitutional Convention provide no direct evidence of the rationale underlying the Clause. Further, the provision’s goals cannot be derived from the papers of any single author because it comprises portions of several proposals. Despite

64 See, e.g., U.S. Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, Inc., 749 F.2d 1028, 1035 n.12 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The creator’s interest is rooted in the ‘labor, skill and money’ which has been devoted to the creation.”).
65 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (describing, in the patent context, that the IP Clause limits the scope of legislative power when exercising the IP Clause to passing statutes that “promote the progress”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003); Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 888-89 (1971); Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 152 (2005), aff’d, 466 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
66 See, e.g., Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 299 (2002) (“The truth is that the phrase can only be read ‘in the nature of a preamble, indicating the purpose of the power,’ and not as a limitation on its exercise.”).
67 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 27, at 2.
68 Edward C. Walterscheid, Conforming the General Welfare Clause and the
these limitations, historical analysis supports the conclusion that the IP Clause circumscribes congressional power by requiring that copyright laws “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”

In a 2006 article, Dotan Oliar concluded that — based on a review of the records from the Constitutional Convention — the IP Clause should be interpreted as limiting Congress's power. Oliar found three specific showings of the drafters’ “collective intent” that the IP Clause limit Congress’s authority, such that Congress may only pass copyright laws to “promote the progress.”

Initially, Oliar noted that the framers discussed a plenary copyright power, but chose to amend the proposal into the form we now know. Had they intended to adopt an unlimited IP Clause, they need not have amended the proposal. This supports the conclusion that Congress’s copyright authority is indeed limited by the language of the Clause.

Second, the “promote the progress” clause is an amalgamation of goals identified in two un-adopted constitutional provisions. Historical analysis shows that these statements of goals were intended to limit the exercise of Congress’s power under the respective proposals. It follows that if the language from which the “promote the progress” clause arose was intended to limit congressional authority, the “progress” clause should similarly serve as a restraint on the power to pass federal law.

Lastly, Oliar noted that a plenary copyright power was proposed by a group favoring a strong national government, while the “promote the progress” limitation was proffered by those who were suspicious of concentrating such power. This is relevant because the conflicting parties could only be expected to find common ground if each side made concessions. On this point, the states-rights camp conceded a

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71 Oliar, supra note 69, at 1811.

72 Id.

73 Id. at 1810-11.

74 Id. at 1811.

75 Id.

76 Id. at 1813-14.

77 Id.
federal copyright power, but only if the strong national government contingent conceded a substantive limitation on the federal power, namely “promot[ing] the progress.”\textsuperscript{78}

These pieces of history — while not individually conclusive — produce a coherent narrative, whereby the “promote the progress” limitation is binding.\textsuperscript{79} Other commenters have, through historical analysis, come to similar conclusions.\textsuperscript{80} The position that the “promote the progress” clause is a limitation on congressional power is, as discussed below, likewise supported by application of basic tenets of constitutional interpretation.

2. Constitutional Interpretation

The Constitution uses “a spare and elegant style” that does not include superfluous language.\textsuperscript{81} With this in mind, it is improper to interpret the document to render a provision (i.e., the “promote the progress” clause) devoid of meaning.\textsuperscript{82} The Supreme Court has held accordingly, stating that “every word must have its due force [because] no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.”\textsuperscript{83}

It contravenes these tenets of interpretation to understand the IP Clause as not requiring that copyright law serve its utilitarian mandate. To do so renders the phrase “to promote the progress of science and useful arts” meaningless, as Congress then has the capacity to legislate in the copyright area for any purpose. This cannot be correct.

Some commenters attempt to avoid these basic rules of constitutional interpretation by giving the “promote the progress” clause some meaning while simultaneously arguing that it does not limit Congress’s power.\textsuperscript{84} For example, it has been asserted that the Clause is a nonbinding statement of “purpose,” which avoids

\textsuperscript{78} Id.
\textsuperscript{79} Id. at 1810-11.
\textsuperscript{80} Walterscheid, supra note 27, at 3; see also Fromer, supra note 32, at 1339.
\textsuperscript{81} L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 365, 370 (2000).
\textsuperscript{82} 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 444-46 (1833) (quoting James Monroe, President of the United States: 1817-1825, Special Message to the House of Representatives Containing the Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822)).
\textsuperscript{83} Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938) (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570-71 (1840)).
rendering the language meaningless but stops short of giving it any power. Re-characterizing the Clause in this way is an action without meaning; this interpretation again renders the language to have no effect. Congressional power is in no way hindered or amended by a non-limiting, purposive statement. This variation of the non-limiting theme again renders a portion of the Constitution meaningless, which is an unacceptable conclusion.

B. The IP Clause as a Limit on Other Congressional Powers

While laws passed pursuant to the IP Clause must “promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,” the Commerce Clause contains no such limitation and arguably encompasses the ability to pass copyright statutes. Whether the IP Clause impliedly prohibits using the Commerce Clause to pass copyright laws is a question with no clear answer. If the Commerce Clause could be used in this manner, all limitations placed on the IP Clause would be meaningless, as Congress could simply look to the Commerce Clause for any necessary legislative authority. The Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, and lower courts are inconsistent on the topic. Non-judicial commenters are, however, almost unanimous in their belief that the IP Clause does serve as a substantive limit on the Commerce Clause’s grant of authority.

85 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 66, at 299.
86 See supra Section II.A.
87 See supra Section II.A.
90 Walterscheid, supra note 68, at 88 & n.5.
91 Compare, e.g., United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that Congress exceeds its power under the Commerce Clause by transgressing limitations of the Copyright Clause only when (1) the law it enacts is an exercise of the power granted Congress by the Copyright Clause and (2) the resulting law violates one or more specific limits of the Copyright Clause.”), with United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (“In general, the various grants of legislative authority contained in the Constitution stand alone and must be independently analyzed. In other words, each of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and what cannot be done under one of them may very well be doable under another.”).
1. Unclear Case Law

In 2004, the Second Circuit addressed whether Congress could grant perpetual anti-bootlegging\(^{92}\) protections in contravention of the IP Clause’s requirement that copyrights exist for “Limited Times.”\(^{93}\) Responding to arguments that the law was a valid use of the Commerce Clause, the court stated “Congress may not . . . enact [a copyright] law under a separate grant of power [e.g., the Commerce Clause], even when that separate grant provides proper authority.”\(^{94}\) Unfortunately, the court backed away from this clear statement when it vacated the opinion and replaced it with the more milquetoast holding that:

No Section 8 clause, including the [IP] Clause, states that Congress can make certain laws only pursuant to that particular clause or that any limitations on the power granted by that clause carry over to Congress’s power to act in a related area under a different Section 8 clause[, though,] in limited instances, the expressed limitations of one clause do apply externally to another clause.\(^{95}\)

The court further elucidated that the anti-bootlegging statute at bar was not actually a “copyright statute” because it does not “allocate property rights in expression.”\(^{96}\) Since the law was not a “copyright statute,” the Court held that it was not subject to the constitutional limitations found in the IP Clause.\(^{97}\)

This less-than-clear standard is further muddied by conflicting court opinions. In 2005, the Central District of California held “that legislation that could not be permitted under the IP Clause could nevertheless pass muster under the Commerce Clause — if the independent requirements of that clause were met.”\(^{98}\) The Eleventh Circuit also disagreed with the Second, holding that “each of the powers of Congress is alternative to all of the other powers, and what

\(^{92}\) Bootlegging “has been defined as the making of ‘an unauthorized copy of a commercially unreleased performance.’” Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 n.3 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 209 n.2 (1985)).

\(^{93}\) United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated and remanded, 492 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007).

\(^{94}\) Id. at 425.

\(^{95}\) Martignon, 492 F.3d at 144.

\(^{96}\) Id. at 150-52.

\(^{97}\) Id. at 153.

cannot be done under one of them [e.g., the IP Clause] may very well be doable under another [e.g., the Commerce Clause].” Of course, both of these cases dealt with the constitutionality of a law dealing with live performances of music, which is outside the purview of copyright. It is therefore not surprising that laws that do not create a copyright were not held to the limitations of the IP Clause.

While this state of affairs leaves the question unanswered, one Supreme Court Justice has made statements relevant to the issue. In 1995, Justice Thomas stated in a concurring opinion that “[a]n interpretation of [one clause in the Constitution] that makes [another clause] superfluous simply cannot be correct.” This is directly applicable to the current issue. If the Commerce Clause can be used to pass copyright laws (regardless of if they comply with the IP Clause), the entire IP Clause and any limitations therein are superfluous. Congress’s power would be coterminous regardless of whether the IP Clause existed. According to Justice Thomas’ logic, this conclusion cannot be correct, and the Commerce Clause powers must be curtailed, such that the IP Clause’s limitations are respected. This is, of course, not binding precedent.

2. Nearly Uniform Academic Literature

While the courts disagree on whether one constitutional grant of legislative authority can limit the use of another enumerated power, outside commentary is almost unanimous. The significant majority of commentators believe that the IP Clause imposes such a restriction, in that Congress cannot look to other grants of authority to avoid the Clause’s limitations (e.g., “to promote the progress of science and the useful arts”). Several such opinions are discussed below.

99 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
100 Id. at 1277; KISS Catalog, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1174.
103 See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 664 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891).
In their 2000 article, Paul Heald and Suzanna Sherry asked the question: “To what extent does the limiting language of the [IP] Clause constrain Congress's other Article I powers, such as those granted in the Commerce and Treaty Clauses?” To address this query, they reviewed “historical evidence, structural provisions, and precedent relevant to identifying principles of intellectual property law that the ratifiers of the Constitution likely presumed would restrain Congress.” From their research, they found that the IP Clause placed several limitations on Congress's authority to legislate under other clauses.

Relevant to the current discussion, Heald and Sherry determined that “legislation that imposes monopoly-like costs on the public through the granting of exclusive rights” (including copyright laws) must “attempt to secure a countervailing benefit to the public.” Congress does not have constitutional mandate to utilize other grants of power (e.g., the Commerce Clause) to pass copyright legislation that does not satisfy this standard.

Likewise, Pollack argued that “Congress may not do an end run around a limitation in [the IP Clause] of the Constitution by invoking a more general clause” (i.e., the Commerce Clause). In coming to this conclusion, she apparently invoked a variant of the common rule of statutory interpretation that “when both a general statute and a specific statute govern the same topic, the specific statute controls.” A host of other parties reached a similar conclusion.

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106 Heald & Sherry, supra note 27, at 1120.
107 Id. at 1160.
108 Id. at 1167.

110 See Heald & Sherry, supra note 27, at 1167.
111 Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 60 (1999); see also Fromer, supra note 32, at 1341 & n.43.
With this weight of commentary in mind and considering the ambiguous state of case law, this Article proceeds under the expectation that Congress cannot utilize the Commerce Clause to circumvent the limitations imposed by the IP Clause. As set forth above, to determine otherwise would render the Clause without purpose or effect. Literally, any copyright law could be passed under the Commerce Clause, and there would be zero need for the IP Clause to exist (and zero need to write on the topic).

The below sections continue to discuss the constitutional bounds of copyright statutes by evaluating the congruence between the present state of the law and the Constitution's utilitarian goals for the intellectual property system. This Part concludes by arguing that the copyright system (as it currently exists) is unconstitutional but this issue is largely moot, as federal courts refuse to exercise any significant judicial review of these statutes.

C. Copyright Laws Do Not Serve Their Constitutional Goal

Incentives exist that may induce legislatures to pass laws representing bad policy or creating a net social loss at the hands of special interests. This is not a surprising proposition, and in the vast majority of instances, disproportionate influence from special interests leads to the passing of laws that are “just” bad policy. This is not the case for copyright legislation.

The following subsection details why — from a host of subject-matter viewpoints — the present state of copyright law represents an extra-constitutional use of legislative power. Due to the above-described limitations on the exercise of power under the IP Clause, Congress's expansion of copyright protection becomes unconstitutional when it does not “promote the progress of science and useful arts.” Over-representation of special interests in this field — a phenomenon predicted by public choice theory and shown through copyright’s ever-expanding protections — has caused copyright laws to range into the area of unconstitutionality. This conclusion is described in the following subsections.

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1. Failure to Create New Incentives

Congress has repeatedly expanded the scope of copyright's protections. Review of several of these acts establishes that the legislation falls short of the constitutional requirement of "promot[ing] the progress." This conclusion can be reached through any of the several below-discussed fields of analysis.

The Copyright Act of 1909 is an early example of copyright's expansion, broadening the maximum length of a term from forty-two years to fifty-six years.\footnote{Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 643-44 (1943); Gordon v. Vincent Youmans, Inc., 358 F.2d 261, 271 n.6 (2d Cir. 1965); Michele Boldrin & David Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, 98-99 (2008).} Despite this increase, the data does not show a significant increase in literary output, as shown through copyright registrations. In their book, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Michele Boldrin and David Levine point out that in 1900 (nine years before the term-extension) 0.13% of the population registered a literary work with the U.S. Copyright Office.\footnote{BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 115, at 99.} This rate of registration barely increased following the 1909 Act; 0.14% of the population registered works in 1925 and 1950.\footnote{Id.} This minimal increase is particularly relevant in light of the ever-decreasing illiteracy rate in the United States: 10.7% in 1900, 6% in 1920, 4.3% in 1930, and 3.2% in 1950.\footnote{120 Years of Literacy, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/naal/lit_history.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).} These statistics show a growing portion of the citizenry that could create and consume works of literary authorship, but little growth in the relative output of these works.

It is notable that Boldrin and Levine’s comparison of registration rates in 1900 and 1925/1950 is imperfect, as the incentives to register changed with the 1909 Act. Before 1909, registration was necessary for copyright protection,\footnote{Tyler T. Ochoa, Protection for Works of Foreign Origin Under the 1909 Copyright Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 295 (2010).} whereas the 1909 statute provided that registration was only required before an infringement action could be brought.\footnote{Peer Int'l Corp. v. Latin Am. Music Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.P.R. 2001).} Recognition of this fact does not, however, defeat Boldrin and Levine’s position. A review of the annual registration rates shows that, after the 1909 statute, the relative rate of literary registration generally declined until the 1970s (with exceptions being peaks near
Of course, these statistics are subject to other extrinsic influences, but taken with the below-described information, they support the conclusion that the continued expansion of copyright has not succeeded in promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.

Approaching the issue from a different perspective, a group of economists — including no fewer than five Nobel laureates — similarly concluded that modern copyright law has come untethered from its constitutional mandate. In a 2002 amicus brief, the economists addressed to what extent the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (“CTEA”) encouraged creation of new authorship by adding twenty years to the copyright term for then-existing and future works. Their below-described analysis concluded that any incentive to create was outweighed by disincentives.

Initially, the brief addressed any new economic inducements created by extending copyright’s term by twenty years. Using the example of an author who lived for thirty years after authorship, the additional term was calculated to increase the copyright’s value by a nominal 0.33%. Almost comically, this estimate likely overstates the additional value because it assumes that the copyrighted work will sell at a constant level for each year of protection, which is a dubious proposition.

BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 115, at 99-100.

Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846, at *3 (“Taken as a whole, it is highly unlikely that the economic benefits from copyright extension under the CTEA outweigh the additional costs.”). The economists were George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, Timothy F. Bresnahan, James M. Buchanan, Ronald H. Coase, Linda R. Cohen, Milton Friedman, Jerry R. Green, Robert W. Hahn, Thomas W. Hazlett, C. Scott Hemphill, Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, Richard Schmalensee, Steven Shavell, Hal R. Varian, and Richard J. Zeckhauser. Id. at *1. This brief was described as such: “In this nearly unprecedented document, the economists jointly stated that the then-recent extension of copyright term in the United States could not appreciably increase incentives to authors.” Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 613, 625 (2014).

Brief of George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 122, at *1-2.

Id. at *5-7.

Id. at *6.

Id. at *7 (citing EDWARD RAPPAPORT, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES, H.R. Doc. No. 98-144E (1998); Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 616-20 (Arthur Fisher ed., Memorial ed. 1963)). The fact that sales do not continue at a constant level is shown through the fact that, when copyright renewal terms were available, most works were not renewed (presumptively as their sales had decreased). William Landes and Richard Posner have stated that “fewer than 11 percent of the copyrights registered between 1883 and 1964...
The authors next addressed the statute's extension of the term for then-existing copyrights. They concluded that the extra “twenty years provides essentially no incentive to create new works.”127 Accepting, arguendo, the proffered explanation that extending current copyrights incentivizes future authors because they can expect to enjoy any future term-extensions, the economists found that the “maximum impact on incentives from this effect . . . is trivial.”128 To this point, they estimated that granting an infinite copyright would only nominally increase the copyright’s present value, and therefore, the value of any finite extension was, by definition, even less.129 In summation, the economists determined that the CTEA’s copyright term extension created very little new incentive to create.

The brief then turned its eye to whether the statute actually hindered authorship of future works. On this point, the economists concluded that the twenty-year extension disincentivizes creative activity by elevating the cost to build upon works that — but for the term extension — would be in the public domain.130 In summation, the brief concluded that the newly created disincentives to create significantly outweighed any newfound incentives.

Approaching the issue from a legal perspective, Justice Breyer used similar logic to likewise criticize the current breadth of copyright protection.131 Writing in 2003, the Justice stated that no reasonable party believes that they have “more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the [CTEA’s twenty-year] copyright extension to matter.”132 Premised upon this, he found a “total implausibility of any incentive effect,” and determined that the term extension fell outside of the Constitution’s mandate for a utilitarian copyright system.133 While the above is sufficient to show a failure on Congress’s part to encourage the creation of new works, the analysis would not be complete without reviewing the laws’ effect on another utilitarian goal of copyright policy: encouraging the public domain and dissemination of information.

were renewed at the end of their twenty-eight-year term, even though the cost of renewal was small.” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 471, 473 (2003).

127 Brief of George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 122, at *8 (emphasis added).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at *12-15.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 264-67.
2. The Public Domain, Dissemination, and Promoting the Progress

Apparently recognizing the constitutional issues presented above, some proponents of expansive-copyright protection have refocused their position from discussing incentives to create to asserting that works entering the public domain represents a social ill. These parties argue that allowing works to fall into the public domain disincentivizes their upkeep and dissemination, which in turn discourages the progress of science and the useful arts. This point was emphatically made by the president and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America, Jack Valenti, who stated to Congress:

Whatever work is not owned is a work that no one protects and preserve[s]. The quality of the print is soon degraded. There is no one who will invest the funds for enhancement because there is no longer an incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that anyone can offer for sale. A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous virtues. How does the consumer benefit from the steady decline of a film's quality?

It has similarly been argued that, with regard to written works, publishers are wary of investing in publishing and disseminating public domain works because they do not have the protection of copyright's artificial monopoly. This hypothesis (hereinafter, the “Underuse Hypothesis”) has been addressed by several empirical

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134 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (arguing that “[c]ontinuing copyright protection will . . . provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to continue to enjoy their works and further disseminate them to the public”); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, at 4); Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 161, 171, 188 (1996) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services, Library of Congress).


studies, each of which concluded that the stated concerns are overblown. The evidence supports for the contention that a work’s entry into the public domain does not discourage its future dissemination.

One project analyzed how often songs from 1913–1922 were used in modern movies before and after they fell into the public domain. If the Underuse Hypothesis is correct, these songs should be used less after they fell into the public domain. This is not what was found. The data established that the songs’ usage did not diminish after entering the public domain, and in fact, it increased, though not to a statistically significant amount. The study concluded that, contrary to the Underuse Hypothesis, “public-domain songs from this era [did] not become orphans that are unavailable for public consumption.”

A similar work compared the rate of publication for 334 bestselling books from 1913–1922 (which became public domain works from 1988–1997) and from 1923–1932 (which are under copyright until at least 2018). The study found that, depending on the year of observation, the public domain bestsellers were either more likely, or just as likely, to be in print relative to the works still under copyright. Based on this data, the research concluded that, contrary to the Underuse Hypothesis, “the number of editions of public domain works available do not suggest that these works are underexploited” or not being disseminated.

A final piece of research compared the availability of audio-book versions of 171 public domain novels (from 1913–1922) and 174 copyrighted novels (from 1923–1932). It is notable the creating an audiobook constitutes a derivative work, which is protected by copyright. This study found that, far from being underutilized, the

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138 Id. at 12.
139 Id. at 11.
141 Id. at 1040.
142 Id. at 1043.
143 Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 21 (2013).
144 Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018)).
public domain works were converted to an audio format at approximately twice the rate of their copyright-protected counterparts. It can thus be concluded that entry into the public domain does little to inhibit a work's future usage and actually encourages dissemination.

Analysis from a host of above-described fields — empirical, economic, and legal — show that copyright expansion has failed to fulfill its obligation to “promote the progress,” and therefore represents an extra-constitutional use of legislative power. These laws, therefore, seem ripe for judicial review of their validity. This expectation has not become a reality.

D. Judicial Deference to Congressional Mandate

While the scope of the federal government has expanded significantly since the beginning of the nation, Congress can still only legislate within a set of constitutionally enumerated grants of power. With this in mind, it is the province of the judiciary to determine whether Congress has the power to pass a statute, including copyright laws. A law that falls outside of Congress's enumerated powers must be invalidated. Courts have, however, been reluctant to exercise judicial review regarding copyright, leading some to allege dereliction of duty.

The CTEA — the above-described addition of twenty years to copyright's term — is a primary example of the courts' unwillingness to review intellectual property legislation. Two different Supreme Courts (the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts) have been tasked with analyzing the constitutionality of the law, and both Courts have wholly deferred to the will of Congress.

145 Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 143, at 23.
147 Id. at 534.
149 United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 2009).
151 Lunney, supra note 44, at 901; Ruth L. Okediji, Through the Years: The Supreme Court and the Copyright Clause, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1633, 1637 (2004).
In *Eldred v. Ashcroft*, a group of businesspeople who utilize works in the public domain challenged the CTEA for failure to abide by the requirement that copyrights must exist for a “limited tim[e],” as mandated by the IP Clause.\(^{153}\) The challenge was not to the extension for new works, but rather the additional term for copyrights *already in existence*.\(^{154}\) Their position was that a copyright’s “limited” duration was set and unchangeable at the term’s start.\(^{155}\)

In support of their argument, petitioners cited the truism that copyright is a quid pro quo, whereby the author gets a temporary limited monopoly and the public gets access to the work.\(^{156}\) They argued that the “deal” was made at the time the copyright was granted, and adding to the term after that gave the author a benefit without a corresponding benefit being granted to the public, thus violating the idea of a quid pro quo.\(^{157}\) The Court rebuffed, stating that the deal was not for the monopoly period then offered by Congress, but rather, for the current period *and any later added extensions*.\(^{158}\) This hands-off position was explained as such: “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the [IP] Clause’s objectives.”\(^{159}\)

Beyond mere deference, *Eldred* gave zero weight to the IP Clause’s express limitations — stating that it was “not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”\(^{160}\) This is not a constitutionally acceptable position. As discussed in subsection II.A.2, the Constitution must be interpreted such that “every word [has] its due force [because] no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.”\(^{161}\) Interpreting the IP Clause to have no limiting power renders its limitations meaningless, and thus, must be wrong.

This theme of improper deference and refusal to enforce the IP Clause’s limitations continued in the 2012 case of *Golan v. Holder*.\(^{162}\) Therein, the Court addressed the question of whether Congress could


\(^{154}\) *Id.*

\(^{155}\) *Id.*


\(^{157}\) *Eldred*, 537 U.S. at 214.

\(^{158}\) *Id.* at 214-15.

\(^{159}\) *Id.* at 212.

\(^{160}\) *Id.* at 208.

\(^{161}\) Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938) (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 570-71 (1840)).

restore copyright protection to works that had previously fallen into
the public domain.\textsuperscript{163} A restoration of this nature had never before
occurred.\textsuperscript{164} Petitioners argued that granting protection to works that
are in the public domain could not promote the progress of science
though the creation of new works.\textsuperscript{165}

The Court disagreed, asserting a newfound position that the
constitutional mandate of progress could be satisfied by encouraging
the dissemination of information (as opposed to creation of new
works).\textsuperscript{166} With this in mind, Justice Ginsburg opined “Congress
rationally could have concluded that [the extension of copyright’s
term] promotes the diffusion of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{167} To reach this
conclusion, the Court acceded not only to Congress’s policy choice,
but also to its novel interpretation of the Constitution.

The proposition that a rational Congress concluded that decreasing
the public’s access to work (via the expansion of copyright) could
encourage dissemination thereof is the apex of deference and refusal
to enforce the IP Clause’s express limitations. As pointed out by
Justice Breyer, the Court was deferring to an illogical factual premise
(i.e., restricting access to increase dissemination).\textsuperscript{168} The proposition
likewise diverges from conclusions reached by academic
commentators\textsuperscript{169} and the above-discussed empirical studies showing

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Id. at 312-17.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Brief for the Petitioners at 7-9, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-
\item \textsuperscript{165} Brief for the Petitioners, \textit{supra} note 164, at 24.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Golan, 565 U.S. at 325-27.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Id. at 326-27.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Id. at 345-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Copyright tends to restrict the
dissemination (and use) of works once produced either because the absence of
competition translates directly into higher consumer prices or because the need to
secure copying permission sometimes imposes administrative costs.” (citing \textsc{William
Law} 68-70, 213-14 (2003))).
\item \textsuperscript{169} Wendy J. Gordon, \textit{Dissemination Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme
Court Erred}, 10 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 5 (2013) (“Economic analysts
sometimes describe copyright law as a compromise between its positive effect of
inducing initial creativity, and its negative effect of reducing dissemination.”); Gordon, \textit{supra} note 122, at 631 (“[I]t would jar our traditions (and my common
sense) if legislation were to expand copyright for [the purpose of dissemination].”); Jessica W. Rice, Case Note, “The Devil Take the Hindmost”: Copyright’s Freedom from
Constitutional Constraints After Golan v. Holder, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 283, 294
(2013).
\end{itemize}
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that works in the public domain are just as likely (or more likely) to be disseminated relative to those under copyright.\(^{170}\)

Furthermore, dissemination of information is not a historically recognized constitutional goal of the U.S. copyright system.\(^{171}\) At most, dissemination was an end brought about by incentivizing parties to create.\(^{172}\) It was thus not surprising that promoting the progress via dissemination was an idea not universally adopted,\(^{173}\) especially given the position’s arguable inconsistency with precedent.\(^{174}\) This is a particularly egregious example of the extent to which the Court is willing to go in deference to Congress on matters of copyright policy.

\(^{170}\) See supra Section II.C.2 (“[E]ntry into the public domain does little to inhibit a work’s future usage and . . . dissemination.”); see also Hannah Dubina, Comment, Decomposing the Precarious Future of American Orchestras in the Face of Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 950, 958 (2013).

\(^{171}\) Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The ultimate goal of copyright is to expand public knowledge and understanding, which copyright seeks to achieve by giving potential creators exclusive control over copying of their works, thus giving them a financial incentive to create informative, intellectually enriching works for public consumption.”); Yuengling v. Schile, 12 F. 97, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 982 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1691). But see Stuart V.C. Duncan Smith, Individualism and Republicanism in the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 432, 449 (2013) (noting that “public knowledge was the primary goal of the IPC due to its relationship with republicanism”).

\(^{172}\) Ansehl v. Puritan Pharm. Co., 61 F.2d 131, 133 (8th Cir. 1932); J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 318-19 (7th Cir. 1897) (“The object of [the IP Clause] was to promote the dissemination of learning, by inducing intellectual labor in works which would promote the general knowledge in science and useful arts.”).

\(^{173}\) Golan, 565 U.S. at 345-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The possibility of eliciting new production is, and always has been, an essential precondition for American copyright protection.”); Deidré A. Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right: A Case Comparison and Proposal, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511, 513 n.16 (2012); Robert E. Shepard, Note, Copyright’s Vicious Triangle: Returning Author Protections to Their Rational Roots, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 731, 746 (2014). Historical documents likewise provide support for the proposition that copyright is intended to encourage the creation of new works (as opposed to dissemination). Yuengling, 12 F. at 103 (“It cannot be doubted that the purpose of the copyright laws from the foundation of the government has been to encourage native talent [to produce new works of authorship] . . . .”); Boucicault, 3 F. Cas. at 982 (“[T]he policy of the law is to encourage literary labor.”); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. 370, 372 (1866) (“[Copyrights] are indulged for the encouragement of ingenuity.”); DRONE, supra note 52, at 209 (“[Copyright’s] true scope and spirit are to encourage the production of ‘useful books.'”).

\(^{174}\) See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“Copyright is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors.”).
As shown by the above examples, deference is the attitude of the Supreme Court with regard to copyright legislation. And as pointed out by Justice Stevens, opinions such as these render “Congress’ actions under the [IP Clause], for all intents and purposes, judicially unreviewable,” which is a result that “cannot be squared with the basic tenets of our constitutional structure.”

It is notable that such hyper-deference cannot be explained as a simple feature of the relevant Courts: Rehnquist (Eldred) and Roberts (Golan). On the contrary, the Rehnquist Court was described as showing a “dramatic lack of deference to Congress.” It has been argued that the Court during Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice was less deferential to Congress than any before it. While the Roberts Court has shown greater deference, this does not explain the continued unwillingness to exercise judicial review of copyright legislation.

An alternate hypothesis might be that those in favor of broad copyright protection are likely to be repeat litigants, and therefore, are able to cultivate judicial rulings and norms that are to their benefit. These parties have the ability to repeatedly choose which lawsuits to file, which to settle, and which to litigate, in order to achieve a preferred set of precedent. While this topic is interesting, further exploration is not warranted to support the relevant issue: courts are presently unwilling to review copyright legislation for congruity with the utilitarian mandate of the IP Clause. The policy implications of this conclusion are further explored in the next part of the Article.

179 Lunney, supra note 44, at 902.
III. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT COPYRIGHT

This Part presents survey evidence establishing that the public does not understand basic tenets of copyright law, which is a prerequisite to advocacy towards returning copyright to its utilitarian goals. Absent sufficient knowledge about copyright law, citizens are unable to recognize that their interests are being ignored and thus, are unable to change the state of affairs. This issue is discussed below, and the survey results relating to knowledge of copyright are presented in the following sections.

The founding fathers envisioned the U.S. copyright system as furthering the promotion of authorship and enriching the public domain.181 Unfortunately, public choice theory predicts — and history has shown — that law makers will ignore this mandate by continually broadening copyright’s protections unless a superseding incentive is placed before them.182 This incentive exists: votes. If the electorate ties an issue (e.g., copyright reform) to their support (e.g., their vote),183 public choice theory holds that self-interested Congressmen will take action on that topic.

This presents a solution to the problem of disproportionate influence by content owners in formulating copyright policy, but for one thing: the U.S. electorate does not know enough about the copyright system to realize their constitutionally entitled interests are being trampled upon. The following sections describe survey-evidence establishing that U.S. citizens are insufficiently informed about copyright law to realize that their interests are not being protected by Congress. Policy implications of this conclusion are addressed at the end of this Part.

While this is the first academic work to investigate the public’s understanding of basic copyright law, prior studies have evaluated perceptions about the intellectual property system and motivations that are important to creative individuals. Christopher Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco, and Zachary Burns conducted a series of experiments confirming the value of attribution to individuals.184

181 See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J. 909, 918 (2003).
182 See supra Section I.B.
183 “Tying” support or vote to an issue could mean that the voter is more likely to vote for a candidate that agrees with the voter on a particular issue. Such “tying” could be an absolute decision to vote for the relevant candidate or an increase in the likelihood to vote for that candidate by some significant amount.
184 Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of
Survey research conducted by Zhanna Mingaleva and Irina Mirskikh found — at least with regard to Russian creators — personal inquisitiveness and the potential for financial remuneration were paramount incentives. In a similar vein, Silbey conducted a variety of interviews with innovative parties, concluding that — while monetary gain was a relevant consideration — concerns such as personal challenge and professional autonomy were also important in their decision to create.

Building on this work, Gregory Mandel, Anne Fast, and Kristina Olson conducted survey research into the public’s subjective beliefs about the justification for intellectual property laws. Their study concluded that, above all, the respondents validated these laws as a means to avoid plagiarism. While that article presented some conclusions about the public’s knowledge of specific intellectual property laws (e.g., a patent’s term length), they did not research the level of understanding of basic tenets of the copyright. This is a void in the literature addressed by the current survey.

A. Google Consumer Surveys

Prior research tells us that — with regard to substantive intellectual property issues (e.g., term of protection, protectable subject matter, and obtaining protection) — the scope of U.S. citizens’ knowledge is low. The present study expands on this research by being the first to collect information on the public’s understanding of elementary tenets of copyright law. More specifically, data was collected pertaining to basic goals of the system and the interaction of copyright holders’ rights and the public domain.

This study collected survey data using Google Surveys (“GS”), a web-based platform launched in 2012. The system asks web-users a

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188 Id. at 917.
189 Id. at 935-36.
190 Id. at 919, 960. The cited article paid particular attention to the scope of intellectual property rights and questions relating to obtaining rights. Id. at 980-82.
series of short questions in order to access a premium website.\textsuperscript{192} Owners of the pages are paid for these responses, such that GS may be used in lieu of selling website advertising.\textsuperscript{193} Online tools of this type are increasingly popular due to their convenience.\textsuperscript{194} The GS platform is distinct from many other online survey tools in that it does not pay its survey participants\textsuperscript{195} and it does not collect their demographic information.\textsuperscript{196} Survey takers are “paid” through access to the subject website, and relevant personal attributes are inferred from the user’s internet history.\textsuperscript{197} Extrapolated information about age, gender, and location are employed to weight the value of collected data or target respondents to be representative of all internet users (or some subset thereof, per instructions from the party conducting the research).\textsuperscript{198} This attribute of GS eliminated the need for preliminary questions inquiring into the demographic information of respondents in the instant study.

\textsuperscript{192} Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opinion Letter (Jan. 1, 2015) (Docket No. 9358), 2015 WL 6396129, at *13; \textit{Pew Res. Ctr.}, \textit{A Comparison of Results from Surveys by the Pew Research Center and Google Consumer Surveys} 3 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/11-7-12%20Google%20Methodology%20paper.pdf. The scope of GS queries and multiple-choice responses on this platform are significantly restricted. Questions are limited to 175 characters and answers are limited to 44 characters. Alex Burr, Public Understanding of the Implications of Metadata Collection from Internet and Phone Usage 25 (Aug. 31, 2014) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, University College London) (on file with author). Communication within these parameters must be particularly brief, causing some details to be eliminated in the name of brevity.


\textsuperscript{195} See, e.g., Michael Buhrmester et al., \textit{Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?}, 6 \textit{Persp. Psychol. Sci.} 3 (2011) (explaining that Amazon hires “workers” to take surveys and they are compensated for their time).


\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Pew Res. Ctr.}, supra note 192.

Several studies have been conducted on whether GS is a viable tool for survey research, and the results are positive.\textsuperscript{199} Addressing if the platform successfully creates a representative sample population using inferred demographics, one article found no evidence that GS “is either more or less representative than other non-probability samples.”\textsuperscript{200} Pew Research reached similar conclusions, finding that “Google [ ] Surveys achieved a representative sample of internet users on gender, age, race/ethnicity, marital status and home ownership when compared with internet users in Pew Research Center surveys.”\textsuperscript{201}

A Google-funded study found that GS outperformed both probability and non-probability internet surveys in several areas, including average absolute error from a benchmark obtained via a large telephone survey.\textsuperscript{202} The same report concluded that the response rate for GS compared favorably to most internet-based intercept surveys,\textsuperscript{203} telephone surveys, and online panels.\textsuperscript{204} Based on such positive results, one researcher stated: “we asked whether [GS] is likely to be a useful platform for survey experimenters doing rigorous social scientific work[, and overall], our answer is yes.”\textsuperscript{205}

Use of internet-based platforms do not, however, come without drawbacks. Online systems such as GS are inherently limited to the 78% of U.S. adults who use the internet, which biases the population younger, better educated, and wealthier.\textsuperscript{206} It is therefore unlikely that any internet-based sample is perfectly representative.\textsuperscript{207} This worry is,

\textsuperscript{199} Benjamin Livshits & Todd Mytkowicz, \textit{InterPoll: Crowd-Sourced Internet Polls}, in \textit{1ST SUMMIT ADVANCES PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES} 156, 171 (Thomas Ball et al. eds., 2015).

\textsuperscript{200} Santoso et al., \textit{supra} note 198, at 370.

\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Pew Res. Ctr.}, \textit{supra} note 192, at 6.

\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Paul McDonald et al.}, \textit{Comparing Google Consumer Surveys to Existing Probability and Non-Probability Based Internet Surveys} 5-7 (2012).

\textsuperscript{203} Intercept surveys on the web are popup surveys that frequently use systematic sampling for every \textit{ith} visitor to a website or web page. Ronald D. Fricker, \textit{Sampling Methods for Web and E-mail Surveys}, in \textit{The SAGE Handbook of Online Research Methods} 195, 204 (Nigel Fielding et al. eds., 2008).

\textsuperscript{204} 

\textsuperscript{205} Santoso et al., \textit{supra} note 198, at 371.


\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Pew Res. Ctr.}, \textit{supra} note 192, at 3-4.
however, mitigated by Google’s ability to infer demographic information and weight responses accordingly.\textsuperscript{208}

Concerns about using an online system are further marginalized by the results of the survey. Internet users (including internet-based survey participants) tend to be wealthier and better educated — characteristics which positively correlate with legal knowledge.\textsuperscript{209} The present study found a lack of popular knowledge about copyright, and this finding is only emphasized by the fact that the survey’s participants might have had a greater understanding of the law than the public at large. The online-nature of the survey therefore appears to do little to mitigate the findings.\textsuperscript{210}

B. The Survey

The primary goal of this survey was to determine whether the voting public in the United States appreciates the constitutional goals of the copyright system. To this end, the questions were tailored to assess the understanding that a utilitarian copyright regime serves the public good by promoting the creation of new works of authorship\textsuperscript{211} while

\textsuperscript{208} Id. at 4.


\textsuperscript{210} In addition, GS does not exhibit some drawbacks present in other online platforms that have been accepted in academic fields. For instance, Amazon’s MTurk is considered a reliable platform for research. David S. Cohen & Jeffrey B. Bingenheimer, Abortion Rights and the Largeness of the Fraction \(\frac{6}{16}\), 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 115, 122 n.46 (2016); Mandel et al., supra note 187, at 921 & n.10. This acceptance is despite MTurk’s policy to pay respondents by the survey, which introduces possible misrepresentation or self-selection issues. Clarke & Fox, supra note 196, at 1270; Ilyana Kuziemko et al., How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 1478, 1480, 1481, 1483-84 (2015). It is therefore not surprising that, despite its recent vintage, GS has been used in academic research in fields including political science, law, business, and psychology. Clarke & Fox, supra note 196, at 1267 (citing Shane Frederick et al., The Limits of Attraction, 51 J. Marketing Res. 487, 491 (2014); Jessica Lavariaga Monforti et al., ¿Por Quién Votará? Experimental Evidence About Language, Ethnicity and Vote Choice (Among Republicans), 1 Pol., Groups, & Identities 475, 481 (2013); Andrew K. Przybylski, Who Believes Electronic Games Cause Real World Aggression?, 17 Cyberpsychol., Behav., & Soc. Networking 228, 229 (2014)).

\textsuperscript{211} Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2014).
ensuring that any incentive structure not unduly encroach upon the public domain. The questions were drafted to be brief to ensure a maximum response rate and comply with word limits on the GS platform.

The survey was targeted to people in the United States of voting age and consisted of three substantive questions. The Author chose not to use introductory (non-substantive) questions about the respondents, though doing so might have made the data set more robust (i.e., collecting information about what attributes correlate with copyright knowledge). Inclusion of additional questions would have negatively affected the study’s completion rate. Additionally, the research targeted knowledge across the entire U.S. electorate, making attributes of any single respondent less important.

The first question spoke unequivocally to the purpose of copyright law. It tested whether respondents appreciated that these statutes were constitutionally meant for the public benefit of encouraging the creation of new works, as opposed to rewarding an author’s work or ensuring the author held dominion over his intellectual creations. The question read:

1. The primary goal of copyright law is:
   A. To encourage creation of new books, art, etc.
   B. To reward authors for their hard work.
   C. To make sure people own what they create.

The first answer (A) is correct, as it mimics relevant constitutional interpretation of the IP Clause.

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212 Threshold Media Corp. v. Relativity Media, LLC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“Copyright law strikes a utilitarian balance between two competing yet complementary societal interests: providing sufficient economic incentives to stimulate the creation of new works while protecting a large and vibrant public domain in which new ideas can flourish.” (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990)).


215 The first question was prefaced by the language: “Answer this anonymous 2 minute academic survey if you consent to participate.”

216 Note that, while the order of questions was not varied from respondent to respondent, the order of the multiple-choice answers was randomized for each participant.
incorrect; the idea that a party deserves a copyright as a quid pro quo for hard work (i.e., the Sweat of the Brow Doctrine) has been rejected by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{218} Answer C is incorrect as it recites a “Moral Rights” justification for copyright law, which while popular abroad, is not a primary goal of U.S. copyright legislation.\textsuperscript{219}

There was some consideration of phrasing the correct answer (representing the IP Clause’s utilitarian goals) to reflect the IP Clause itself. Had this been done, the first answer (A) would have read “[T]o promote the progress of science and useful arts.” Despite being the most forthright manner of phrasing this question, this course of action was rejected for two reasons.

Initially, the IP Clause’s language is — compared to modern English — stilted and thus would have stood out. This would have biased responses, creating a subpar survey. Second, the IP Clause’s language is misleading when interpreted by modern readers. Consistent with language used at drafting, the IP Clause intended for copyright to promote the progress of “science.” In the 1700s, “science” meant knowledge or learning.\textsuperscript{220} If the survey question asked whether copyright was meant to promote “science,” respondents would have been confused, as copyright is generally concerned with creative endeavors and patents more concerned with “science” (as currently defined). Thus, the correct answer was phrased to not mimic the IP Clause’s explicit language.\textsuperscript{221}

The second survey question addressed the respondent’s appreciation that all copyrights end, as per the Constitution’s “limited Times” mandate.\textsuperscript{222} The question implicitly tested whether the subject was aware that the public domain existed, as a work falls into the public domain when its copyright term expires.\textsuperscript{223} The question read:

218 Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Pub’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699 (2d Cir. 1998).
221 The Author also considered having the correct answer mimic the newly recognized potential goal of copyright (dissemination of information, see Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012)). However, the Author chose to address only the goal of encouraging creation of new works, as that goal has been recognized for over 150 years, see supra note 148, as it was believed that if survey respondents were to recognize any of the constitutional goals of copyright (which they did not), it would be the historically recognized goal.
222 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
223 Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 761 F.3d 789, 790 (7th Cir. 2014).
2. Bob owns the copyright for a book. What option does he have when the copyright’s term expires?
   
   A. Renew the copyright.
   B. There is nothing he can do.
   C. A copyright's term never ends.

   The second answer (B) is correct. Copyrights must be for a limited time, and there is nothing the author can do to change this. Under the present regime, renewal is not an option, as all copyrights exist for a designated period. Therefore, the first response is incorrect. It is notable that a “renewal term” was available under the Copyright Act of 1909, but no party has been required to renew a copyright since 1991. Thus, “renew the copyright” has not been a valid option for a copyright owner for twenty-five years. The final answer is incorrect, as it recites the untrue belief that copyright terms are perpetual.

   The third question tested the basic tenet of copyright law that there comes a time for all works after which the public has unfettered access and use. This time is, of course, when the work enters the public domain. The question read:

   3. Jessica owns the copyright for a book. At some point in the future, the public can sell the book without her permission.
   
   True or False?
   
   A. True — Copyrights end. Then anyone can sell it.
   B. False — Owners always control this right.
   C. False — The public will never have this right.

   The first answer is correct, as it recognizes that after a copyright’s term concludes, the public can make use of the work without permission from the author. The incorrect second answer posits that an owner’s right to sell his copyrighted work is eternal, which is at odds with the constitutional limitation that copyrights exist for a finite time. Answer C expressly limits the rights that the public can ever enjoy, which is at odds with the public’s completely free use of a work in the public domain.

   224 See, e.g., Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc., 822 F.3d 926, 928 (6th Cir. 2016) (“At the same time it created these termination rights, the 1976 Act abolished the copyright renewal provision.”).

C. Results

The survey addressed 1,000 U.S.-based respondents of voting age. This number of survey takers was chosen to minimize uncertainty associated with the results without making the respondent pool unduly large. That goal was largely realized, with the maximum margin of error for any answer being plus or minus 3.5%. Further, the sample size led to a 95% statistically significant “winning (though incorrect) answer” for the first two questions. For the third query, respondents’ below-discussed inability to select the correct answer was likewise significant.\(^{226}\)

The study was conducted from July 21, 2016 to July 23, 2016 with results consistent with expectations based on earlier studies.\(^{227}\) Respondents of voting age displayed little knowledge of the constitutional goals of the copyright system — namely incentivizing creation of new works and maintaining a robust public domain.\(^{228}\)

Question 1 asked respondents to complete the sentence: “The primary goal of copyright law is ____.” The response was overwhelmingly that copyright’s primary goal is “To make sure people own what they create.”\(^{229}\) This answer is incorrect. Only 7.8% of those surveyed correctly recognized the utilitarian goal of copyright. The results are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Margin of Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To make sure people own what they create</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>+3.0/1-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reward authors for their hard work</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>+3.0/1-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To encourage creation of new books, art, etc</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>+2.3/1-1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 2 presented a miniature fact scenario for the respondent to evaluate. The query read: “Bob owns the copyright for a book. What option does he have when the copyright’s term expires?” A majority of

\(^{226}\) Complete survey results on file with the Author. For question three, a comparison of the total responses to incorrect answers versus the correct answer was statistically significant.

\(^{227}\) Mandel et al., supra note 187, at 960.

\(^{228}\) Threshold Media Corp. v. Relativity Media, LLC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 2013).

\(^{229}\) The data is based on 845 responses.
respondents indicated that Bob could simply “renew” his copyright.\textsuperscript{230} This answer is incorrect. Only 9.2\% correctly recognized that all copyrights end (and the work falls into the public domain). The results are shown below:

Question 3 was unique within the survey, as it produced the only plurality winner. Survey takers were again presented with a short fact scenario, reading: “Jessica owns the copyright for a book. At some point in the future, the public can sell the book without her permission. True or False?” On this topic, 44.1\% of the public correctly recognized that a public domain work could be sold by anyone, though this percentage likely over-estimates the portion of respondents that actually knew the correct answer (as opposed to guessing the correct choice).\textsuperscript{231} Regardless, a majority of respondents did not recognize this tenet of copyright law.\textsuperscript{232} The results are shown below:

\textsuperscript{230} The data is based on 825 responses.
\textsuperscript{231} See Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., Improving Survey Questions: Design and Evaluation 69 (1995) (explaining that some portion of “correct” multiple choice answers were simply lucky guesses and do not represent actual mastery of the subject). This effect is likely applicable in each of the instant survey questions.
\textsuperscript{232} The data was based on 814 responses.
D. Analysis

The results of the instant survey found significant misunderstandings about primary tenets of copyright law among U.S. residents of voting age. For each question, a majority of respondents’ answers indicated a failure to grasp the utilitarian nature of the copyright system. More specifically, the survey results found the audience to not understand that copyright laws must benefit the public by encouraging the creation of new works (Question 1) which will eventually fall into the public domain (Question 2) and be freely available for public use (Question 3). In contrast, the responses led one to believe the public thinks that copyright laws exist to reward authors and content owners. Respondents generally did not recognize the existence or nature of the public domain.

It is notable that the current results are consistent with earlier research which investigated survey-respondents’ subjective justification for the existence of intellectual property. That study gave four possible reasons for the creation of intellectual property laws and asked respondents to “rank the statements based on how much you agree with them as a basis for intellectual property law.” The subjective nature of the inquiry was shown in the introduction to each of the statements, namely “We should have intellectual property rights because . . . .” That survey found “preventing plagiarism” was the plurality winner (37.1%), with “incentive to create” and “moral rights” both coming in with 25.9%.

The current survey investigated respondents’ knowledge of the objective, constitutional goals of copyright law. The prior work asked questions about “intellectual property laws” (a superset of copyright law), but the findings are still fairly consistent. The instant study (Question 1) showed a very strong belief (71%) that copyright exists to “make sure people own what they create.” This answer seems to envelop both the prior research’s subjective justifications of “moral rights” (25.9%) and “avoiding plagiarism” (37.1%). The sum of those answers (63%) is similar to the percentage of respondents who (incorrectly) believed the objective purpose of copyright law is ensuring someone owns what they made (71%).

Aside from exhibiting similar findings, the prior study’s investigation into the population’s subjective beliefs about why

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233 Mandel et al., supra note 187, at 929.
234 Id. at 973.
235 Id. at 931. A study investigating the objective reasons that the U.S. copyright/intellectual property system exists would omit the word “should.”
intellectual property exists is also explanatory of the current results. Specifically, a survey into the moral grounds for intellectual property is likely to indicate what the respondents believe is a “fair” state of affairs, and this perception commonly influences what a party believes the law actually is.

In the absence of knowledge about a particular subject, individuals are likely to employ a fairness heuristic, whereby they conflate laws and norms. This heuristic is particularly prevalent where parties have to make quick decisions, such as those made in a survey. Recognizing that the public lacks knowledge about copyright law and that it subjectively believes copyright should exist to avoid plagiarism or support moral rights, it is unsurprising that the present survey found a belief that copyright law is intended to create very broad rights for the owner.

This Part presented survey evidence establishing that the public lacks a basic understanding of copyright law, which is a prerequisite to public advocacy to return copyright law to its utilitarian goals. The following discussion details how this issue may be remedied towards a successful realignment of the copyright system.

IV. PROPOSALS TO RETURN TO A UTILITARIAN COPYRIGHT REGIME

Public choice theory explains why Congress passes copyright laws that are untethered from their utilitarian goals. These overly expansive statutes fail to “promote the progress” and — beyond just being bad policy — are unconstitutional. The courts, however, have refused to judicially review these laws, which means that only the electorate can sufficiently influence Congress to pass utilitarian copyright statutes. Unfortunately, as the current study has shown, the


238 See supra Section III.D.

239 Mandel et al., supra note 187, at 930.

240 This would include making sure that people own what they create (Question 1), granting long-term copyrights (Question 2), and allowing the author to continuously maintain some level of control over their work (Question 3).

241 See supra Section I.B.

242 See supra Section II.A.
electorate is not amply knowledgeable about the copyright system to recognize that it is being denied constitutionally mandated benefits (e.g., the public domain and access to works of authorship).

This Part looks to several fields, including behavioral economics and the study of collective action, for methods to incentivize the public to educate themselves about the copyright system and successfully advocate for reform. The below proposals do not represent an exhaustive list of possible courses of action, but rather, are intended as a preliminary strategy to contend with, and possibly reverse, the rationally predicted expansion of copyright’s protections.

A. Avoiding Collective Action Problems: Lessons from PIPA and SOPA

While traditional economics and public choice theory expect that concentrated interests will successfully secure legislative actions in their favor, reality has occasionally deviated from these expectations. This section investigates the defeat of a recent proposal to expand copyright’s protections and attempts to glean lessons underlying the movement.

The Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (“PIPA”) were contemporaneous proposals to enlarge the scope of remedies associated with copyright infringement.243 Both bills were aggressively lobbied for by the music and movie industries,244 which usually equates to passage. These proposals, however, were met with widespread resistance from individuals, interested companies, and academia.245

243 Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, 3D Printing: Digital Infringement & Digital Regulation, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 37, 71 (2016). These bills have been described as such:

The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) was a bill directed toward expanding the ability of U.S. enforcement officials to combat Internet sites dedicated to the theft of U.S. property marketed as offering counterfeit goods in a way that enabled or facilitated copyright infringement. The Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (PROTECT IP Act or PIPA) enabled the Attorney General to sue an owner or operator of an Internet website dedicated to infringing activities that had a legitimate purpose other than to facilitate copyright infringement.


245 Matthew Bernstein, Note, Searching for More Efficient Piracy Protection, 43
Social media was a significant tool for citizens looking to express their displeasure with the bills. Complaints were publicly aired through the blogosphere (e.g., Reddit and Techdirt), and protesters organized using anti-SOPA Facebook groups. Individuals additionally censored parts of their public Facebook profiles to highlight their disapproval.

Large corporate interests, including Google, Microsoft, and Facebook, also opposed the bills. These companies initially registered their displeasure through standard means, such as contacting Congress. This approach did not prove immediately successful, which led to a less conventional manner of protest. On January 18, 2012, a significant number of websites (approximately 75,000) altered or blacked out their content as a means to protest the bills.

The anti-SOPA/PIPA cause found traction with individuals across a variety of professional and political boundaries, and the backlash eventually made its way to legislators in Washington. Support for the bills plummeted, and the proposals were ultimately defeated.

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250 Mary Quinn O’Connor, Censoring Clicks or Saving the Web? SOPA Hearing May Shape Net’s Future, FOX NEWS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/12/15/censoring-your-clicks-saving-web-sopa-hearing-may-shape-nets-future (“An open letter to Washington signed by the creators of some of the web’s biggest sites argues that a new bill could dramatically restrict law-abiding U.S. Internet and technology companies — and reshape the web as we know it.”).


253 Lev-Aretz, supra note 247, at 223.

254 Bernstein, supra note 245, at 639.

The following subsections identify several aspects of the SOPA/PIPA story that may prove useful in returning copyright to its constitutional moorings.

1. Organizing Interested Companies

The actions of the various corporate interests that stood against SOPA/PIPA are notable for the tremendous breadth of the group, including Facebook, Google, PayPal, eBay, Mozilla, Yahoo, AOL, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Zynga. The joint action by these parties was undoubtedly a significant part of the bills' defeat, and the impetus for these companies to work together is significant with regard to catalyzing future copyright reform.

The literature on collective action to attain a public good sheds insight on the successful group protest. In this instance, defeating SOPA/PIPA can be modeled as a public good, as it exhibits the two primary attributes of public goods: non-rivalrousness and non-excludability. Precluding enactment of these bills was a benefit that can be held by all interested parties without diminishing another's enjoyment (non-rivalrous), and it would have been impossible to exclude a member of the public from enjoying this benefit (non-excludable).

Where a single party maintains a sufficient interest in securing a public good, it will rationally choose to individually incur the cost of attempting to obtain that good. This was presumptively the case for one or more of the nine companies that chose to lobby Congress to reject SOPA/PIPA. At least one of the parties that paid to lobby against the bills determined that defeating the proposals was worth the cost of attempting to persuade Congress. For instance, Google might have concluded that SOPA's regulation of search engines would have

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256 Duvivier, supra note 251.
257 See Schuster, supra note 18, at 1182.
259 OLSON, supra note 17, at 22, 33-34.
been a sufficient detriment to warrant hiring lobbyists. Any (or all) of the parties that lobbied against SOPA/PIPA may have made this conclusion and allowed the balance of the signatories to add their support post hoc.

This effort to dissuade Congress would, however, ultimately fail. Such a fate was not particularly surprising given the commercial strength of the bills’ supporters, who included ABC, CBS, Comcast/NBC Universal, and Disney. This failure led these technology companies to engage in a collective protest by blacking out or altering their respective websites — an act which would prove successful.

The causes of this collective action are notable, as they may have a significant role to play in future copyright reform. The literature on collective action holds that — absent an extrinsic motivator — a group may not collectively act to obtain a public good where no member will undertake the entire cost to act. If the group is large enough that the members are essentially anonymous (a “large group”), parties will choose to freeride and allow others to take the necessary actions, because the public good will be enjoyed by everyone (including free-riders). All parties will rationally make this conclusion, and no party will act. The public good will thus not be obtained unless there is an outside means to discipline (encourage to act) those who freeride.

Likewise, if the group is small enough that an entity failing to “pay its share” will be noticed by other members (a “small group”), it is indeterminate whether the collective good will be obtained. The other parties may recognize a free-rider’s lack of engagement and likewise choose to stop pursuit of the good. However, the initial party may foresee this course of events, and — still wanting to obtain the public good — decide not to freeride. As above, the only certain means to obtain the public good is to have some enforcement mechanism to discipline free-riders.

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261 See Monica Yun, Note, Pinterest’s Secondary Liability: The DMCA Implications of Holding Pinterest Responsible and What Pinterest Can Do to Avoid Liability, 36 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 489, 500 (2014). The Author does not assert to know what business choices or valuations any of the relevant parties made.
263 Bernstein, supra note 245, at 638-39.
264 OLSON, supra note 17, at 44.
265 Id. at 43-44.
266 Id. at 43.
267 Id.
Looking to the SOPA website blackout, the collective action problem is relevant. It is unlikely that a blackout of any single website would exert the public pressure necessary to defeat the bills, and therefore, collective action (e.g., a collective internet protest) was required. As discussed above, regardless of whether the group is defined as “small” or “large,” there is no guarantee of collective action absent some extrinsic motivator to force parties to do their part towards the greater good (e.g., blacking out their website towards defeating SOPA). One such extrinsic motivator is identifiable: the cultural cachet of participating in the blackout.

In the time surrounding the blackout, the anti-SOPA/PIPA undertaking had become a cause célèbre. Vast numbers of citizens were influenced by the movement, and each of these individuals represented a potential customer for firms participating in the blackout. Websites engaging in the protest were commercially rewarded via positive perceptions of their firm among those with anti-SOPA leanings. Conversely, parties that failed to participate would not obtain this benefit and, potentially, would be viewed negatively for failure to join the cause.

Value generation of this type externally incentivizes firms to join a collective action (e.g., the movement to defeat SOPA/PIPA), such that they may be rewarded with positive public perception. Likewise, parties that do not participate (e.g., firms that did not participate in

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268 One could define the parties that engaged in the blackout as small, if one were to only include the primary members, including Wikipedia, Google, etc. Likewise, one would define the group as large, if one were to include all 75,000-115,000 participating websites. As discussed in the body text, this characterization is not relevant to the current conclusion.

269 See OLSON, supra note 17, at 44.


the anti-SOPA blackout) are disciplined to the extent that they do not receive the same public benefit (or potentially, may be viewed negatively for not participating). These conclusions are relevant to future attempts to encourage collective action to obtain a public good — namely copyright reform.

As discussed above, collective corporate action towards a policy goal can have significant effects. It is therefore advantageous for proponents of copyright reform to secure such backing. When seeking corporate support for this cause, reformers would do well to emphasize the reputational value available to firms that participate in the collective action and the lack thereof for those who do not. This is true regardless of the nature of the requested corporate action (e.g., lobbying, public display of support, etc.). Of course, the reputational value available to corporations is proportional to the number of individuals that are, or may become, supportive of the cause. Similarly, the number of interested individuals increases with corporate support. It is therefore important to simultaneously secure individual and corporate backing for copyright reform.

2. Incentivizing Individual Action

A second lesson from the anti-SOPA/PIPA movement is worth noting: an individual's choice to educate themselves on an issue and advocate for a policy can significantly influence government action when conducted on a large scale. Similar to the above analysis, collective action theories are useful to explain if, and when, individuals will work together to secure public goods such as copyright reform and public education about copyright policy. This subsection discusses means to incentivize this type of collective action, including obtaining celebrity endorsements and using social media for education and advocacy.

The use of social media as a tool of learning about political issues, individual social protest, and expression of policy preferences is significant in that it reduces costs associated with collective action (e.g., expenditures on communication and organization). It does


274 See Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 1211, 1215 (2016); Sebastián Valenzuela, Unpacking the Use of Social Media for Protest Behavior: The Roles of Information, Opinion Expression, and Activism, 57 Am. Behav. Scientist 920, 921 (2013); see also Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 7 n.24
not, however, eliminate all problems related to achieving a public good such as copyright education and reform. As discussed above, when organizing a large group of parties to act towards a good that will be shared by all, the free-rider problem will prevent achievement of the goal absent some outside motivation to participate in the collective action.\footnote{275} It is thus imperative that — in order to secure a critical mass of education about, and subsequent support for, copyright reform — some incentive be identified to encourage individual action and avoid free-riding. The literature provides several possible methods.

There is a significant body of research on the capacity for celebrities to influence public opinion.\footnote{276} Within the boundaries of politics, these endorsements directly influence politicians\footnote{277} and persuade the public to adopt a proffered policy stance.\footnote{278} Beyond immediately effecting policy change, endorsements are important because they may motivate members of the electorate to advocate for reform. As discussed above, absent sufficient outside motivation, members of a large group will rationally choose to free-ride, and therefore, any means to encourage collective political activity is significant.\footnote{279} There is reason to believe that obtaining celebrity support for copyright reform is feasible.

In the modern era, celebrities are encouraged to develop a public “brand” that can be commercially exploited in the future.\footnote{280} To this end, they have reason to actively secure public goodwill, and as discussed above, supporting a cause is a means by which a brand may

\footnote{275} OLSON, supra note 17, at 21, 44.
\footnote{276} See generally David J. Jackson, Selling Politics: The Impact of Celebrities’ Political Beliefs on Young Americans, 6 J. POL. MARKETING 67, 69-71 (2007) (summarizing research on market effects of celebrity endorsements); David J. Jackson & Thomas I.A. Darrow, The Influence of Celebrity Endorsements on Young Adults’ Political Opinions, 10 HARV. INTL. J. PRESS/ POL. STUD. 322, 333 (2010).
\footnote{277} Amy B. Becker, Star power? Advocacy, Receptivity, and Viewpoints on Celebrity Involvement in Issue Politics, 21 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 1, 2 (2013).
\footnote{278} Jackson, supra note 276, at 77. But see David T. Morin et al., Celebrity and Politics: Effects of Endorser Credibility and Sex on Voter Attitudes, Perceptions, and Behaviors, 49 SOC. SCI. J. 413, 418 (2012).
\footnote{279} In this vein, celebrity advocacy has been described as a means to “reach out to and mobilise otherwise apathetic publics.” David Marsh et al., Celebrity politics: The Politics of the Late Modernity?, 8 POL. STUD. REV. 322, 333 (2010).
do so. Celebrity endorsement of copyright reform is thus a symbiotic relationship, whereby the public figure enhances their “brand” and the reform movement obtains public awareness and support of problems and proposals associated with copyright.

Individuals can similarly be encouraged to act collectively by wisely choosing the means to express dissatisfaction with the copyright regime. The use of social media as an educational and protest platform has innate characteristics that incentivize users to express policy preferences. This incentive comes in the form of personal gratification that inherently arises from using social media to express beliefs and share news. Individual incentives include status seeking (e.g., getting attention or gaining in reputation), boosting one’s self-confidence, and socialization. The existence of these motivations encourage individuals to participate in a collective protest (and the prerequisite self-education) towards a utilitarian copyright system, as opposed to free-riding on the actions of others with the expectation of still securing the public good.

The use of social media as a means of expressing policy preferences has a second benefit, namely widespread education about the need for copyright reform. While individuals share political information for personal gratification, this activity creates a beneficial externality, namely the dissemination of relevant information. Through this means, the public receives information about copyright policy and reform that might not otherwise be available. Education of this sort may remedy the public’s lack of understanding about copyright

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281 See Barone et al., supra note 272; Webb & Mohr, supra note 272, at 226.
284 See Homero Gil de Zúñiga, Nakwon Jung & Sebastián Valenzuela, Social Media Use for News and Individuals’ Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Political Participation, 17 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 319, 322 (2012); see also Valenzuela, supra note 274, at 923.
285 Valenzuela, supra note 274, at 922.
policy and enables larger-scale collective action by an informed populace.

The above subsections addressed why traditional economic theory predicts difficulties in producing collective action by individuals and corporations towards a public good (e.g., copyright education and reform). Means to overcome the predicted free-riding problems were proposed in the form of feasible extrinsic incentives to encourage participation in collective action. The next subsection discusses how issue presentation may likewise influence willingness to be part of a group endeavor.

3. Effective Issue Presentation

A final lesson on collective action can be learned from the successful SOPA/PIPA protests: the value of issue presentation. The literature postulates that a movement’s success relies, at least in part, on the issue’s capacity to resonate with a large group of parties. Such arguments are premised on framing theory. This idea holds that “an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives,” and the manner in which an issue is presented (framed) influences how “people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue.”

The terms in which an issue is couched determine whether parties believe the issue is relevant to them. In the intellectual property realm, Amy Kapczynski analyzed the use of framing in the access-to-knowledge (“A2K”) movement to create a sense of common cause among disparate interests. The A2K movement could be framed as relating to purely legal issues or it could be presented as championing a public good — the public domain. More parties are likely to believe the issue is relevant to them when presented in the latter manner, showing how issue framing influences people’s willingness to support an issue or collective action. Likewise, J. Janewa Osei-Tutu evaluated the framing of intellectual property as a

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286 See supra Part III.
human right and Deborah Cantrell discussed the issue as an anti-poverty measure.

The SOPA/PIPA protests exemplified the successful use of framing in several ways. Early organizers of the movement smartly presented the issue broadly enough to appeal to a significant array of parties — arguing SOPA would hinder websites important to many parties (including social media and news sites) and destabilize the functioning of the internet. This framing was particularly successful, as it spoke to the interests of the citizenry and many large corporate interests that normally might not care about copyright legislation (e.g., Google, Twitter, and eBay). The ability to secure support from companies that would normally be disinterested in copyright issues was key to this protest.

Further, framing of the issue by corporate protesters is informative about its appeal across a large swath of the citizenry. For instance, Google presented the protest as acting against censorship by modifying its home page to have a black box over the Google logo and including the phrase, “Tell Congress: Please don’t censor the web!” As censorship is widely viewed in a negative light, this position was likely to find broad support. Similarly, Craigslist employed an equally accessible theme of patriotism, using a red, white, and blue motif on its protest page. Again, framing protests against SOPA as a patriotic act presents the issue in a manner that many will support.

Further reading:
- Langford, supra note 293, at 97-98.
Building on the research by Kapczynski and others and the successes of the SOPA/PIPA protests, it is prudent to inclusively frame future calls for collective action in the copyright field. The relevant issue should be presented to pique the interest of potential corporate allies that would usually remain uncommitted. This secures significant backing from unexpected supporters — such as the large corporate interests (e.g., Google and Facebook) that surprisingly stood against SOPA/PIPA.

Further, the public is unlikely to respond to a call for legal reform, as many do not understand or care about the law. However, were expanded copyright protections framed as interfering with education or destroying a common good — the public domain — broad support and collective action against expansionist copyright policies would be more likely. Building from this subsection’s suggestions relating to incentive structure, traditional economic theory, and issue presentation, the following discussions set forth proposals arising from a different realm: behavioral economics.

B. Status Quo Bias

The field of behavioral economics unites the study of economics and psychology to describe how individual behaviors may predictably deviate from the rational actions expected by neoclassical economics. These repeated irrationalities are described as a set of cognitive biases; this section describes how these biases serve as an impediment to, and catalyst for, change in the copyright system.

People exhibit an irrational preference for maintaining the current state of affairs, referred to as the status quo bias. Humans are innately averse to loss, and this aversion causes decision makers to overvalue that which they currently have, but might lose if they deviate from the status quo. This irrational overvaluation of what

one presently has is why parties commonly refuse to trade the present state of affairs for an objectively better situation.300

Content owners have used this bias to their benefit by presenting copyright as a personal property interest, as opposed to a monopoly granted for the benefit of society.301 Mark Lemley argues this viewpoint invokes ideas of strong property rights and an entitlement to reap all profits arising from one's intellectual property.302 Once such a sense of entitlement is created, the citizenry perceives all possible benefits from a copyright — owned now or in the future — to be theirs as a matter of property right (as opposed to a deviation from the government's usual abhorrence of monopolies).303

When viewed through such a lens, copyrights (and the “right” to obtain one) become the subject of humanity’s inherent overvaluing of current property interests and irrational unwillingness to deviate from the status quo.304 In the face of this bias, the electorate may choose to disfavor copyright reform, even where it is in their best interest to do so.305 This is an obvious impediment to retargeting copyright towards its constitutional goals, but it may not be insurmountable.

Research indicates that when actors view their choices relative to a state of affairs other than the present, the status quo bias is marginalized and existing conditions may be destabilized.306 Should the electorate recognize that copyrights have been historically

300 KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 292; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 299, at 104.
304 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 299, at 1042.
305 See Davis & Barua, supra note 298, at 148. This does not imply that the decision maker will never change their position, just that they are less likely to do so than traditional economic theory would predict. KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 292.
characterized as an aberration from the free-to-use public domain— as opposed to a positive property right — preference for the current state of affairs may be diminished. Educating the public on this issue minimizes the power of the status quo bias and furthers the goal of copyright reform.

As an alternative, it might be possible to coopt the use of property rhetoric in copyright to diminish the status quo bias. Researchers such as Michael Carrier believe the “propertization” of copyright is irreversible, and thus, there is no return to the traditional view of that area of law. Recognizing this, he suggests importing limitations from real property doctrine into intellectual property. For instance, Carrier cites to easements, adverse possession, and zoning as examples of generalized property doctrines to incorporate. His approach concedes the use of property rhetoric, but inherently decreases the property interest that citizens believe they “own.” This diminishes the impact of the status quo bias because the public no longer perceives itself to own the entire scope of all uses of a copyright (and it will not fight to protect its ability to exploit those interests).

C. Strategic Framing of the Issue

Preference weighting associated with loss aversion is relevant to the present discussion in a second manner. Faced with a choice to deviate from the status quo, decision makers are disproportionately more likely to select a choice presented as a means of avoiding a loss (as opposed to securing a gain). This type of choice framing can be

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307 Mark A. Lemley, Comment, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1548-49 (2000). Similarly, the public’s eye could be refocused on the fact that intellectual property has “historically served as a means to accomplish national welfare objectives,” as opposed to a means to enrich content owners. Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 747 (1996); see also Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1858).

308 If an enterprising strategist were able to frame deviations from the status quo as a “routine commercial exchange,” it is likewise possible that they might diminish the status quo bias. Kahneman, supra note 20, at 294. Use of this bias is, unfortunately, unlikely to be available in this situation, as rights given under law are not commonly viewed as fungible.


311 Carrier, supra note 309, at 54-65.

312 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
used to influence an electorate that is deciding to what extent it will support a legislative proposal. Research relevant to this bias is below-described, and strategic application of this phenomenon in behavioral economics is discussed with regard to framing copyright reform.

A 1995 study addressed the rate of success in encouraging someone to act by alternatively emphasizing losses arising from not acting or gains associated with acting. To this point, the authors looked at inducements employed by credit card companies to encourage inactive cardholders to use their line of credit. The companies sent inactive customers information emphasizing either “gains they can obtain from using the [card] or . . . losses they would suffer from not using it.”

The study found a significant increase in use among customers receiving information about losses associated with non-use, relative to those sent information about the benefits of using their charge account. These increases included greater card usage among non-active customers and a larger number of charges. The disproportionately high rate of influence associated with emphasizing the negative has likewise been found in other studies. This relative over-valuing of avoiding losses is germane to successfully presenting questions associated with copyright policy.

Emphasizing losses to the public domain associated with expansive copyright laws is likely to be a disproportionately successful strategy when attempting to reduce, or avoid enlarging, copyright protections. For example, a slogan such as “avoid losing parts of the public domain” is more likely to succeed than “secure a broader public domain for future generations.” These statements are essentially equal (and both are applicable to calls to reduce copyright protection or to not expand protection), but pursuant to the research above, the former is likely to prove more successful.

\[\text{HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS} 36-37 (2008).\]

313 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 306, at 453.
315 Id.
316 Id. at 14-15.
317 Id. at 14-15.
318 Id.
This approach may be particularly beneficial if tied to the extant property-like perception of copyright discussed in the previous section. As recognized by David Fagundes, property should not be viewed as “coterminous with private property, but instead includes common and public forms of property.”\(^{320}\) Likening the public domain to communal land creates a perception of “property ownership” for all citizens. Consequently, presenting an issue as a potential loss to the public domain may both invoke the status quo bias and the irrational fear of loss. Framing the issue in this way thus increases the public’s willingness to stand against copyright expansion.\(^{321}\)

This strategy assumes that the earlier discussions about educating the population regarding the basic tenets of copyright law (including about the public domain) are successful. With this assumption in hand, framing policy choices in terms of “losses to the public domain” should prove successful (relative to other options). Strategic choices of this nature are of value when faced with significant rational incentives for others to push copyright-expanding legislation.\(^{322}\)

**Conclusion**

This Article is not the final work on the ever-expanding scope of copyright and its interplay with the IP Clause’s utilitarian mandate. Rather, it sets the stage for reform by using several doctrinal means of analysis to investigate why protections afforded by copyright have historically broadened. Novel survey evidence established that the electorate lacks the understanding necessary to realize that its interests in a utilitarian copyright system are not being protected. In conjunction with a judiciary that is unwilling to limit Congress’s actions under the IP Clause, this creates a state of affairs whereby the utilitarian goals of copyright will not be fulfilled absent collective activity to educate the populous and advocate for reform. Suggested avenues to achieve these goals were presented in conclusion.


\(^{321}\) Presenting the public domain as real property-like, of course, should only be used if attempts to defeat the “propertization” of intellectual property are unsuccessful. This approach should, thus, only be used in conjunction with attempts to import real property limitations (e.g., zoning). *See* Carrier, *supra* note 309, at 54-65; Section IV.B.

\(^{322}\) *See supra* Section I.B.